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Abstract 
 
This study  examines Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth 
Movement), from now on the HSU, and aims to be a first scholarly attempt at 
mapping the organisation, strategy, challenges, and significance of this youth-
led and youth-organised social movement. Taking an interpretive approach to 
organisational research, this thesis has used a wide range of primary and 
secondary data, benefited from extensive periods of participant observation as 
well as interviews with a variety of people including movement participants, in 
order to achieve a better understanding of the HSU. 
The main findings that result from this research show that the HSU is 
ideologically an umbrella to a variety of ideologies, from leftist or communists to 
Islamists, and that it chooses to organise informally and uninstitutionally in 
accordance with their political conviction of political parties and traditional 
opposition groups being a tool of social control for the regime. Politically, 
therefore, the movement represents a rupture with traditional politics in the 
country which are perceived by participants as part of a historically constructed 
system for exercising social control. Finally, the movement challenges 
traditional frames of ethnic and religious understandings of social and political 
subjectivities by mobilising a more inclusive discourse that tries to recover the 
debate on class struggle. Its political independence from other actors in the 
Jordanian political scene allows participant to raise more radical claims that 
seek regime removal as well as demands for reform, and these radical 
discourse within the movement greatly depend on the varying political 
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opportunity structure in time determined by the Jordanian regime‘s combination 
of conciliatory and repressive counter-strategies. An analysis of the strategic 
conversation between the regime and the HSU is key to exploring the social 
and political significance of movement strategies in bringing about change in the 
country as it determines the challenges to organisation encountered. However, 
relevant transformations in the culture of activism in Jordan are evident, and 
have the potential to transforming the future of political participation and 
organisation.   
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Introduction Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī; the protagonists of the 
study 
 
 
On Thursday 24th March 2011, an assorted group of young Jordanians gathered 
after the noon prayer on Duwwār Ad-Dākhiliyyai, the roundabout of the Ministry 
of Interior, in the capital city of Amman. Their aim was to organise a sit-in where 
they could express their collective discomfort with the socio-economic situation 
in the country and demand political change. Moreover, they intended to gather 
more people on Friday, a weekend holiday for the majority in Jordan. Duwwār 
Ad-Dākhiliyya is the roundabout or junction in central Amman where the 
Ministry of Interior is located. In Jordan, spaces are chosen by activists to 
facilitate mobilisation or because of their symbolism, and among other symbolic 
spaces where political protests frequently take placeii, youth decided to mobilise 
outside the Ministry of Interior that day.  
Three months into the Arab revolutions, these young Jordanians had 
been leading and organising weekly Friday protests, in different locations, since 
January 2011. Under the banner of ‗yawm al-ghadhab‟ (Day of Anger), these 
actions, although organisationally divided, shared this common sense of anger. 
March 24 was the first time that all these small ‗angry‘ constituencies were 
gathering to do something together, something similar to what young people 
were organising in the region. In line with other regional initiatives, such as the 
6th April Youth Movementiii in Egypt, or the 20th February Youth Movementiv in 
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Morocco, youth had organised this joint sit-in under the name 24th March 
Youthv. The symbolism and significance of the 24th March 2011 event have 
been disputed, and while many outsiders consider it the ‗death‘ of the Arab 
revolutionary period in Jordan (Tarawneh, 2011), participants interviewed for 
this research consider it to signal the starting point of their efforts towards 
organised activism, an effort that later resulted in the creation of Al-Ḥirāk Al-
Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement), the focus of this research 
thesis. 
The 24th March and the period that followed led young activists to realise 
the importance of organisation when facing the strength of other institutionalised 
parties, and the harsh environment they would have to face later. They became 
self-aware of their various backgrounds and of the importance of mobilising a 
common shared will of fighting together in order to organise into a single 
movement. It took them around one year to create an umbrella movement that 
would gather them together. For one of the activists of the movement, Seraj, 
during the following months ‗it became obvious that there was a problem in 
working with the older generations; they think in a different way‘ (AI04-
04.09.13)vi. Seraj, now in his early thirties, is single and works in a bank. 
Although he currently lives in Amman for work, he grew up in the northern city 
of Irbid. He is currently part of the organising members of I‟tihād Al-Shabāb Al-
Dimuqrātī (Union of Democratic Youth), which he defines as a group of young 
people that have secular, leftist and nationalistic convictions, and used to be 
part of the Socialist Left and the Communist Party. In June 2012, these young 
activists‘ organisational efforts resulted in the creation of the HSU.  
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The HSU is a youth-led, youth-organised, informal, uninstitutionalized, 
horizontal, network-like social movement that is re-defining what dissent looks 
like in Jordan today. Seraj explains that it was created and is organised by 
young people that found it necessary to organise ‗a social, youth, political 
framework which talks about us‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Politically and organisationally 
independent, participants of the movement call themselves hirakis, and some of 
them such as Suleyman describe themselves as ‗not linked to any political 
party‘, and their movement as a ‗a youth movement that is simple and 
spontaneous‘ (AI06-05.09.13). Suleyman is a teacher from Sahab, who in his 
early thirties is working on the organisation of HSU. Suleyman started 
organising the local movement of Al-Ḥirāk Sahab before he started working for 
HSU as a joint movement. He prefers not to be presented as being part of any 
specific group within the movement but to be presented as an activist of the 
movement. As well as being active in the HSU, Suleyman is part of the 
Teachers‘ Movement and a member of the Hayyat Al-Markaziyeh li-Nawabat Al-
Mu‟alimīn (the Central Commission for Teachers‘ Union). He met me at the 
Jordanian Writers‘ Association in Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman. 
Seraj and Suleyman, together with other participants form part of the 
HSU. Participants in the HSU are from diverse ideological backgrounds. The 
majority of them ascribe to a leftist political ideology, including socialist and 
communist backgrounds, however the HSU acts as an umbrella to other 
political ideologies that include Islamism. Ideologically what brings them 
together is the fact that they all feel that the political discourse put forward by 
political parties does not represent them, and shared grievances around 
inequality and injustice in Jordan. In terms of education, the majority of 
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participants are university graduates who after their studies find it difficult to find 
a job for which they have been prepared. Therefore, they generally take on 
multiple jobs at the same time in order to make a living, although they share a 
feeling of not being motivated to grow and develop in the jobs that they 
undertake. Although the majority of them participate in professional unions, 
none of them are members of political parties or have any type of affiliation to 
institutional political groups for, as we will develop in this research, they 
consider them to be part of the political establishment that they seek to change.  
Variation between participants of the HSU exists not only in terms of 
ideology, but also in terms of ethnicity, class or gender. Participants are 
ethnically diverse and come from families of Transjordanian as well as 
Palestinian backgrounds. Although the majority of them currently live in the 
capital city Amman because of work or studies, some participants of the HSU 
spent their childhood in other cities across Jordan which include Irbid, Aqaba, 
Kerak or Madaba. Moreover, some of the participants of Palestinian origin grew 
up in different Palestinian refugee camps including Al-Baqaa or Zarqa, where 
they continue taking part in different activities that aim to empower those 
communities in Jordan. In terms of class, we will see that participants come 
from very diverse backgrounds including middle and low-income families. 
Finally, in terms of gender, as we will see in this study, participants of the 
movement are in their majority male, and female participants get involved in 
activities of HSU in the same way as male participants do. 
Seraj points to their ideological, strategic, and organisational 
independence as a fundamental element in their activities, asserting that ‗it was 
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not important for us if our movement was always small in relation to them 
[referring to other opposition actors in Jordan], but we as youth would be able to 
decide whatever we wanted to‘ (AI04-04.09.13). 
 
Aims and questions 
This thesis takes the case of the HSU, and aims to be a first scholarly 
attempt at mapping the organisation, strategy, challenges, and significance of 
this youth-led and youth-organised social movement. 
The first line of inquiry that I pursue seeks to analyse the movement‘s 
mobilising structure and ideology to answer the following overarching question: 
what does youth-led and youth-organised dissent look like in Jordan today? 
This part examines who the activists are, their motivations to participate in the 
movement, their aims, demands and ideology, and the type of mobilising 
structure that has been put into practice by movement activists. This includes 
an analysis of its degree of formality and institutionalisation as well as internal 
links inside this structure. 
The second line of inquiry examines strategies pursued by the 
movement, and answers the following overall analytical question: what 
strategies do activists of the HSU put into practice? Taking this analytical 
question as central, the analysis examines strategic decision-making in the 
movement, and its strategic spectrum, conditioned by each constituency‘s 
conceptualisation of change and activists‘ understandings of how change 
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should be reached. Moreover, the analysis explores the movement‘s mobilising 
structure, the strategic framing processes put forward by movement activists, 
the political opportunity structure, and their relationship to the movement‘s 
strategies.  
The third line of inquiry analyses regime counter-strategies to 
mobilisation of the HSU and answers the question: how has the regime 
responded to this social movement‘s strategies? My research suggests that the 
Jordanian regime has responded to HSU‘s strategies through a well-managed 
counter-strategy built on apparent conciliation and repression in the form of 
harassment and surveillance. These measures have increased challenges to 
mobilisation of the HSU lacking previous organisational experience. 
Finally, the fourth line of inquiry explores the social and political 
significance of the movement for Jordanian politics and society. I will argue that 
the major significance of the movement until now has been an alteration of the 
forms of political action or political expression tolerated by the regime during a 
period of political opening. Having said this, the main limits to the movement‘s 
significance can be found in terms of social resonance or the way in which 
participants of the movement as well as the claims it has put forward have been 
accepted in the Jordanian society. As we will see, the limits to the social 
resonance of the activities of the HSU suggest limits to the success of its 
strategic framing processes. 
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Academic rationale 
The present exploratory research on HSU seeks to contribute to 
knowledge at both an empirical and a conceptual level. The case study is 
situated within the broader body of academic literature on youth, youth 
organisations and their role during the Arab Spring since 2011. The experience 
and discourses constructed by young people in the Arab World are analytically 
relevant as they are the largest constituency in these societies, characterised by 
a ‗youth bulge‘, and their ‗experience of growing up is qualitatively different from 
that of their parents‘ (Anderson, 2015 p. 51).  
Before presenting the literature on youth and social movements in the 
Arab Spring, it is relevant to present at this point the way in which literature has 
explored the construction of identities and discourses among Arab youth prior to 
the Arab Spring. Several key contributions provide insightful analyses. One of 
the main contributions to the knowledge on collective action in the Middle 
East until the Arab Spring has been Asef Bayat, who has undertaken leading 
empirical research that provides insight into forms of activism and strategies 
pursued mainly by urban grass-roots to defend their rights and improve their 
lives (2002, 2003, 2000).  Until 2010, Bayat‘s focus was not on social 
movements but he was the only academic that contributed to the knowledge on 
forms of action and strategies in this period. Bayat has later introduced the 
concept of ‗nonmovements‘ which, although briefly mentioned in former 
publications, he fully developed in 2010. Bayat defines social nonmovements as 
‗the collective endeavors of millions of noncollective actors, carried out in the 
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main squares, back streets, court houses, or communities‘ (2010 p. ix) and 
distinguishes them from social movements in that they ‗enjoy significant, 
consequential elements of social movements; yet they constitute distinct 
entities‘ (2010 p. 14). Although not explicitly talking about social 
movements, Bayat‘s analysis aims to contribute, by studying the Middle East, to 
debates on social movements and social change (2010 p. x).  
Interestingly, Bayat talks about repression, forms of practice, and 
strategies in social nonmovements. In terms of repression, this authors looks at 
the way in which ‗social and political movements keep up when authoritarian 
regimes exhibit a great intolerance towards organized activism‘ and when 
repression has been ‗a hallmark of most Middle Eastern states‘ (2010 p. 2). The 
author explains that ‗certain distinct and unconventional forms of agency and 
activism have emerged in the region that do not get adequate attention, 
because they do not fit into our prevailing categories and 
conceptual imaginations‘ and looks at some of these unconventional forms of 
agency and activism to ‗raise a number of theoretical and methodological 
questions as to how to look at the notions of agency and change in the Muslim 
Middle East today‘ (2010 p. 3). In this line of argument made by Bayat for what 
he defines as social nonmovements, my research looks at forms of organisation 
of the HSU in order to analyse the way in which repressive state strategies 
affect strategies and organisation of social movements that challenge the 
political system. I do so in order to show the way in which, for example, 
‗surveillance and secrecy disrupt free communication and open debate within a 
movement, leading either to fragmentation of aims and expectations— a recipe 
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for discord and sedition— or to outright authoritarian tendencies and a cult of 
leadership‘ (2010 p. 11).   
Forms of practice in nonmovements are another level of analysis in 
which forms of collective action in the MENA have been analysed by Bayat. 
According to this author, practice in nonmovements tends to be ‗action-oriented 
rather than ideologically driven, quiet rather than audible‘ since claims ‗are 
made largely individually rather than by united groups‘. In nonmovements 
‗actors directly practice what they claim, despite government sanctions‘ and 
practices ‗are merged into […] the ordinary practices of everyday life‘. 
For Bayat, the ‗power of nonmovements rests on the power of big numbers, that 
is, the consequential effect on norms and rules in society of many people 
simultaneously doing similar, though contentious, things‘ (2010 pp. 19-20).   
In terms of strategies, Bayat presents ‗quiet encroachment‘ as the main 
strategy in Middle Eastern societies ‗as a prevalent strategy that gives the urban 
grass roots some power over their own lives and influence over state policy‘ 
(2010 p. 68). For this author, quiet encroachment is ‗quiet, largely atomized, 
and prolonged mobilization with episodic collective action— open and fleeting 
struggles without clear leadership, ideology, or structured organization‘ (2010 p. 
90). Bayat‘s analysis is relevant for my research because it analyses forms of 
social practice in the region. However, this analysis focuses on nonmovements, 
leaving a clear gap of knowledge on the practices and organization of social 
movements in the region, which this analysis completely oversees. The forms of 
quiet action and nonmovements that are the focus of Bayat correspond to a 
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period preceding 2011 in the MENA region during which forms of resistance to 
power and collective action were not outspoken as they became after 2011.  
Bayat in his study situates youth together with the urban dispossessed, 
Muslim women, and other urban grass-roots, coming to form what this author 
defines as ‗the subaltern‘ (2010 p. ix). For Bayat, youth is ‗a collective challenge 
whose central goal consists of defending and extending youth habitus— 
defending and extending the conditions that allow the young to assert their 
individuality, creativity, and lightness and free them from anxiety over the 
prospect of their future‘ and curbing or controlling it ‗is likely to trigger youth 
dissent‘ in different expressions and claims, which will determine if youth 
engages in a youth movement or in a nonmovement (2010 pp. 17-18). This 
author looks at youth and ‗the transforming or, in particular, 
democratizing effects of youth nonmovements‘ that partly depend ‗on the 
capacity of adversarial regimes or states to accommodate youthful claims‘ 
(2010 p. 19).   
However, the focus on youth is preoccupied with ‗new social norms, 
religious practices, cultural codes, and values‘ that the youth can bring about in 
youth nonmovements which are ‗characterized less by what the young 
do (networking, organizing, deploying resources, mobilizing) than by how they 
are (in behaviors, outfits, ways of speaking and walking, in private and public 
spaces). The identity of a youth nonmovement is based not as much on 
collective doing as on collective being; and the forms of their expression are 
less collective protest than collective presence‟ (2010 p. 120). 
Although Bayat looks at youth as a social group capable of taking action and 
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bringing about change, this research contributes to the knowledge on youth 
social movements, where what the youth do in terms of organisation and 
mobilisation acquires predominance. 
Another relevant contribution to the analysis of youth in Muslim majority 
and minority societies in the context of globalisation and modernity is the 
collective volume edited by Linda Herrera and Asef Bayat, Being Young and 
Muslim: New Cultural Politics in the Global South and North (2010). Through its 
numerous essays, this collective volume addresses the diverse forms of political 
socialisation among Muslim youth. The essays address first, the way in which 
experiences of political socialisation result in different forms of political dissent 
and ways in which Muslim youth aim to reclaim youthfulness in countries such 
as Morocco, Saudi Arabia Palestine or Egypt. As well as addressing the Politics 
of Dissent, essays included in this collective volume analyse the ways in which 
Muslim youth strive for citizenship in Muslim minority societies such as France, 
Germany or the Netherlands. The analyses included in these essays look at 
different spaces where Muslim youth actively construct their identities. Overall 
this volume contributes to understanding the diversity of forms of political 
socialisation among Muslim youth in comparative perspective. 
Of particular interest within this edited volume for studies on youth social 
movements in the Middle East is Asef Bayat‘s chapter titled ‗Muslim Youth and 
the Claim for Youthfulness‘ (2010). This chapter points to the problematic 
construction of Muslim youth‘s political imaginations whether as radical 
Islamists or democratic reformers. The second interesting discussion presented 
by Bayat in this chapter is the way in which a distinction should be made 
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between the way in which we construct the concept of ‗young people‘ and 
‗youth‘. For this author, the distinction should be that the former is constructed 
as an age category and the latter as a social category. Bayat considers that 
making this distinction would help realise that youth movements are not about 
political change but about ‗claiming youthfulness‘, which the author defines as a 
social place between childhood and adulthood during which particular 
behavioural and cognitive dispositions come into play. Moreover, in 
understanding youth movements as essentially about ‗claiming youthfulness‘, 
Bayat argues that their efficacy will depend on the ‗capacity of adversaries –
both political and moral authority– to accommodate the claims of youthfulness‘ 
(2010 p. 28). Bayat argues that ‗a discussion of the experience of youth in the 
Muslim Middle East, where moral and political authority impose a high degree of 
social control over the young, can offer valuable insights into conceptualizing 
youth and youth movements‘ (2010 p. 28).  
As well as Bayat‘s insightful contribution to the study of collective action 
and strategy in the MENA region prior to the Arab Spring, Ragui Assad and 
Farzaneh Roudi-Fahimi contribute to the discussion around youth in their article 
‗Youth in the Middle East and North Africa: Demographic Opportunity or 
Challenge?‘ (2009). In this work, the authors discuss the youth bulge as a 
challenge or an opportunity for the MENA region by including a discussion of 
the nature of the region‘s youth, which includes socio-economic indicators such 
as unemployment and education. Assad and Roudi-Fahimi‘s article concludes, 
already prior to 2011, that ‗political, economic and social reforms that could 
encourage greater participation of MENA‘s youth in society are long overdue‘ 
(2009 p. 7).  
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Youth has been identified in the academic conversation on the Arab 
Spring as a new generation of actors in social movements and collective action. 
Several insightful contributions to the role of youth organisations during the 
Arab Spring help us situate the case of the HSU as one that is analytically 
situated as part of broader trans-national social dynamics in Middle Eastern 
societies. Several volumes have provided insightful comparative analyses on 
social dynamics in the region during the Arab Spring and situate youth activists 
and organisations at the centre of the story in academic literature. In the book 
The People Want. Gilbert Achcar provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
roots of the Arab Spring, particularly in relation to the political situation, but 
more extensively to the economic variables that have led to dramatic social 
consequences, including poverty, inequality, precarity, informal sector growth, 
and unemployment (Achcar, 2013). Throughout this analysis, Achcar identifies 
the actors and dynamics in the Arab Spring. These include social and political 
movements, new youth actors and their innovative use of communications tools, 
as well as states and state apparatuses and their role in determining the 
development of revolutions. The focus of this book is on revolutions during the 
Arab Spring, and focuses on these elements in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, 
Yemen, Bahrain, Libya and Syria. 
Marc Lynch‘s edited volume also engages in a multilevel examination of 
the Arab Spring. Throughout different chapters, contributors to The Arab 
Uprisings Explained examine a diversity of elements including 
counterrevolution, media, diffusion and demonstrations. Moreover, this book 
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explores multiple actors in the Arab Spring across the region, including the role 
of states, bankers, Arab militaries, Islamist movements, and labour movements. 
Among the arguments put forward, this volume stresses the distinctive role of 
youth, characterised as self-aware and self-identified actors, in shaping and 
driving these events (Lynch, 2014 p. 9). The analysis portrays youth activists as 
clear agents of the uprisings, and points to grievances that affect this mainly 
urban social group across the region such as underemployment.   
Following the comparative approaches of the volumes of Achcar and 
Lynch, Fawaz Gerges in his edited volume The New Middle East goes a step 
further and aims to highlight connections between individual regional case 
studies and systemic conditions throughout the Middle East (Gerges, 2015). 
Gerges argues that ‗a psychological and epistemological rupture has occurred 
in the Arab Middle East that has shaken the authoritarian order to its very 
foundation and introduced a new language and a new era of contentious politics 
and revolutions‘ (2015 p. 1). For Gerges, this rupture is brought about by the 
expression of new stories and new narratives of resistance, hope and 
determination that include crisis of political authority, failure of economic 
development, and new genres of mobilisation and activism, particularly youth 
movements. 
Through personal stories and direct accounts from Arab youth, the book 
Arab Spring Dreams presents their experiences with the region‘s laws and 
cultural mores, which later served for the appearance of widespread youthful 
dissent. This volume is a collection of individual youth voices that represent the 
new generation that ‗inspired bursts of nonviolent, popular uprisings‘ and 
28 
 
‗shattered stereotypes by leading dignified struggles in the face of 
overwhelming repression‘ (Ahmari and Weddady, 2012 pp. 1-2). The book is a 
comprehensive overview of the experiences of youth prior to the Arab Spring 
that describes the atmosphere that led to the Arab Spring, and places youth as 
the central voices of the story.  
In line with Ahmari and Weddady‘s volume, the book Voices of the Arab 
Spring also collects the personal stories of mainly youth voices from Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya and Yemen (Al-Saleh, 2015). In this work and through the 
selection of stories for the book, Al-Saleh places youth at the centre of the Arab 
Spring‘s social movements by asserting that ‗the organising force behind this 
string of revolutions was primarily young Arabs who were technologically savvy, 
politically deprived, and unmoved by the antiquated rhetoric of their rulers 
masquerading as tributes to the people‘ (2015 p. 2). The book brings together 
youth‘s personal and collective motivations to engage in collective action and 
organisation against their regimes. 
Finally, a group of contributions by Lisa Anderson and Holger Albrecht 
seek to open space for the discussion around political opposition dynamics 
under authoritarian settings, arguing around the importance of the repressive 
authoritarian nature of the political context to understanding participation in the 
Middle East. On one hand, Lisa Anderson‘s chapter ‗Authoritarian Legacies and 
Regime Change‘ analyses the dimensions of resistance and rebellion in 
authoritarian regimes, and aims to show how dissatisfaction and unhappiness 
matter for the outcome of the process of political change in today‘s Arab world 
(Anderson, 2015 p. 50). Despite the diverse development of protest in each 
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country during the Arab Spring, Anderson highlights common themes in this 
development including access to information, youth empowerment, demands for 
citizenship or corruption (2015 pp. 51-3). Throughout her exploration of the 
effects of authoritarian regimes on protest and dissent, Anderson addresses the 
challenges posed by regimes on youth organisations during the Arab Spring. 
She explains that ‗the authority these young rebels confronted – the knowledge 
they acquired and the problems they tackled in the aftermath of the uprisings – 
were very different from country to country; the varied legacies of different kinds 
of authoritarianism shaped the opportunities and challenges of change in 
dramatic ways‘ (Anderson, 2015 p. 43).  
Anderson‘s line of argumentation follows the argument posed by Albrecht 
in the chapter ‗The Nature of Political Participation‘ included in the edited 
volume Political Participation in the Middle East and North Africa. In this 
chapter, Albrecht argues that the concept of participation ‗is critical to a 
comprehensive understanding of state-society relationships in this region‘ (2008 
p. 15). In order to fully understand political participation in the Middle East and 
North Africa, this author considers that the ‗regime type is an important aspect 
that needs to be taken into account more often in order to identify the 
peculiarities of sources, channels, aims, and effectiveness of political 
participation and the differences that distinguish one case from the other‘ 
(Albrecht, 2008 p. 29).  
Furthermore, Albrecht continues building on this discussion focusing on 
the case of Egypt in the book Raging Against the Machine: Political Opposition 
under Authoritarianism in Egypt (2013).In this work, Albrecht seeks to 
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disentangle the ‗empirical puzzle about the opposition‘s role when it comes to 
fully understanding authoritarianism under Mubarak‘ (2013 p. xviii). Through an 
exploration of other established opposition parties in Egypt, including political 
parties, and parliamentarians, human rights NGOs, a powerful Islamic 
movement, and a cohort of independent intellectuals, Albrecht‘s work provides 
an insightful analysis of the way in which these political groups established 
within an authoritarian political context determine the nature of participation in 
the country during the Egyptian revolution. The present research aims to 
contribute on this academic conversation opened by Albrecht and Anderson 
and to exploring the way in which the Jordanian regime has challenged the 
organisation of the HSU, thereby seeking to contribute to the understanding of 
the opportunity structure in Jordan, and moreover to enriching the literature on 
the structures of opportunity for these youth organisations across the Middle 
East. 
 
As well as these comparative analyses on the Arab Spring, several 
volumes dedicated to analysing social dynamics during this period of contention 
in other cases provide richness to the academic conversation on youth 
mobilisation in the Middle East. Among them, the book edited by Bahgat Korany 
and Rabab El-Mahdi, Arab Spring in Egypt, focuses on the period of contention 
in Egypt as it developed around Tahrir Square to explore group dynamics and 
state-society relations (Korany and El-Mahdi, 2012). The overarching themes 
addressed in the volume, which the editors argue to be representative of 
regional trends, are authoritarian resilience; group dynamics in Tahrir as the 
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embodiment of a protest in its own right, including labour, youth, Islamist, and 
women‘s groups; and external factors that influenced the internal dynamics of 
the revolution. Dina Shehata‘s contribution to this edited volume explores the 
dynamics of youth movements in Egypt. In her chapter ‗Youth Movements and 
the 25 January Revolution‘, Shehata examines the role of youth movements 
and youth activists in the unfolding of the Egyptian Revolution (Shehata, 2012). 
In this analysis, the role played by youth activists and youth movements is 
argued to be critical in creating revolutionary conditions in Egypt as they were 
instrumental in the emergence of new modes of mobilisation and discourses.  
In line with Shehata‘s empirical analysis of Egyptian youth movements 
during the Arab Spring, further academic contributions have aimed to provide 
in-depth analyses on specific youth movements similar to the HSU in other 
countries. The article ‗Moroccan Youth and the Forming of a New Generation‘ 
by Thierry Desrues provides an in-depth and empirically rich sociological 
exploration of organisational dynamics among Moroccan youth during the Arab 
Spring (2012). In this article, the author argues that ‗the new generation 
emerging in Morocco is more than a mere product of the present historic 
moment‘ and that it is distinct from previous generations (2012 p. 23). Desrues 
observes discontinuities in the family sphere, in the greater education capital 
present in youth, in the new forms of cultural expression or socio-political 
activism, in the use of new information and communication technologies or in 
the evolving conceptions of religion (2012 p. 24). The youth movement in 
Morocco ‗has brought together young people without activist experience and 
activists of diverse ideological leanings with a long trajectory of protests 
sparring the past decade‘ (2012 p. 24). The dynamics put forward in this article 
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for Moroccan youth allow us to situate the study of the HSU as part of greater 
regional youth organisation trends, particularly in terms of internal organization 
and structure. 
Desrues explores strategies of youth in Morocco in relation to the regime 
and explains that the strategies of ‗self-exclusion from the reform process and 
the incapacity of the movement to increase the size of its ranks has reduced its 
ability to influence change and has trapped it in a logic of protest and defiance 
instead of leading it towards a strategy of proposal‘ (Desrues, 2012 p. 35). Here 
once again, strategies presented for the youth movement in Morocco in relation 
to the state, as well as the way these strategies have affected the development 
of the movement into this trap of responsiveness and reaction to the regime 
instead of moving towards a horizontal and social strategy of mobilisation could 
be useful to analyse the strategies present in the HSU. Desrues‘ piece confirms 
the relevance of studying the formation of this ‗sociological generation‘ through 
the study of youth social movements in other cases in the region such as the 
HSU. 
Similarly to Desrues, Khalid Mustafa Medani explores the organisational 
dynamics in the Sudanese grassroots youth organization Girifna (We Are Fed 
Up) (2013). In his article ‗Between Grievances and State Violence: Sudan‘s 
Youth Movement and Islamist Activism Beyond the ―Arab Spring‖‘, Medani 
presents the movement as one that includes the whole ideological spectrum, 
and that remains independent from other political opposition actors. Girifna is a 
movement that is ‗distinctly averse to the promotion of a particular ideology and 
includes young people from across the political spectrum‘ (Medani, 2013). As 
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well as being ideologically inclusive, participants of the Sudanese youth 
movement have sought to ‗bridge the gap between Arabised tribes and 
Darfurians resident in central Sudan‘ as they perceive that these ethnic 
divisions deter the development of collective action in Sudan. Moreover, Medani 
highlights the fact that participants of this movement do not consider the 
Islamist-secular divide as the greatest challenge for the movement, and try to 
reintroduce more pressing issues related to class and regional divides into their 
discourse.  
As well as analysing the movement internally, Medani looks into external 
variables and the way in which the movement organises in a context of 
‗increasing repression by the state, including tightened surveillance, 
extrajudicial detention, sexual assault of male and female leaders, and torture‘. 
As a result of this threatening context, movement activists concentrate on 
‗raising political awareness and harnessing shared grievances about state 
repression and socio-economic crisis‘. The Sudanese youth movement Girifna 
is mindful of the weaknesses of the traditional political parties, which they see 
as ‗factions pursuing particularistic political interests‘. For Medani, the case of 
Sudan demonstrates that the strategic interaction between the movement and 
the state is in itself what determines the development of youth movement 
strategies and action.  
Shehata, Desrues and Medani‘s studies on youth movements in Egypt, 
Morocco and Sudan allow us to situate this study the HSU as part of youth 
organisational efforts during the Arab Spring. Through these in-depth empirical 
studies we identify regional trends in youth movements, both internally and 
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externally, to which this study contributes. Internally in terms of organisation and 
ideology, we see that youth movements in the region are ideologically inclusive, 
shifting ideological dynamics in previous generations which build their political 
discourse around ethnic and identity divisions and take form in traditional 
political parties. Activists in these youth movements are building a new 
discourse for change that does not rely on traditional ethnic understandings of 
the way in which these societies are structures, but that try to reintroduce a 
discourse on class struggle and inequality.  
As well as internal organisational and ideological trends in youth 
movements, these analyses describe a trend in the challenges that youth 
movements face in the region. Without forgetting the political heterogeneity in 
the region, and being aware of the different political characteristics in each 
case, these studies allow us to identify that there is a trend by which repression 
is being exercised in similar forms on these other movements. As well as 
repression, another external characteristic that appears when comparing these 
cases is the fact that these youth movements strategically decide to remain 
independent from other opposition actors, particularly political parties. There is 
a shared feeling among young activists who participate in these movements on 
the weaknesses of these parties in bringing about change, and a shared 
perception of political parties being part of a national struggle for particularistic 
political interests. These studies present the interaction between youth social 
movements and the contentious political context in which they organise in a way 
that is similar to the trends that this research explores in the case of Jordan, 
allowing for broader arguments on the way in which this case study is part of a 
wider conversation on youth movements at a regional level.  
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It is surprising that, while the role of youth-led and youth-organised 
movements has been central for many analyses of the Arab revolutions 
regionally, in the case of Jordan it has been greatly understudied. The 
experiences and discourses of youth activists in the HSU highlight several 
socio-political transformations that are significant to explaining national 
transformations. Examining and analysing these discourses in this study seeks 
to be an initial contribution to completing the picture provided by important 
academic research in the region and in Jordan. Incorporating an exhaustive and 
in-depth examination of the HSU will help us to point to several lines of 
significance that might be helpful to shed light on a changing social and political 
reality in the country. 
Several recent insightful contributions to the study of collective action in 
Jordan intend to provide an overall approach to studying activism, protest and 
contentious politics. Notable is the work of Larzilliere on Activism in Jordan 
(2015), which provides an exploration of motivations, ideologies and careers of 
activists under the exclusionary Jordanian political system, both before and 
after the Arab Spring. Her aim is to show how opposition movements have 
shifted from the underground before 1989 to a heavily controlled public sphere. 
This publication provides insight into the importance of Jordan as a stabilizing 
factor in the contemporary Middle East.  
As well as this volume dedicated to Jordan, other edited volumes have 
included chapters on Jordan that contribute to understanding contentious 
politics in the country. Among them we can note the contribution of Debruyne 
and Parker who situate protests in Jordan at the beginning of 2011 as 
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‗responding to very real changes that had been brought about by more than a 
decade of rapid and dramatic neoliberal restructuring‘ (Debruyne and Parker, 
2015 p. 437). Their exploration of these events mirroring other regional efforts 
traces protest dynamics back in time to the start of the 2000s to rightly present 
them as the result of sustained efforts at organizing undertaken by many other 
social actors in preceding years. 
 Several other academic contributions have contributed to the knowledge 
on contentious politics and protest in Jordan through different dimensions. 
Among them, Schwedler presents an insightful systematic look at protests in 
Jordan over the years in regard to the dimensions of law, space, and 
spectacle(2012b) exploring these three variables since the 1950s to present 
protest as a recurring dynamic in authoritarian Jordan. In another article, this 
author explores the political geography of protest in neoliberal Jordan 
Schwedler (2012a) where she presents Jordan as a case where new strategies 
of non-democratic governance are emerging, and explores the expanding 
neoliberal economic reforms to shed light on broad dynamics of protest and 
contention.  
Analyses on Jordan during the Arab revolutions have mainly focused on 
the role of existing political actors ‗well integrated into Jordan‘s political 
landscape‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 7) and the political opposition and reform coalitions 
they establish in this period between them (Ryan, 2011b). These major political 
actors include urban intellectuals, tribal elements, or the Islamic Action Front 
(IAF), the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood (Barany, 2012). Other 
contributions have explored the specific role of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
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Jordan during this period of contention(Bondokji, 2015) particularly analysing 
the internal crisis in the organisation and the need for it to reform in a changing 
and challenging national and regional context. Finally, other organisations that 
have been studied in Jordan during this period are professional associations 
(Larzillière, 2012), which are presented as alternative contentious arenas that 
appeared in this period which are characterised by having an ambivalent role 
between challenging and integrated positions.  
Within this insightful literature on the latest period of contention and 
activism in Jordan, in-depth exploration of specific dynamics within movements 
in Jordan in this period can be found in Ababneh‘s contribution to understanding 
the role of women in the Jordanian Day-Waged Labour Movement (2016). In 
the same way as the Jordanian Al-Ḥirāk Ash-Shabābī (Youth Movement), the 
Jordanian Day-Waged Labour Movement (DWLM) played a central role during 
this period. In her article, Ababneh‘s contribution provides an extensive 
exploration of the active and leading role of women within this movement. 
Through the analysis of discourse and structure of this movement, her study 
provides important lessons about the way in which the movement understood 
women to be embedded within communities, prioritizing their economic needs, 
and about gender-inclusive political and institutional reform. 
The present research follows the line of Ababneh‘s in-depth ethnographic 
research and intends to build on this academic literature providing an 
exhaustive exploration of the HSU as an umbrella organisation that gathered 
scattered youth dissent groups in the Jordanian context of activism and 
contentious politics. Analyses that have addressed young activists‘ 
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organisational efforts highlight their weaknesses due to their lack of experience. 
Jordanian youth is presented as ‗politically aware, knowledgeable of their rights, 
Internet savvy, and unafraid to raise issues without inhibition‘ but with the 
weakness of a lack of ‗political organisation‘ (Ottaway and Muasher, 2011 p. 
10). This organisational inexperience has been said to lead youth to ‗draw on 
the organisation and logistical experience of organised parties in order to 
generate public support for their demonstrations, even as they remain 
independent organisations‘ (Ryan, 2011b p. 387). Few authors, among them 
Yom, have actually briefly mentioned the fact that it was ‗youth activists rather 
than formal organizations (including the Muslim Brotherhood) [who] led the 
charge against dictatorship‘ (Yom, 2013 p. 133), something that Jordan shares 
with other regional countries. 
In this activist context, the present thesis contributes to knowledge of 
social movements in Jordan by exploring the HSU, the only youth-led and 
youth-organised movement in Jordan which ‗includes some of the most active 
political organizers in the country‘ (2014e p. 74). Ideologically, the movement is 
an umbrella to a variety of ideologies, from leftist or communists to Islamists. 
Although the majority label their ideology as leftist, socialist, communist, or 
nationalist, there are also a few Islamists. Hassan, activist in his late twenties, 
who was part of Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-Islāmī (the Islamist Youth Movement) 
and then left, was part of the Jordanian Youth Parliament initiative at the time of 
our interview. From Amman, and living in Jabal Natheef, Hassan is a video 
producer who had a very important role in documenting the activities of HSU. 
We meet in Jadal, a Culture Centre in the neighbourhood of Jabal Lweibdeh, for 
a coffee at the end of September 2014. Hassan explains that Islamists in the 
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HSU ‗are the Islamists that we can call ―defectors‖ of the Muslim Brotherhood‘ 
(AI20-29.09.14). 
In the words of activists, such as Seraj, their goals include ‗social 
equality‘ (AI04-04.09.13) and Suleyman adds that they mobilise for ‗a country 
that is free and has its own choice and fights for its decisions‘ (AI06-05.09.13) at 
an economic and at a political level. Khaled, single 22-year old activist that grew 
up and lives in Marka Shamaliya in Amman, meets me at Cafe de Paris in 
Amman‘s Jabal Lweibdeh neighbourhood for a beer on a warm Saturday 
afternoon in August 2013. Having recently completed his Master‘s degree in 
Sociology, Khaled is now part of the political group Tandīm Al Taghīr wa Al 
Taḥrīr, which translates into English as the Organisation for Change and 
Freedom and is part of the HSU. He has also started joining I‟tihād Al-Shabāb 
Al-Dimuqrātī (Union of Democratic Youth) in some of the recent meetings and 
activities of HSU. According to Khaled, their motivation to act and get involved 
in this uprising in Jordan was mainly social, seeing that ‗there is a clear social 
injustice‘ (AI02-24.08.13), to which Suleyman adds that what motivates him is a 
feeling that they ‗have to fight for any right that has been stolen‘ (AI06-
05.09.13). Khaled identifies this social situation of injustice ‗with the capitalist 
economy and it is related to the tyrannical authority in this country‘ (AI02-
24.08.13). Suleyman continues explaining that it is about regaining ‗freedoms at 
a national level, taking back the treasures and resources of the country, 
recovering the will of the people, so people have will and opinion on anything 
that is decided‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
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As well as the movement‘s ideology, this thesis will explore the 
movement‘s organisation and the type of mobilising structure chosen by 
movement activists —informal, non-institutional, network-like— and analyse a) 
the rationale behind choosing this type of structure, and b) the strengths and 
limits of this structure in the Jordanian context. The HSU chooses to organise 
informally and uninstitutionally in accordance with their political conviction of 
political parties and traditional opposition groups being a tool of social control 
for the regime.  
The movement is informal and uninstitutionalized, without links with other 
opposition actors that have ‗relations with the regime, relations with authorities‘, 
which gives them ideological, strategic, and organisational independence. As 
Seraj explained during his interview ‗it was not important for us if our movement 
was always small in relation to them, but we as youth would be able to decide 
whatever we wanted to‘ (AI04-04.09.13). The movement is formed of 
constituencies that are loosely organised as a network. These constituencies 
are volatile, they frequently disappear, reappear, merge, and change name. 
Activists of the movement move from one constituency to another, and some of 
them consider themselves ‗independent‘, or not linked to any particular 
constituency but to the movement as a whole.  
Politically, the movement represents a rupture with traditional politics in 
the country, including disagreements with all political parties, from the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF) to the political parties of the traditional left. Activists of the 
HSU are ‗youth who very often identify with neither the state nor its traditional 
opposition forces‘ (Ryan, 2011b p. 385). Party system and traditional political 
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opposition groups —of the whole ideological spectrum— are perceived as a 
historically constructed system for exercising social control. It is the only 
movement in Jordan that is independent from political parties and from the 
traditional opposition structure. This has made them become ‗the most 
controversial‘ movement in the country (2014e p. 74). In the words of 
Suleyman: 
‗We try to find a third way, different from the leftist and nationalist political 
parties, and the Muslim Brotherhood. This third way is under the name of 
‗youth movement‘, which is not in line with any of the traditional 
ideologies, neither leftist, nor nationalist or Islamist‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
Finally, the thesis will argue that the HSU is the only movement that 
challenges traditional frames of ethnic and religious understandings of social 
and political subjectivities. In Jordan, multiple identities have been deployed 
historically, and reinforced through different episodes of conflict. These have 
resulted in current social fragmentation along several lines, including ethnical 
(Transjordanian/Palestinian-Jordanian), religious (Muslim, Christian, secular), 
urban/rural, class, or gender. Traditional political opposition parties and 
movements, including their ‗child‘ youth movementsvii, are still working with 
these ethnic and religious frames (Jordanian-Jordanian, Palestinian-Jordanian, 
Islamist, tribal, etc.), however the HSU is trying to challenge these traditional 
frames by mobilising a more inclusive discourse. 
Academic literature on this period of contention in Jordan tends to 
present this period in Jordan as one where claims demanded reform and did not 
confront the Jordanian regime. Accounts stress that regional protests were 
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copied in Jordan, however in the form of ‗peaceful demonstrations, marches, 
and rallies –starting with protests against corruption, police brutality, and high 
food prices‗(Anderson, 2015 p. 50).In this case, episodes of collective action 
have been said to have escalated to calls for changes in governments 
(Anderson, 2015 p. 50). 
While there has been a prevalence of reformist demands in Jordan, the 
HSU provides an exception to this picture. Indeed it forces us to rethink the 
claims that are being made in Jordan and the accounts of the lack of radical or 
revolutionary demands (Ottaway and Muasher, 2011), and that ‗no one publicly 
suggested abolishing the monarchy‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 8). This supposed lack of 
radicals has been said to be due to the king‘s legitimacy and social support 
(Ottaway and Muasher, 2011 p. 9), and to the king as the ‗thread that holds a 
divided country together‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 10), a ‗security blanket‘ (Ottaway and 
Muasher, 2011 p. 9), or more with a ‗fear of the alternative rather than any deep 
appreciation for Abdullah himself‘ (Hamid and Freer, 2011 p. 4). 
Youth are depicted as having ‗moderated their demands, focusing on 
how their kings should govern rather than whether they should rule in the first 
place‘ (Yom and Gause, 2012 p. 80). This statement goes in line with 
aforementioned arguments that present Jordan as a reformist set of events, 
rather than a revolutionary struggle. Only one author acknowledges the 
existence of radical, revolutionary demands among youth in Jordan, and the 
subsequent repression they suffered. Yom explains that ‗by mid-2011, young 
protesters were defying arrest threats by calling for the regime‘s downfall and 
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comparing King Abdullah to the recently deposed Egyptian dictator Hosni 
Mubarak‘ (Yom, 2013 p. 133). 
The HSU is the only movement in Jordan in which we find radical voices, 
meaning claims that seek regime removal and not just reform. As explained by 
Khaled during his interview at Cafe de Paris, ‗the issue is not about reforming; 
it‘s not about taking something and changing its form. It is about flipping the 
table. It is about changing from the root. It is the change so the people can live 
a decent life, specifically, the poor people‘ (AI02-24.08.13). Given its structural 
independence, and its complete lack of institutionalisation, movement activists 
are completely outside of the scope of control of the regime. This gives them 
the space and the ability to have radical voices and put forward radical 
demands. Other youth movements, such as the aforementioned ‗child‘ youth 
movements linked to other traditional opposition constituencies, are controlled 
or partly institutionalised into the system. This mechanism of social control 
provided by traditional opposition parties prevents youth from radicalising. 
Moreover, this thesis presents trends of radicalisation and de-radicalisation of 
youth‘s demands inside the HSU. These trends of radicalisation and de-
radicalisation of demands have depended on the varying political opportunity 
structure and the changing forms of repression and levels of threat in time, 
exercised through legislation, harassment, or imprisonment that activists of the 
youth movement were mobilising under. 
Turning to the regime‘s counter-strategies, there has been a special 
focus by media and academics on conciliatory measures taken by the regime, 
such as constitutional amendments, government reshuffles, reform committees, 
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or elections (municipal and parliamentary). Few analyses have had a positive 
comment for measures put forward by the regime, although some portrayed 
them as ‗a first step in the right direction‘ (Muasher, 2011). The majority have 
been cautious evaluating them as ‗limited political reform‘ and ‗nonexistent‘ 
economic reform (Ottaway and Muasher, 2011 p. 12) justified, for example, by 
an under-developed party system, in which ‗political parties need to develop‘ 
before the king can announce that the prime minister will be elected (Ottaway 
and Muasher, 2011 p. 8). 
Other more critical accounts describe the Jordanian regime‘s response to 
the Arab revolutions as ‗insufficient‘ (Pelham, 2011), where ‗manipulation, co-
option, and minor concessions [have been] masked as major reforms‘ (Barany, 
2012 p. 27), projecting ‗willingness to compromise and carefully calibrate the 
actions of their coercive agencies to avoid the clumsy overreaction of some 
other rulers in the region‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 27). Furthermore, Hamid and Freer 
portray regime moves in Jordan as a set of ‗top-down reforms‘ based on 
‗political parties and electoral laws‘ which according to the authors are 
‗increasingly beside the point‘; the point for them is ‗the way in which parliament 
is elected‘, and structural problems such as ‗the grossly unequal distribution of 
power between elected institutions and those that remain unelected – the 
monarchy, the royal court, the prime minister, and the cabinet‘ (2011 pp.3-4). 
Repression in regime counter-strategies to mobilisation has been 
recognised in short analyses of the crackdown on dissent as an overarching 
dynamic in Jordan (Bishop, 2014) and reports that monitor the tightening grip on 
activism (Su, 2013). More in-depth reporting of repressive strategies towards 
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activists has mainly been reported by Human Rights Watch (HRW) in short 
electronic articles. This repression has reportedly taken place towards youth 
activists as well as to leaders of other traditional opposition groups and 
journalists and include restricting freedom of expression (2011b, 2012a, 2013a, 
2013d, 2014a, 2014b); attacks on protestors (2011c, 2014c); imprisonment of 
activists (2012b, 2012c, 2012f, 2013c); torturing activists in prisons (2011a, 
2012d, Coogle, 2013); trials in the State Security Court (2012g, 2012e, 2013b); 
and under the Terrorist Law (2014d). These reports, although valuable for 
raising awareness about episodes of repression in general, lack deeper 
analysis or evaluation of who was being affected more by repression and the 
way in which repression varied in time. 
To address the neglect, the study of the HSU will examine both 
strategies of repression as well as conciliation, and the way they are interlinked. 
It is necessary to evaluate to what extent apparent conciliatory measures were 
positive for the HSU, and to what extent they were actually harmful, especially 
in weakening the movement‘s social support base. By presenting itself to 
society as willing to reform—with no further evaluation of what these reforms 
resulted in or how they would change or benefit the majority‘s living 
conditions—,the Jordanian regime has managed to make audiences reticent to 
believe and support the need to continue struggling. This was even more so in 
an increasingly threatening national and regional context. Furthermore, it is 
necessary to look further into repression and how it has been exercised in 
different forms and levels over time against the HSU which, because of being 
the most controversial movement in Jordan, has become ‗a central target for 
anti-reformist forces in Jordan‘ (2014e p. 74).  
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Finally, academic literature has portrayed the Arab revolutionary period in 
Jordan as one that only lasted a few months at the beginning of 2011, and 
ended in mid-2011 after the March 24 events. This has been explained through 
the analytical framework of social fragmentation along traditional ethnic and 
religious fault lines. Jordanian opposition during this period has been portrayed 
as divided into ‗two halves‘ (Pelham, 2011 p. 2) with different understandings of 
what constitutional monarchy means. These analyses refer back to the widely 
studied Jordanian-Palestinian divide and the way in which identity politics works 
in mobilization (Ryan, 2011a), a ‗major divide in Jordan‘s fractious ―opposition‖ 
movement‘ (Hamid and Freer, 2011 p.4) arguing that both new and old 
opposition use identity divisions ‗to advance their reform priorities‘ (Yaghi and 
Clark, 2014 p. 250). Highlighting ethnic divisions has led analysts to argue that 
‗the ethnic divide effectively limited the protests because Palestinians would not 
join demonstrations‘ and that ‗East Bankers, on the other hand, were not about 
to call for democratization that would effectively mean more political power for 
the Palestinian community‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 20). Ethno-religious differences 
have been singled out as ‗the most decisive‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 23) factor of the 
Jordanian ‗Spring‘. 
The HSU cuts across ethnic and religious lines, where ‗youth activists 
have continued to organise and also to broaden their networks to engage as 
diverse a cross-section of Jordanian society as possible‘ (Ryan, 2011b p. 386). 
Under the name of this single movement, the HSU activists include men and 
women, Islamist and Christian, secular and religious, and East Jordanians, 
Palestinians and Circassians. They have strategically mobilised the concept of 
youth and a generational gap, going against the use of religious and ethnic 
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frames that traditional opposition has continued mobilising. As Yom points out 
about the significance of the ‗youth‘ component in the movement, and the 
generational shift in social and political subjectivities: ‗their activism suggests 
that opposition to the regime as currently constituted may be less religious or 
ethnic than generational‘ (Yom, 2013 p. 133). This research adds to Yom‘s 
research to further argue that the HSU has challenged traditional frames of 
social organisation around ethnicity and identity by trying to mobilise a fresh 
understanding that critically recovers the debate on class and inequality.  
Conceptually, the study contributes to social movement theory in general, 
and particularly to the theoretical framework used for this project, Political 
Process Theory (PPT). It does so by extending expectations on the study of 
social movements in non-democratic countries, particularly in liberal 
autocracies. Overall, I argue that PPT is a useful framework for the study of 
social movements in Jordan. However, several weaknesses exist in the model 
when applied to non-democratic countries, in terms of the model‘s 
conceptualisation of repression, political opportunity, and success. This study 
will contribute at these three levels conceptually in the following way. 
First, the study of the HSU contributes to explore the concept of 
repression further, including possible variations in the type of repression. 
According to the PPT threat-opportunity analysis of the framework, costs and 
benefits drive decisions of organizations (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009 pp. 12-14). 
PPT assumes that high-level repression might lead to the absence of 
mobilisation or to radicalisation. However, the study of the HSU allows us to 
explore different types of repression, such as low-level and high-level 
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repression, and their varying effects for mobilisation. Repression in Jordan 
could be classified as ‗low-level‘ repression. How does this type of repression 
affect mobilisation of the HSU? Until now, this repression has led to paralysis 
and almost complete absence of radical voices. The case of the Jordanian Al-
Ḥirāk Ash-Shabābī (Youth Movement) suggests that the relationship between 
repression and mobilisation is not as fixed as suggested by the framework. 
Second, this study elaborates on the effects of varying forms of 
repression, over time on the HSU. Not only we explore a case where different 
types of repression exist, but moreover we perceive a changing repression in 
type, affected by a changing national and regional environment. How does this 
changing opportunity structure affect the way in which the HSU builds its short 
and long term strategies? In the case of the Jordanian Al-Ḥirāk Ash-Shabābī 
(Youth Movement), we see that the varying political opportunity structure has 
deeply affected the internal organisation and strategy of the movement. During 
periods of less repression and an opening opportunity structure, movement 
demands were radicalised, while during periods of greater repression and 
closing opportunity structure, social movement strategies have seen a de-
radicalisation of demands. Overall, the changing repression in time has 
weakened the movement internally in terms of its capacity to make strategic 
decisions. This study therefore contributes to PPT‘s claim of repression being a 
deterrent for mobilisation even for cases in which repression takes place 
through ‗low-level‘ strategies.  
Moreover, the study of the HSU within the wider context of activism and 
collective action contributes to broadening the scope of political opportunity 
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structure to include elements that go beyond the state. PPT assumes the 
opportunity structure is provided by the state, and analyses focus on these 
opportunities at a national level. When looking at the opportunity structure in 
Jordan, we have to expand this concept to not only look at the national events 
at the level of the state, but also at the regional context, and the way they both 
affect regime decisions and the changing opportunity structure.  
The regional context of revolutionary episodes in Tunisia and Egypt have 
had a positive impact in Jordan, at the level of activists (micro) and organisation 
(meso), but also at the macro level of the regime, that was forced to open up 
space for dissent, opening political opportunities, under scrutiny of international 
media. On the other hand, the regional events in other cases such as Egypt and 
Syria have had a negative repercussion, affecting the movement at the micro 
level (individual) and the meso level (organisational).This new understanding of 
the context to analyse the political opportunity structure, which expands to the 
regional level, could be applied to the study of repression and opportunity 
structures in other countries of the region.  
Finally, this thesis seeks to contribute conceptually to the study of social 
movements is through the relationship that PPT establishes between the forms 
of organisation social movements adopt, and their success. PPT assumes that 
hierarchical, formal, institutionalised organisation structures will result in 
successful political outcomes (understood as institutionalisation and 
acceptance) because they can sustain interaction with authorities and 
supporters. The concept of ‗success‘ as understood by PPT theoristsviii, has to 
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be re-thought for cases in which claimants do not seek neither acceptance nor 
advantages from powerholders, such as in the case of the HSU.  
The mobilizing structure adopted by the HSU, —an informal, horizontal, 
and network-like form of organization, that operates outside the umbrella or 
scope of the regime, is a rationally adopted form of organisation. I argue this 
basing myself on the central understanding that PPT has of activists as rational 
actors that ‗adopt mobilizing structural forms that are known to them from direct 
experience‘ (McCarthy, 1996 p. 148).  
This research explores the way in which activists of the HSU rationally 
choose informal, horizontal structures of organization because of the negative 
perception movement activists have of a) formal and institutionalised structures 
and b) of hierarchical leadership, as a tools to exercise political and social 
control. This choice is, moreover, part of activists‘ strategic approach to 
mobilisation, and their refusal to creating coalitions with any other formal or 
institutionalised actors, such as political parties. Therefore, we will see how it is 
problematic to assume that their aim is to be accepted by the political system or 
to acquire new advantages within this systemix; their conceptualization of being 
‗successful‘ is not dependant on interacting or negotiating with authorities.  
Overall, the in-depth exploration of the HSU in the context of Jordan will 
point to the need of reconceptualising ‗success‘ as presented by PPT for the 
case of Jordan. This discussion will be useful not only for the case of the HSU, 
but also for the study of other similar marginal and informal social movements in 
the MENA region.  
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Thesis structure 
Turning to the structure, this thesis has seven chapters, which are 
divided into two parts. Part I is dedicated to reviewing the theoretical framework, 
to presenting the methodology used in the research, and to contextualising 
social movements and dissent in Jordan. Part II contains four analytical 
chapters dedicated to pursuing my four lines of inquiry on the HSU: the 
movement‘s mobilising structure and ideology; the movement‘s strategies; the 
regime‘s counter-strategies; and the movement‘s social and political 
significance.  
 The first chapter, entitled Political Process Theory (PPT) and its 
Applicability for the study of the Al-Hirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the 
Jordanian Youth Movement): Mobilizing Structure, Political Opportunity, 
and Framing Processes, is on Political Process Theory (PPT) and its main 
concepts, and aims are to present the framework as one that provides a useful 
toolbox for the study of the HSU. I argue that PPT is a useful framework for the 
study of my movement, and that it serves as a useful analytical toolbox to 
understand social movements in Jordan.  
 In chapter two, Researching Mobilisation and Repression in the 
MENA, I present the methodological approach that is used in this project, a 
qualitative research project within an interpretative frame. I argue that, given the 
fluidity of social movements, and the relevance of self-understanding to answer 
my analytical questions, a holistic approach is necessary, one which is built on 
three levels of analysis —macro (national), meso (organization), micro 
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(individual). In order to do so, I present the methods used to gather data, and 
then personally reflect on my research experience in this project.  
 The final chapter of part one, chapter three, Contextualising the  
Case: Jordan’s Liberal Autocracy in Containing Mobilisation, seeks to 
analyse the way in which the relationship between the Jordanian regime and 
social movements has been historically constructed as it provides insights into 
the way in which dissent and the state converse today. I argue that, despite the 
existence of relatively organized dissidence during specific moments in time, 
the state has managed to survive until now through the implementation of a 
calculated counter-strategy that combines repressive and conciliatory measures 
which have marked the development of social movements in the country. 
 In the second part of the thesis, I map structure, strategy, counter-
strategy, and significance across four chapters. Chapter four, Mapping Al-
Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement): Grievances, 
Aims, Structure and Ideology, analyses today‘s informal dissent youth 
movement in Jordan, the HSU and the different constituencies and activists 
therein. I argue that this movement represents a new form of informal, 
uninstitutionalized, horizontal, network-like organization that mobilizes the 
concept of youth bringing together multiple ideologies, and is re-defining what 
dissent looks like in Jordan today. At this point, I establish the HSU as my 
analytical object of inquiry, analysing the demographic characteristics of 
activists in the movement, its internal mobilization structure, its main political 
characteristics and its ideology.  
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Chapter five, Strategy in Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the 
Jordanian Youth Movement), analyses the development of both 
confrontational, conflict-oriented, and non-confrontational, consensus-oriented 
strategies in the movement and the events that affect this variation. The chapter 
argues that movement strategies are reactive and context-specific, and vary in 
time. Moreover, even if we are talking about a movement as a whole, there is a 
strategic variation between constituencies that adopt more confrontational 
strategies and those that prefer non-confrontational ones. Finally, strategic 
weaknesses or limits of the movement are a result of the challenging context 
and of activists‘ lack of previous organization experience. In this chapter, after 
identifying the spectrum of the movement‘s strategic choices in terms of 
confrontation and non-confrontation, strategy is analysed by drawing on the 
concepts of political opportunity, mobilizing structure, and framing processes 
provided by the PPT and analysing the way in which these variables determine 
the development of movement activists‘ strategic articulation.  
Chapter six, The Jordanian State’s Counter-strategies: Collective 
Action, explores the counter-strategies that have been put forward by the 
Jordanian regime in response to the HSU. I argue that the HSU has been 
challenged by the state‘s counter-strategies to mobilisation, and the varying 
opportunity structure, which has managed to almost completely demobilise the 
movement. The regime‘s survival until now is not due to its political legitimacy in 
the eyes of the population, but to a carefully calculated strategic management of 
collective action that combines apparent conciliatory moves with repression. I 
analyse the Jordanian regime‘s counter-strategy in two parts: first, conciliatory 
measures, including government reshuffles, and putting forward a roadmap to 
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reform that includes constitutional amendments, and reforming the 
parliamentary election and political party laws; second, repressive measures in 
terms of legislation —including those related to freedom of expression, 
association, and assembly—, and the way this legislative framework is 
arbitrarily implemented, as well as direct repressive measures towards activists 
that include harassment, surveillance, or imprisonment. 
 In the final chapter of this second part, entitled Enduring Social, 
Political and Cultural Transformations: Framing Significance in Al-Ḥirāk 
Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement), I set out what has 
been framed by movement participants as the political and social significance of 
the HSU. I argue that while the concept of success as defined by PPT is not 
applicable for the case of the HSU, the movement‘s activities are considered as 
significant by participants in terms of its social and political importance and 
influence. Moreover I argue that major significance of the movement is framed 
as the following: social, the existence and organisation of an informal, 
noninstitutionalised movement in Jordan; and political, altering limits of political 
action or political expression tolerated by the regime, or the ‗red-lines‘ of 
freedom of political action and expression in Jordan, and the reintroduction of 
national issues in the political debate. Finally, the chapter explores the way in 
which the movement is considered as having been important in transforming the 
culture of activism in Jordan, which has the potential to transform the future of 
political participation and organisation.  
I conclude my thesis with a Conclusion that lays out the empirical 
findings of the project and summarises the main arguments that have been 
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developed throughout the chapters. It moreover recounts the way in which this 
project contributes to the academic conversation on both social movements in 
Jordan and in the MENA. Furthermore, it advocates for the need of carrying out 
similar projects to study collective action and contentious politics in the MENA 
that focus on alternative structures and forms of organising. This will encourage 
thinking about the way in which alternative discourses develop and are 
challenged in this region. The chapter closes indicating possible future lines of 
research and highlighting the insights that this type of study can make to the 
knowledge on transformations in societal dynamics and discourses in other 
cases. 
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Chapter 1 Political Process Theory (PPT) and its Applicability for the 
study of Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement): 
Mobilizing Structure, Political Opportunity, and Framing Processes 
 
 
 
This chapter is on Political Process Theory (PPT) and its main concepts. The 
aim of this theoretical chapter is to present the framework as one that provides 
a useful toolbox for the study of the HSU by extending expectations on 
mobilisation in non-democratic countries. I argue that PPT is a useful framework 
for the study of the HSU, and that it can provide a useful analytical toolbox to 
understand social movements in Jordan.  
In order to support this argument, I first provide an introduction to PPT 
theory, including how this framework was built and its focus. Second, I present 
the way PPT conceptualises mobilising structure, political opportunity, and 
framing processes, which are central to the framework. Finally, I evaluate 
strengths and limits of PPT concepts, arguments, and categories to answer my 
four analytical questions around organisation, social movement strategy, regime 
counter-strategy, and significance of the HSU.  
 
General introduction to Political Process Theory (PPT) 
In order to analyse the structure, strategies and significance of the HSU 
as well as its strategic interaction with Jordanian authorities, I take Social 
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Movement Theory, and in particular the Political Process Theoryx as my 
analytical frame. PPT was developed in the 1970s, mainly through the study of 
social movements in democratic countries, particularly in the US. PPT defines 
social movements as:  
―A sustained series of interactions between national powerholders and 
persons successfully claiming to speak on behalf of a constituency 
lacking formal representation, in the course of which those persons make 
publicly-visible demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of 
power, and back those demands with public demonstrations of support.‖ 
(Tilly, 1979 p. 12). 
The key recognition of this theoretical framework is that ―activists‘ 
prospects for advancing particular claims, mobilizing supporters, and affecting 
influence are context-dependent‖ (Meyer, 2004 p. 126) and that ―social 
movements cannot be isolated from contentious politics as a whole‖ (McAdam 
et al., 1997 p. 163). The model especially focuses on movements that have 
been ―excluded from political power and legal rights‖ and that direct their 
demands to the state and to state policies (Gamson, 1975).  
PPT presents activists as ―eminently rational‖ arguing that ―activists do 
not choose goals, strategies, and tactics in a vacuum‖ and that ―the political 
context, conceptualized fairly broadly, sets the grievances around which 
activists mobilize‖ (Meyer, 2004 pp. 127-128). PPT is a framework that enables 
an analytical focus on the interaction between challengers of the system and 
the world around them, and this interaction determines the outcomes of 
movements as well as their development and potential influence over time 
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(Meyer, 2004). PPT offers a conceptual toolkit that is useful for my project, more 
precisely the concepts of ‗mobilizing structure‘, ‗political opportunity‘ and 
‗framing processes‘ are relevant for my four main research questions around 
the concepts of ‗organization‘, ‗social movement strategy‘, ‗regime counter-
strategy‘ (and ‗repression‘) and ‗significance‘ or in PPT language ‗success‘ of 
social movements.  
 
Conceptualisation of mobilizing structure, political opportunity, and 
framing processes 
After this brief introduction of PPT, I will now present concepts used by 
PPT that are relevant for my research. The first central concept in PPT is that of 
mobilizing structure which is useful to answer my analytical questions on 
organization, social movement strategy, and political and social significance of 
the HSU. The concept of mobilizing structure has been defined by PPT as 
‗those collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people 
mobilize and engage in collective action‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b p.3). The role 
of these structures in social movements has been to allow contentious acts to 
be sustained as social movements. This concept focuses on the forms of 
organization to which a diversity of collective settings give rise, thereby turning 
the focus to the organisational dynamics of social movements (McAdam et al., 
1996b p. 4).  
There is not a single model of movement organization (Tarrow, 2011 p. 
137) and models vary according to their degree of formality, which can be 
measured through the variables of hierarchy and autonomy, where a greater 
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hierarchy in organisation would lead to greater formality, and greater autonomy 
derives in less formality. Examples of the least formal organization types would 
include ‗families‘ and ‗networks of friends‘ (McCarthy, 1996 p. 142). Mobilizing 
structures are relevant to study social movement organization in several ways. 
These structures are the ones that ‗bring people together in the field, shape 
coalitions, confront opponents, and assure their own future after the exhilaration 
of the peak of mobilization has passed‘ (Tarrow, 2011 p. 123). From the central 
understanding that the model has of activists as rational actors, social 
movement participants ‗adopt mobilizing structural forms that are known to them 
from direct experience‘ (McCarthy, 1996 p. 148).  
Mobilizing structures are also relevant to studying social movement 
strategies, as the model assumes that a variation in mobilizing structures result 
in major variation in strategic repertoires at different levels. PPT considers 
possible variation in strategic repertoires, including: level of mobilization; 
dominant organizational form; level of outside subsidy; and alliance structures 
—between SMOs and political parties, unions, churches, and authorities. PPT 
presents strategic choices of social movements and of groups therein through 
three binaries related to the magnitude of goals including single v multiple 
demands, radical demands v demands that do not challenge the legitimacy of 
the constituency, or influencing v substituting elites (Gamson, 1975). 
PPT assumes that the variation in mobilising structures results in a 
variation of forms and strategies of action. Conservative mobilising structures 
adopted by ‗leaders who aim to work with the experience of their people, may 
severely constrain the range of possible choices of form‘ (McCarthy, 1996 p. 
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150). On the other hand, informal structures allow for a more direct type of 
activism at a grassroots level, providing ‗fertile ground in which radicals can 
flourish and thrive‘. Formal and hierarchical mobilising structures ‗inhibit risky 
and potentially illegal behaviour‘ given their ‗lack the flexibility and autonomy 
necessary for clandestine or extreme actions‘ (Cross and Snow, 2011 p. 119). 
Overall, informal, non-hierarchical mobilising structures offer a ‗free space‘ 
where activists are able to build a community or a movement beyond the control 
of authorities. 
Finally, the concept of mobilizing structure has been related to the 
‗success‘ of social movements for PPT. The framework defines ‗success‘ at two 
levels: first, as acceptance, when ‗the challenging group‘s existence is accepted 
by its antagonists‘, reflected in acts of consultation, negotiations, formal 
recognition that the challenging group represents a formally designated 
opposition group, and inclusion in the system; second, in the form of new 
advantages, when any of the objectives or demands that were being demanded 
by the opposition group were achieved (Gamson, 1980 p. 1043). The 
assumption made by the framework is that the type of organization or mobilizing 
structure adopted by the movement deeply affects the success of the 
movement. According to Tarrow, formal hierarchical organizations have greater 
capacity to sustain interaction with allies, authorities, and supporters, than 
hierarchies that fully internalize their base, such as grass-roots activists, which 
lose much of their capacity for contention. Moreover, autonomous, horizontally 
organized groups, where each individual is a full participant, have greater 
capacity for contention, at the same time as autonomous groups encourage a 
lack of coordination and continuity (Tarrow, 2011 p. 137). 
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The second central concept of PPT, political opportunity, is especially 
relevant to answer my analytical questions on social movement strategies and 
regime counter-strategy, which are central for the model. Political opportunity 
has been defined as ‗consistent – but not necessarily formal, permanent, or 
national – signals to social or political actors which either encourage or 
discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements‘ 
(Tarrow, 1996 p. 54). This level of analysis in social movement studies gives 
importance to the formal structures like institutions, and also the conflict and 
alliance structures that externally influence the movement. Examples of political 
opportunities for the framework are political shifts that occur at the level of the 
state, among them, unusual repression, divided political elites, or divergent 
interests between political and economic elites, as the most important 
opportunities to the appearance and development of opposition movements.  
With this concept, PPT seeks to explain the ‗emergence of a particular 
social movement on the basis of changes in the national structure or informal 
power relations of a given national political system‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b p. 3). 
However, as well as focusing on the emergence of a particular movement, the 
relevance of this concept could be extended to the study of the development of 
social movement strategies, as the model is based on the conviction ‗that social 
movements and revolutions are shaped by the broader set of political 
constraints and opportunities unique to the national context in which they are 
embedded‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b p. 3). 
Political opportunity is a useful concept to answer my analytical question 
on the development of social movement strategies. Conceptualizations of 
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strategy are generally made in terms of ‗mutually independent and instrumental 
decisions‘ and are generally ‗confined to actor-opponent interactions‘ (Downey 
and Rohlinger, 2008). PPT, however, establishes that ‗much of the history of 
movement/state interaction can be read as a duet of strategy and 
counterstrategy between movement activists and power holders‘ (Tarrow, 2011 
p. 8). For the model, once the social movement is created, social movement 
strategy and regime counter-strategy should be understood as mutually 
dependent and no longer independent of each other:  
‗After the onset of protest activity, the broader set of environmental 
opportunities and constraints are no longer independent of the actions of 
movement groups. The structure of political opportunities is now more a 
product of the interaction of the movement with its environment than a 
simple reflection of changes occurring elsewhere‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b 
p. 13). 
The concept of political opportunity is also relevant to answer my 
analytical question on regime counter-strategies, which includes a variable 
political opportunity structure. PPT assumes that the balance between threat 
and opportunity or costs and benefits drive decisions of organizations (Goodwin 
and Jasper, 2009 pp. 12-14), and these factors are determined by varying 
regime counter-strategies that build the political opportunity structure. This 
political opportunity structure can be measured through the protesting policy, 
which the framework presents as ‗an important barometer of political 
opportunities available for social movements‘ (Della Porta, 1996 p. 90). 
According to Della Porta, this protesting policy is built on ‗institutional features – 
police organisation, the nature of the judiciary, law codes, constitutional rights, 
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and so forth-play an extremely important role in defining the opportunities, and 
the constraints, on protest policing‘ (Della Porta, 1996 p. 80). Among the threats 
for social mobilization, the model includes repression as ‗any action by another 
group that raises the contenders‘ cost of collective action‘ (Tilly, 1978 p. 100). 
When applying PPT in non-democracies, as well as state repression, other 
threats include economic problems and the erosion of rights (Almeida, 2003 p. 
351).  
The third central concept of PPT is framing processes which are relevant 
to answer the analytical question on social movement strategies and the 
political and social significance of the movement. Framing processes have been 
defined by PPT as ‗conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion 
shared understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and 
motivate collective action‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b p. 6). Framing implies ‗an 
active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level 
of reality construction’ (Benford and Snow, 2000 p.614). These frames are not 
chosen in a vacuum, and ‗the political context, conceptualized fairly broadly, 
sets the grievances around which activists mobilize‘ (Meyer, 2004 pp. 127-128).  
This rational and active process undertaken by social movement activists 
results in collective action frames, formed by ‗the shared meanings and 
definitions that people bring to their situation‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b p. 5). 
Although framing processes are undertaken by social movement activists, they 
respond to existing conceptualizations of politics and society in a given context. 
As Tarrow suggests, social movements attempt to replace 'a dominant belief 
system that legitimizes the status quo with an alternative mobilizing belief 
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system that supports collective action for change,' movement leaders proffer the 
symbols of revolt to gain support and mark themselves off from opponents‘ 
(2011 p. 106). 
 The concept of framing processes is useful to answer my analytical 
question on social movement strategy. Within social movements, framing 
processes are key at three distinct moments: diagnostic framing, when the 
problem is identified and attributed to a particular actor; prognostic framing, 
when a solution to the problem is articulated by movement activists; and 
motivational framing, when a social movement constructs a rationale for 
engaging in collective action (Benford and Snow, 2000 pp. 615-617). When 
framing processes are strategized by social movement activists, they result in 
‗frame alignment processes‘ which have been defined as:  
‗deliberative, utilitarian, and goal directed: frames are developed and 
deployed to achieve a specific purpose—to recruit new members, to 
mobilize adherents, to acquire resources, and so forth‘ (Benford and 
Snow, 2000 p. 624).  
PPT considers four main frame alignment processes: frame bridging, 
frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Benford and 
Snow, 2000 pp. 624-625). First, frame bridging is ‗the linking of two or more 
ideological congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a particular 
issue or problem‘, and can occur between a movement and individuals, 
between a movement and an un-mobilised group, or across social movements. 
The second type of frame alignment process is frame amplification, which is ‗the 
idealization, embellishment, clarification, or invigoration of existing values or 
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beliefs‘. With this strategy, social movements intend to resonate with potential 
constituencies by incorporating existing cultural values, beliefs or narratives. 
This strategy is particularly relevant for movements that rely on constituencies 
different from the movement beneficiaries, or for movements stigmatized due to 
the contradiction between their beliefs and those of the dominant culture. Third, 
the strategy of frame extension is when SM interests and demands extend 
‗beyond its primary interests to include issues and concerns that are presumed 
to be of importance to potential adherents‘. This strategy can lead to instability 
in the movement when it reaches the point at which demands are broad and 
movement members are no longer able to identify movement demands. Finally, 
frame transformation is concerned with ‗changing old understandings and 
meanings and/or generating new ones‘. 
The concept of framing processes is moreover relevant to answer my 
analytical question on the political and social significance of the movement in 
the Jordanian context. In this sense, I will refer to the related concept of 
‗resonance‘ which is ‗relevant to the issue of the effectiveness or mobilizing 
potency of proffered framing‘ (Benford and Snow, 2000 p. 619). The varying 
effectivenessxi of framing processes is dependent on two factors: credibility, and 
salience (Benford and Snow, 2000 p. 620). The credibility of a particular frame 
depends on three factors: the consistency between beliefs, claims and actions 
inside the movement; the empirical credibility of the frame in the eyes of 
potential adherents; and the credibility of frame articulators (SM activists) 
themselves. On the other hand, salience also depends on three factors: 
centrality, or ‗how essential the beliefs, values, and ideas associated with 
movement frames are to the lives of the targets of mobilization‘; experiential 
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commensurability, or resonance with personal, everyday, experiences of the 
targets of mobilization; and finally narrative fidelity (Benford and Snow, 2000 p. 
621). 
 
Strengths and initial limits to the application of PPT in the Jordanian case 
As we have introduced in the preceding section of the chapter, the concepts of 
mobilising structure, political opportunity, and framing processes are a useful 
tool to answer the four analytical questions put forward in this thesis related to 
organisation, social movement strategy, regime counterstrategy, and social and 
political significance. In this following part of the chapter, I engage in evaluating 
the strengths and initial limits to the application of PPT in the case of the HSU. 
First, the concept of mobilizing structure is a useful tool for the analysis of 
organization, and social movement strategy. In terms of organisation, analysing 
the chosen mobilising structure of the movement enables us to present the 
collective form that the movement has chosen to engage in collective action. 
The form adopted by activists of the movement is the structure that keeps them 
together, that shapes their coalitions with other groups, and that activists then 
utilise to confront opponents. It is necessary to analyse this collective form and 
look into the organisation of the movement internally. Initially, the HSU is a 
loosely organised, network-like structure, which has been built at a grassroots 
level on informal ties and operates outside the umbrella or scope of the regime.  
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One of the key theoretical contributions to applying social movement 
theory to the MENA is the one outlined by Benin and Vairel, who propose a 
‗relational‘ perspective in which ‗interpersonal networks‘ are central to 
comprehending organisational structures (Benin and Vairel, 2011) through the 
exploration of other regional cases such as Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, 
Turkey and Tunisia . Theoretically the authors of this volume have argued for 
the applicability of social movement theories to the MENA region as, for them, 
studying social movements in the MENA allows to expand and enrich social 
movement theories.  
Moreover, analysing the mobilising structure allows us to examine social 
movement strategies. For this thesis, this is particularly relevant at two levels: 
first, in terms of the way in which the mobilising structure defines the 
movement‘s alliance structures with other actors, particularly with other social 
movements and with political parties; second, the way in which the mobilising 
structure allows for the appearance of radical voices and demands. First, from 
the central PPT assumption of activists as rational actors, and analysing the 
mobilizing structure of the HSU as a rationally adopted form of organization, 
allows us to understand the overall lack of strategic alliance structures between 
the movement and other opposition actors, particularly social movements and 
political parties. Initially it seems as if the HSU has rationally chosen an 
informal, horizontal structure of organization because of its negative perception 
of traditional hierarchical leadership dynamics as a tool to exercise political and 
social control. Second, the informal, noninstitutional mobilising structure of the 
movement has allowed for the appearance of radical voices and demands, 
given the fact that it retains its independence from the regime‘s structure. The 
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link between the form of the movement and its strategic approach provided by 
PPT is therefore useful for this thesis. The case of the HSU follows the 
assumption of PPT, and the informal, horizontal, network-like structure allows 
for the flourishing of more radical political ideologies.  
The concept of mobilising structure is therefore useful for the study of 
organisation and strategy of the HSU. However, initial limits to the application of 
the model in the Jordanian case surface when looking into the relationship 
between mobilizing structure and social and political significance of the 
movement. As we have presented in the previous section, PPT refers to the 
‗success‘ of a movement‘s outcomes as acceptance and as advantages. Initial 
limits for applying this concept in the case of the HSU appear at two levels. 
First, the concept of ‗success‘ has to be re-constructed for cases in which 
claimants do not seek neither acceptance nor advantages from powerholders. 
In the case of the HSU, activists strategically decide the informal, non-
institutional nature of the movement, and their refusal to creating coalitions with 
any other formal or institutionalised actors, such as political parties. This is 
especially so for the groups that we situate at the radical end of the reform-
radical strategic spectrum, for which we cannot assume their aim to be 
accepted by the political system or to acquire new advantages in this system. 
Given the fact that these groups do not see any possibility of change with the 
current regime, a successful outcome that would meet these groups‘ demands 
might imply elite substitution or regime change rather than inclusion into the 
system at any of the two levels presented by PPT.  
69 
 
Second, PPT assumes that only hierarchical, institutionalised structures 
would be able to be successful because they can sustain interaction with 
authorities and supporters. However, for movements that rationally choose to 
work as an informal, non-institutionalized organization due to their political 
rejection to these institutionalized structures, again their conceptualization of 
being ‗successful‘ would not come as a result of interacting with authorities. The 
more radical positions in the HSU would actually consider interacting with 
authorities as a negative result of their activism that would be interpreted as a 
success of the regime‘s strategies of co-optation. Therefore, the concept of 
‗success‘ as presented by PPT will need to be re-conceptualized for the case of 
Jordan, and this re-conceptualization will be useful not only for the case of the 
HSU, but also for the study of other youth movements in the MENA region.  
Second, the concept political opportunity is a useful tool to answer my 
analytical questions on social movement strategies and regime counter-
strategy. First, in terms of social movement strategies, the strength of PPT for 
the case of the HSU lies in its idea of strategy as dependent on regime counter-
strategies. The varying political opportunity structure provided by the Jordanian 
regime, has resulted in difficulties for the movement to plan long-term 
strategies. Moreover, the radicalisation and de-radicalisation of the movement‘s 
strategy and demands has depended on the opening and closing opportunity 
structure provided by the regime. A greater cost and threat to mobilisation has 
resulted in a de-radicalisation of radical voices in the movement. In order to 
analyse this dynamic, the model provided by PPT is extremely valuable.  
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Moreover, political opportunity is useful to analyse regime counter-
strategies in Jordan where the ‗institutional or legal structure sets the conditions 
for the actual strategies of protest policing‘ (Della Porta, 1996 pp. 79-80). 
Although social movement strategies of the HSU have been affected by regime 
counter-strategies more than the other way round, the latter can also be 
understood as a response to the activities of the movement. In Jordan, the 
regime has built a counter-strategy to control social mobilisation that includes 
liberal democratic reform moves, such as constitutional amendments, or 
elections, and repression and securitization moves such as imprisonment, 
harassment, or a selective application of the law. PPT serves as a useful tool to 
analyse the regime‘s protesting policy towards the HSU.  
Two initial limits to the model surface when analysing repression in 
Jordan. PPT assumes that threat increases the cost of action and deters protest 
but if groups are well organized we will expect greater collective action and 
resistance (Almeida, 2003p. 351). Based on this assumption, in a context in 
which we find repression and in which collective action entails relative high 
costs for activists, such as in Jordan, we would expect an absence of social 
movements. The presence and activities of the HSU therefore present a 
contradiction with the model‘s assumptions on the repression-mobilisation 
relationship.  
The second limit to the theory is that it does not distinguish between 
different possible types of repression. In Jordan, we find a regime counter-
strategy to social mobilization that combines apparent conciliatory moves with 
repression and securitization. The fact that the regime makes public apparent 
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concessions in the form of liberal democratic moves undermines the resonance 
of the movement‘s activities in society. Tripp has sought to contribute 
theoretically to the knowledge on social movements and action in the MENA by 
focusing on resistance and different forms of resistance to power in the region 
(2013). This author explores different forms of resistance in the region: state 
capture and violent resistance; resistance as a denial of authority, mainly 
nonviolent resistance; resistance in economic life; resistance of women through 
body politics; and symbolic forms of resistance in art. Throughout his analysis, 
Tripp is interested in looking at ways in which a system of power works over 
others, its principles, and the ways in which people experience this power (2013 
p. 4). Overall, Tripp‘s contribution to knowledge revolves around the 
examination of the ‗genealogy of resistance and its potential‘ (2013 p. 5), and 
will be key to compliment the theoretical limits that might arise when analysing 
repression in Jordan using PPT.  
Finally, as theorised by Davenport, ‗mixed transitional regimes, which 
combine autocracy and democracy, are the most coercive‘ (Davenport, 2007 
p.11). The concept of repression would need further exploration, analysing 
variations in forms and levels of repression (low/high-level repression), and ‗the 
use of alternative mechanisms of control‘ that have not been examined 
extensively (Davenport, 2007 p. 9). The Jordanian regime uses these 
alternative mechanisms of repression, what we could call low-level repression, 
in the form of harassment, surveillance or imprisonment. If PPT assumes that 
repression results in the lack of mobilisation or in radicalisation, introducing 
these other variants of repression is necessary to further disentangle the 
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‗punishment puzzle‘ or the non consistent effects of repression on dissent in 
Jordan (Davenport, 2007 p. 8). 
Finally, for the case of the HSU, framing processes are a useful 
analytical tool for strategies and social and political significance. Diagnostic, 
prognostic and motivational framing by the movement, highlight its internal 
strategic weaknesses. Although diagnostic framing might have been relatively 
effective in the HSU, creating internal consensus in articulating and identifying 
the problem, prognostic framing, or articulating a solution to the problem, has 
found competing voices, mainly between the radical and the reformist camps. 
The multiplicities of frames in the movement, and the pluralism of 
conceptualizations of change involved, affect movement strategies as a whole, 
making it difficult to reach agreements 
With existing competition between activists in terms of articulating a 
solution to the problem, motivational framing —third step in frame alignment 
processes—, is further weakened. In order to analyse the overall strategic 
approach to mobilization undertaken by the movement, it is relevant to look into 
how these three steps have occurred, what frames have been mobilized, if 
frames have been bridged, amplified, extended, or transformed, and how useful 
each of these frame alignment processes has been to strengthening social 
movement strategies.  
The concept of ‗resonance‘ is useful in analysing the social significance 
of the HSU. The degree of credibility of the HSU has been weakened by the 
aforementioned internal disagreements, and the weakness of their strategic 
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frame alignment processes. Moreover, resonance has been affected by the fact 
that activists themselves are young and do not have past experience in 
organizing. Salience among Jordanian society has not been very high because 
of the security-minded nature of the society, fostered by a history of surrounding 
regional conflicts, and their resulting rejection towards any type of ideology that 
is radical or revolutionary.  
One of the major challenges faced by the HSU is found in their inability to 
effectively strategise framing processes to create a common and shared frame 
of understanding that would enable greater unity, less fragmentation inside the 
movement, and a larger horizontal reach to amplify the movement and resonate 
in society. Weaknesses in the effectiveness of framing processes can shed light 
on weaknesses at a strategic level and limits in the social significance of the 
movement.  
 In analysing the political significance of the HSU, I will focus on the 
impact the movement has had in bringing about change both at a social and at 
a political level. This focus will enable me to reinforce the argument that the 
main political significance of the HSU has been to alter the forms of political 
action or political expression tolerated by the regime. Although it is debatable 
the extent to which we can analyse the outcomes and evaluate the success of a 
movement as new as the HSU, there have been notable changes at the level of 
the culture of activism that may determine the future of social movements and 
collective action in Jordan. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have provided an overview of Political Process Theory 
(PPT) theoretical framework within Social Movement Theory. More specifically, I 
have taken this chapter to conceptualise the key concepts of mobilising 
structure, political opportunity and framing processes. By presenting the way in 
which these central PPT concepts link to my analytical questions, I have argued 
that this is a useful framework for the study of the HSU, and that it can provide a 
useful analytical toolbox to understand its organisation, strategy and 
significance, as well as its interaction with Jordanian authorities. 
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Chapter 2 Researching Mobilisation and Repression in the MENA 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to set out the methodological approach that is used in this 
project, a qualitative research project within an interpretative frame. Moreover, it 
aims to serve as a personal reflection on researching social mobilisation and 
repression in the MENA. Given the fluidity of social movements, and the 
relevance of self-understanding to answer the analytical questions of this 
project, a holistic approach is necessary, one which is built on three levels of 
inquiry of the object of study —macro (national), meso (organization), micro 
(individual).   
The first part of this methodological chapter lays out the general 
methodological approach of this project, and justifies the selection of an 
interpretative frame for this particular research. The chapter then turns on to 
describe the methods used to gather and analyse primary data for the project, 
namely participant observation, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and 
document analysis. As well as descriptive in nature, this section aims to justify 
the use of these methods and their usefulness for the purpose of collecting 
primary data. Finally, the chapter reflects on the experience of researching 
mobilisation and repression in Jordan by engaging with more context-specific 
issues related to research methodology such as the researcher‘s role as 
insider/outsider of the movement, as a female researcher, the importance of 
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creating trust networks for this type of research, and obstacles encountered on 
the way. 
 
General methodological approach 
This research is predominantly qualitative in nature and has adopted an 
interpretive approach to organisational research, which refers to a 
methodological procedure that takes into account hermeneutics and meaning. 
This approach has been presented in the field of organisational research in 
contraposition with a more positivist approach that are generally associated with 
hypothesis testing and experimental or quasi-experimental research design 
(Lee, 1991 p. 342). This research project therefore does not work with 
hypotheses and does not aim to test hypotheses which would characterise 
more positivist approaches to research. Instead it seeks to understand the 
meaning of social behaviour through a process of interpretation of the empirical 
reality.  
The interpretative approach to organisational research is based on the 
idea that methodologies used in natural sciences are not applicable to the study 
of social reality. In social science research, the same social process or 
behaviour can have different meaning for different researchers. Therefore the 
observation of human behaviour must involve a process of interpreting the 
empirical reality in terms of what it means as part of the object of inquiry (Lee, 
1991 p. 347). The interpretative frame has been widely used as an approach to 
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understanding social behaviour. One of the fields in which this approach has 
been taken and which is particularly relevant for this research project has been 
phenomenological sociology which aims to explain the role of human 
awareness in human action. In this field, ‗scientific interpretations of the social 
world can, and for certain purposes, must refer to the subjective meaning of the 
actions of human beings from which social reality originates‘ (Schutz, 1973 p. 
62). In this research, the interpretive approach is useful to explore the way in 
which the organisation and strategies of social movement collective action are 
framed by the subjective interpretation of participants involved. The selection of 
methods of primary data collection for this research follows this basic premise in 
the overall qualitative and interpretative methodological approach to the subject 
of inquiry.  
 
Methods of data collection and analysis 
In this project I adopt the participant observation research approach ‗in 
which the major activity is characterized by a prolonged period of contact with 
subjects in the place in which they normally spend their time‘ (Bogdan, 1973 p. 
303) and that relies on the ‗active participation of the researcher in the social 
context under observation‘ (Ross and Ross, 1974 p. 64). Bogdan presents the 
aims of this research approach which are to ‗develop an understanding of 
complex social settings and complex social relationships‘ and to ‗understand as 
fully as possible the situation being studied without disturbing that 
situation‘(1973 pp. 303-304). I adopt this approach in my research because I 
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agree with its proponents in that the only way to understand the complexity of 
social life, in the case of my research project, the complexity of the HSU and the 
context in which it acts, is to immerse oneself in it. Moreover, ‗studies which 
have an entire community, organisation, or group as their unit of analysis will 
benefit particularly from the holistic focus of participant observation‘ (Ross and 
Ross, 1974 p. 64).  
 In participant observation, ‗analysis is an ongoing and constant process‘ 
that can provide both ‗substantive and theoretical‘ findings for the research 
(Bogdan, 1973 pp. 307-308). In my project, this research approach has enabled 
me to gather data on substantive findings of the HSU, providing insight into the 
way in which activists of the movement organise themselves or the strategies 
that they choose. Moreover, the approach provides theoretical findings related 
to my broader analytical questions on repression-mobilisation dynamics and 
movement/state strategic interactions in Jordan. Overall, this approach 
produces ‗data which are either unobtainable through other techniques, 
prerequisite to the use of other techniques, or a reinforcement of data obtained 
through other methods‘(Ross and Ross, 1974 p. 64).  
 For this project, I have carried out extensive periods of participant 
observation: from September 2011 until September 2012, in January 2013, in 
April 2013, from June to September 2013, and from May 2014 to June 2015. 
During my extensive fieldwork periods, I observe activists in the movement 
during all the activities they carry out, including informal social gatherings, 
events, meetings, and diverse public demonstrations such as marches and sit-
ins. My participation in the movement‘s activities in general, especially in the 
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private and informal gatherings, is only possible because of the trust and 
friendship networks created during extensive periods of time with activists, 
without which this research project would find many limits to gathering data on 
the movement. Due to the radical position towards change that activists defend, 
I have encountered some challenges to the research, mainly in the form of 
repression and security and during demonstrations. Other times these 
challenges have affected my interviews, and I will develop this point in the next 
pages when I talk about the interviews carried out. These challenges made me 
decide from the start that I would, whenever possible, be accompanied by a 
Jordanian male friend, especially during the interviews and focus groups with 
activists.  
 The participant observation approach is normally combined to other 
specific research methods (Bogdan, 1973 p. 304) that also contribute to the 
data collection needed in the project. I use three methods in combination with 
the general participant observation approach: semi-structured interviews, focus 
groups, and document analysis. 
Semi-structured interviews, sometimes called the in-depth or intensive, 
focus on the ‗meanings that life experiences hold for the individuals being 
interviewed‘ (Warren and Karner, 2009 p. 115). They can be used to study 
behaviour and interaction, or as a sole method when looking at account, 
however combining this method with a more general political observation 
methodological approach provides the researcher with ‗a much broader 
understanding and thicker description‘(Warren and Karner, 2009 p. 118). 
Interviews, in contrast to informal conversations, require a formal structure that 
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enables the researcher to gather specific information needed for the project. 
The broad structure put forward by Warren and Karner is ‗conceptualizing the 
topic, framing the research question, developing the specific questions, the IRB 
review, deciding on the interview format, sampling respondents, and planning 
the interview‘(2009 p. 118).  
Semi-structured interviews provide open answers at the same time as it 
guides the interview following a structure that meets the objectives of the 
researcher. One of the characteristics of semi-structured interviews is that they 
‗allow respondents the chance to be the experts and to inform the research‘ 
(Leech, 2002 p. 668). I have used this method to gather data that has enabled 
me to answer the research questions related to: strategies of groups and 
individuals in the movement, how strategic decisions are reached, and 
variations in strategic choices between groups; obstacles and challenges that 
individual activists have faced and their perceptions on the extent to which their 
activities are affected by the repressive context; and outcomes of the 
movement, as they provide data on the aims of the groups which I then am able 
to relate to the movement‘s political outcomes. Semi-structured interviews 
provide the an in-depth description of the individual activist‘s engagement in 
activities related to organization and strategic decision making, as well as their 
experiences of repression and surveillance during their activism and the ways in 
which they consider this has affected their organizational practices and strategic 
decisions.  
Individual semi-structured interviews for this project have been designed 
to address the three levels of analysis of the research, and have been loosely 
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structured around the main analytical questions while allowing flexibility to 
respondents. As well as questions related to the main analytical questions, 
interviews included personal information about participants in the movement, as 
well as historical and context related questions that have provided insight into 
their interpretative stance towards the social, economic and political context in 
which they understand their organisational efforts and in which they strategise 
their activities. In order to reference the data collected through this method 
throughout the thesis, a coding system has been created and linked to details 
on interviewees for this project (see Appendix 2).  
During the aforementioned periods of fieldwork, I have carried out a total 
of 26 semi-structured interviews: 16 to activists of the movement, 8 to Jordanian 
analysts in different fields —politics, sociology, social media, legislation—, one 
to a Jordanian journalist, and one to a Jordanian blogger. From the 16 
interviews to activists of the movement that I have done until now, 9 have been 
done to activists that take a radical and rupturist understanding of change in the 
country, confronting the regime directly. The other 7 interviews were done to 
activists with a reformist understanding of change. The interviews done to 
activists are extensive and cover personal information, organisational 
information, ideology, strategy, challenges and obstacles, outcomes and 
background questions. From the 26 interviews carried out, 15 of them were 
done in Arabic, either in Jordanian dialect or in classical Arabic, and 11 were in 
English.  
I have to point out at this point that during the last period of fieldwork, 
from May 2014 until June 2015, I encountered increased limits to carrying out 
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the research for this project in Jordan. I had initially planned at least 15 more 
interviews with activists of the movement, which had previously accepted in my 
2013 field trip. However, upon arrival to Jordan and given the changing political 
environment in the country (and in the region), conditioned nationally with a new 
Anti-Terror Law being issued before the summer of 2014, and activists being 
increasingly harassed, and trialled under this securitization law, I was only able 
to interview 2 more activists this year. The other activists have refused to talk 
‗officially‘, and in an interview setting, about their activism, probably out of fear. 
This change has been extremely noticeable for me as a researcher, and it has 
made my fieldwork harder and more frustrating. However I consider that the 
observation and informal, non-recorded, meetings with activists during the 
fieldwork periods carried out since 2011, together with the interviews carried out 
to researchers, analysts, bloggers, and journalists, complement interviews with 
activists, and provide a solid empirical picture of the HSU. 
The fluidity of the individual ascription of activists and constituencies in 
the movement makes it difficult to select interviewees for this project and to 
define the movement‘s boundaries. However, I use three ways to determine 
who the activists are: first, I use snowballing sampling in interviews; second, I 
use the boundaries established by activists in the interviews to questions on, for 
example, who can form part of constituencies; and finally, I use the 
constituencies‘ identity as established in their manifestos.  
As I mentioned before, I have faced some challenges related to 
repression and security during my research. Ethical and safety issues have 
been of central concern for carrying out this research and for the fieldwork in 
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Jordan. These concerns have noticeably increased since 2013. In 2013, main 
challenges to carrying out interviews were the increased imprisonment of 
radical activists in the movement during the summer of 2013, and sometimes 
the activist that I was supposed to be interviewing was imprisoned hours before 
the interview. Despite the challenges encountered, in 2013 almost all the 
activists interviewed wanted their full names to appear in this project. In 2014 
however, I experienced greater difficulties in carrying out interviews with 
activists, as mentioned before. Moreover, the two activists interviewed in this 
last period have made sure that their names remain anonymous. For the sake 
of consistency and in order to protect my interviewees in this changing political 
context, I have decided to keep all respondents anonymous and use 
pseudonyms to refer to them. For each participant, a few lines have been added 
on their social position and identity, including their ascription to specific groups 
within the movement, while retaining their anonymity in all cases. As a final 
note, I have never personally felt threatened while carrying out my research, 
although I have received varied comments from other people in the society —
ranging from support, indifference, criticism or rejection, to negation of their 
existence— on the nature and activities of my object of inquiry, the HSU. 
The second method that I use to gather data for my analysis is focus 
groups which compliments semi-structured individual interviews by providing 
insight to the interaction between research participants (Kitzinger, 1994). This 
method can be combined with individual interviews to promote interaction 
between participants, between participants and facilitators, avoiding asymmetry 
between interviewer and interviewee and eliminating tensions through the 
discussion among participants involved in the same activity, for example, in 
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social movement organization and collective action. Focus groups have been 
approached as a ‗‘transformational act‘, raising consciousness and empowering 
participants, rupturing rather than reproducing underlying relations of 
exploitation and domination‘ (Johnson, 1996 p. 517) with ‗the potential to 
promote change‘ (Chiu, 2003 p. 181). In words of Johnson, the true potential for 
focus groups is:  
‗Not to appropriate bits of tacit knowledge the better to manipulate 
the providers, but to blend different kinds of expert knowledge - tacit 
and everyday with scientific and theoretical - to empower and to 
foster social change. There is scope for creative experimentation in 
their use. Facilitating this activity could reconnect the critical social 
scientist to agents of social change‘ (Johnson, 1996 p. 536). 
Focus groups examine the way in which knowledge and ideas on a specific 
issue develop and operate in a specific context and group (Kitzinger, 1994). For 
this research, focus groups provide insight into the way organization and 
strategy is debated and decided among members of groups and between 
groups of the social movement under study enabling further focus on 
agreements and disagreements between activists, arguments and how they are 
developed throughout the discussion. Data gathered with this method has been 
analysed to answer the research questions related to strategy, mainly strategic 
decision-making inside the movement and variation in preferred strategies 
among activists. During the fieldwork periods, I carried out one focus group 
together with a Jordanian researcher. This focus group was done in January 
2013 just after the Parliamentary Elections in Jordan in order to gather data on 
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the perception of non-elective actors, activists in the HSU. Participants in this 
focus group were activists of the movement who represented a variety of 
ideologies. Given the changing conditions for this research project in the 
country, it has been impossible to gather any small group of activists to carry 
out a focus group since the beginning of 2014.  
Although the practice of using members who previously know each other 
in focus groups is generally discouraged, for the purpose of our analysis it was 
important that participants knew each other, if not personally at least they all 
recognized each other as pertaining to specific groups. This was so because of 
the topic that was going to be covered in a context of repressive state tactics 
towards protestors of movement in the form of detentions or state surveillance. 
This discussion could have not taken place if all participants in it were not 
trusted by other participants. The trust network created among participants, as 
well as between participants and researchers, was vital in order to gather data. 
The fact that participants knew each other to a greater or lesser extent was 
moreover positive because of their shared experiences that framed their 
political views and to which they referred, which further provided input to our 
analysis. 
The third method that I used is document analysis. Documents ‗inform 
the practical and political decisions which people make on a daily and long-term 
basis and may even construct a particular reading of the past social or political 
events‘ (May, 1993 p. 133). This particular method is a form of ‗unobtrusive‘ 
research that does not directly involve human subjects (Wesley, 2010 p. 12), 
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but the active role of the researcher in selecting and accessing these 
documents should be acknowledged.  
In my analysis, I use primary documents, ‗materials which are written or 
collected by those who actually witnessed the events‘, and secondary 
documents, ‗written after an event which the author had not personally 
witnessed‘ (May, 1993 p. 136), all of which are publicly available. The sources 
for primary documents are state representatives and movement activists. 
Primary documentation from state representatives includes political speeches, 
declarations, constitutional and legislative amendments; documents produced 
by activists of the movement include manifestos, speeches, pamphlets, signs, 
and social media publications, as well as entries in blogs and updates in social 
networking sites like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. Secondary documents 
are mainly published articles, in academic journals as well as on-line articles, 
and books. Document analysis is a method that is constantly carried out and 
that has been one of the ways in which I gather data since September 2011.  
I analyse these documents as ‗mediums through which power is 
expressed‘ (May, 1993 p. 139) and as pieces in a particular social and political 
context through which I ‗examine the factors surrounding the process of its 
production, as well as the social context‟ (May, 1993 p. 138) which makes them 
interesting not only for what they contain but also for what they leave out. This 
document analysis helps me answer my research questions related to 
movement strategies and regime counter-strategies, and the relationship they 
have established. Combining the findings in document analysis with data 
collected in semi-structured interviews and focus groups through ‗triangulation‘ 
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(Wesley, 2010 p. 6) allows me to corroborate the findings resulting from this 
method. 
In order to organise the data collected through the aforementioned 
variety of data collection methods, and to facilitate its analysis, I have coded 
results using the NVivo program. The amount of unstructured data collected 
through my extensive observation periods, as well as through the long and 
detailed interviews carried out with activists, is difficult to analyse. Structuring 
and organising this data is necessary. NVivo provides a suitable tool to organise 
and ease the visualisation of large amounts of unstructured qualitative data as 
the one collected in this project.  
Coding has been a fundamental task for this project, and NVivo has 
greatly facilitated this task. Coding has allowed me to group data into the 
different lines of analysis and arguments, greatly facilitating the visualisation of 
data for its analysis. The nodes that I have created in order to code data have 
generally been simple nodes around people, places, the four analytical 
questions (organisation, SM strategy, regime response, and significance), and 
opinions (for example, on demands, radical and reformist strategies, or 
repression).    
 
The challenge of researching mobilisation in the MENA 
For this project, I spent extensive periods of time living in Amman, 
observing the community and movement activists in the community. As a 
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foreign female researcher, this experience raised some issues that I deemed of 
vital importance to cover in this methodological reflection. Among them, the 
difficulty of creating a critical balance between my role as insider/outsider of the 
movement and the community, my role as a foreign female researcher, the 
importance of creating trust networks, language and its limits, and other 
obstacles related to security encountered in the way.  
Researchers that engage in social research are faced with the challenge 
of balancing the researcher‘s insider role, that of being participant of the world 
that is being studied, and outsider role, where the researcher takes distance 
from the object of study. One of the first points of my research that I deem 
necessary to include in this personal reflection of my research experience 
during the four years in Jordan is my role as an insider and as an outsider of the 
movement. First, being an insider of the movement in my case would mean to 
belong to the movement, and participate as an activist. Although I was never 
truly an insider in the studied movement, I have acquaintances that are active 
participants and organisers of the movement. My position was not therefore as 
insider per se, but I was involved in some activists‘ life to the extent that they 
shared their impressions and emotions throughout the studied period.  
At the same time, I have been primarily outsider or nonparticipant in the 
movement. Although sometimes benefits of this position are not so obvious, it 
‗can provide valuable perspectives on the taken-for-granted assumptions of 
social movement participants‘ (Blee and Taylor, 2002 p. 97). This position as an 
outsider has been positive because it has helped me to keep a certain 
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emotional distance from the movement, which has in turn been fundamental to 
remain neutral in the analysis.  
The position of a foreign (Spanish) female young researcher in Jordan 
has overall benefited my research and for accessing activists as well as the 
Jordanian society. In terms of gender, being a female researcher has facilitated 
access to public and private spaces, and for both men and women. Because of 
dual access to women and men in the Middle East, foreign women researchers 
have sometimes been referred to as the ‗third sex‘ (Schwedler, 2006 p. 425).  
Second, being young has benefited me in the sense that activists of the 
HSU have found in me someone that they could share their ideas with, 
particularly in terms of the perception of the social and political situation in 
Jordan. The fact of being from Spain (and neither northern European nor British 
nor from the US), made my condition as ‗Westerner‘ distant from the ‗West‘ they 
consider has directly contributed to the situation of Jordan today, namely Britain 
and the US. Moreover, having participated for a period of time in the Spanish 
Indignados movement has allowed me to share even more with young activists 
of the HSU which observe increasing similarities with southern European youth 
and societies.   
The third point that I would like to reflect upon, is the importance of 
creating trust networks for this type of research. This has been absolutely 
critical for my thesis. The long periods of fieldwork have been extremely 
important to establish solid relationships of trust, not only with my 
acquaintances but also with other movement participants that heard about me 
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through them. I arrived in Jordan for the first time in September 2011, when I 
accepted a research position at the University of Jordan. During one year, I 
personally met some of the youth activists that were starting to organise the 
HSU, which was created in mid-2012. This friendship with a few of the activists, 
allowed me to meet other activists in the movement. Upon my return to Jordan 
later on, during my fieldwork periods in 2013-2015, these activists accepted to 
be interviewed for the research because they already knew me and trusted me.  
In highly repressive environments, trust networks are particularly 
important when accessing and recording the voices of radical collectivities and 
individuals in the movement, who would otherwise not be willing to participate in 
the project. Accessing radical activists is extremely difficult, and almost no 
research has included these radical voices in their analysis because they are 
unwilling to participate in any funded research, or carried out by anyone they do 
not personally know.  
During this research, I have realised how important language is to 
express identity and subjectivity. There is a need to be aware of the variations 
of Arabic –diglossia, bilinguisms, and cultural identity–, as well as variations 
shaped by urbanization, education, and migration. After studying Arabic for 10 
years now, in different Arabic speaking countries, I have acquired an advanced 
level of comprehension and speaking. More importantly for this project, during 
the four years spent researching, collecting data, and living in Jordan, I have 
become fluent in Jordanian dialect, particularly the dialect spoken in Amman 
among urban social clusters, but also with some of its geographical variations. 
This has extremely helped me during my research in having acquaintances and 
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friends in the community that go beyond the economic and political English-
speaking elites with whom foreign immigrants generally socialise. 
The majority of interviews carried out to activists of the HSU were done in 
Jordanian dialect, which is the day to day colloquial communicative option. 
Interviews to journalists or activists of the Islamist Youth Movement were 
normally done in classical Arabic or fuṣḥā, variation that transmits formality and 
is usually related to a religious identity. Finally, the minority of interviews were 
carried out in English, and this was mainly when carrying out interviews to 
researchers or analysts. The decision on the language was always taken by 
respondents (respondents moreover always chose the place where the 
interview would be held), and being aware of these variations shed light on 
social and political stances. For the majority of activists, responding to 
interviews in Arabic –either Jordanian dialect or classical Arabic– was a political 
decision. This is due to the negative conception they have of huge numbers of 
foreigners living and benefitting from economic development in the country, who 
almost have no relation with the local community, and who very frequently do 
not know Arabic and are not able to access the community in a natural way.  
As a final note, it is important to reflect on some challenges encountered 
during this research period, particularly in terms of security. Research topics 
related to ‗security or state repression are often more politically sensitive‘ than 
many other topics (Schwedler, 2006 p. 426). The challenges in terms of security 
were not from society or from activists at all. They were from authorities. The 
challenges that I personally experienced as a research have led me to take 
specific research decisions at particular points in time. An example of one of 
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these situations is my experience during the last protest that I attended on the 
17th October 2014, the first protest after the new terrorism law was passed. 
Upon arrival to the protest site, I was approached by an unidentified man before 
the protest began, who told me to not take pictures. From his looks and from the 
way his following actions, it was obvious this man was from the intelligence. At 
that moment, I decided I would do as he said, and I stopped documenting the 
protest. During the hours that the protest lasted, I felt a lot of tension among 
activists as well as among observers. After this incident, I reflected on what had 
happened, and on the turn that the issue of security was taking in the country 
since summer 2014. Moreover, I remembered another Exeter Student, and his 
unfortunate experience a few months earlier. At that moment I decided that I 
would not attend other protests (if any were organised by the HSU), at least for 
a period. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out the methodological approach used in this 
project, which is overall a qualitative research approach that takes an 
interpretive frame. It has argued that the fluidity of social movements and the 
relevance of participants‘ self-understanding need the combination of the three 
levels of inquiry –macro, meso and micro- to provide the holistic approach 
needed to address the analytical questions of the project. The chapter has 
described the relevance and justified the selection of an interpretive approach 
for this particular approach, and has presented the selection of methods of data 
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collection as one that is based on this overall research approach. The methods 
of data collection for the project, namely participant observation, semi-
structured interviews, focus groups, and document analysis, have been 
explained in turn, identifying the way in which these methods have been useful 
when applied to this particular research project.  
Finally, the chapter has allowed for a reflection on the experience of 
researching mobilisation and repression in Jordan by engaging with more 
context-specific issues related to the researcher‘s role as insider/outsider of the 
movement, as a female researcher, the importance of creating trust networks 
for this type of research, and obstacles encountered on the way. These 
elements have been discussed as being of key concern for this particular 
research project and its viability.  
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Chapter 3 Contextualising the Case: Jordan’s Liberal Autocracy in 
Containing Social Mobilisation 
 
 
The present chapter analyses the way in which the relationship between the 
Jordanian regime and social movements today has been historically 
constructed. This contextual outline provides insights into the way in which 
dissent and the state relate to one another in contemporary Jordan. The 
Jordanian regime has faced challenges to its authority since the 1950s, and has 
developed, since 1989 a liberal autocratic government model system of 
authority, which determines the regime‘s response to challenges in the form of 
movements, riots, coups, and protests. New forms of dissent thus range 
themselves against a regime that has consolidated a repertoire of counter-
strategic measures for decades. I argue that the Jordanian regime‘s 
development into a liberal autocratic system has allowed the state to survive via 
a calculated counter-strategy that combines liberal democratic conciliatory 
measures with repression and securitisation. This system of authority has 
effects at a social, economic, and political level and determines expressions of 
social dissent and mobilisation in the country.  
In order to argue this, and after presenting a working definition of ‗liberal 
autocracy‘, I intentionally avoid framing the analysis in terms of the reign of the 
different monarchs as I consider that other events have marked this relationship 
to a greater extent. The analysis is therefore be structured in the following way. 
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First, I explore the period that preceded the 1989 April Uprising in Jordan, 
characterised by a brief period of contention followed by the implementation of 
martial law. The second analytical period starts with the 1989 April Uprising, 
and continues until the early 2000, period during characterised by the initial 
development of Jordan into a liberal autocracy after the lifting of martial law and 
by the realignment of state interests in society.  
Third, I analyse the period since 2000, when social, economic, and 
political repercussions of this model became particularly evident with the rapid 
development of global capitalism and the engagement of Jordan in the Global 
War on Terror (GWOT). Finally, I look into the first months of Arab revolutionary 
period in Jordan until the 24th March 2011 sit-in, and the capitalisation of social 
mobilisation during this initial period, in order to situate the HSU in time, 
describing the movement‘s appearance in the Jordanian and regional context. 
This analysis is necessary to understand the current context in which the HSU 
acts. 
The Middle East and North African region has been home for a variety of 
conflicts that have taken different forms and have constantly threatened human 
security since the end of its formal colonisation period. This period resulted in 
the creation of nation-states that not only supposed the physical division of the 
territory but, more importantly, built frontiers between its peoples and 
communities. More recently, the region has witnessed an increase in protest 
and dissident activities in the form of popular uprisings that demand dignity and 
political change from the established power, posing challenges to the pre-
conceived idea of ‗Arab Exceptionalism‘.  
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The so-called Arab Spring, which some consider should be called the 
Arab Republics‟ Spring (Yom and Gause, 2012 p. 74) has managed to produce 
an unprecedented change in a region marked until now by a stagnant status 
quo and political authoritarianism. However, social dynamics in the monarchical 
regimes of the region have been portrayed as inexistent or as working towards 
authoritarian regime endurance, resulting in what Sean Yom and Gregory 
Gause have recently defined as ‗new Monarchical Exceptionalism‘ (2012 p. 76). 
The Jordanian regime has put forward various strategies that have 
marked its relationship with society and resulted in a complex relationship which 
could explain the regime‘s authoritarian resilience. Throughout the years, 
regime strategies have contributed to a situation of what I define elsewhere as 
‗tense stability‘ in the relationship between the state and political dissidence. I 
thereby ague against recent analyses that paint a solid and stable monarchy in 
a troubled region. In order to understand strategies and social movement 
organisation today, there is a need to further explore the relation between state 
and society through episodes of collective action and contentious politics. The 
aim here is to see how the current relationship between social movements and 
the regime are a result of decades of regime strategies. 
 
1952-1989. Consolidating authority, silencing opposition and martial law 
The Jordanian regime has faced challenges to its authority since the 50s 
after the first liberalised constitution and the creation of the Jordanian 
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Parliament in 1952, which have threatened regime survival, forcing it to develop 
a particular repertoire of strategic response. Although this chapter focuses on 
the relationship between the state and dissent in Jordan since 1989, year when 
the Jordanian regime started developing fully into a liberal autocratic one, it is 
necessary to briefly introduce the period that preceded this year in order to 
highlight several points of interest that are necessary to understand dissent and 
the state today.  
During this period, the regime took several moves to consolidate its 
authority and weaken challenges from opposing voices. The first period of 
contention that we will refer to, with the protagonist role of the Jordanian 
National Movement, was relatively short and ended five years later with the 
declaration of martial law in 1957. Then we will look into the regime‘s strategies 
after the period of political turmoil in 1957 and the way in which the 1967 war, 
the Black September civil war in 1970 and the oil booms in the 1980s have 
determined the state‘s response to social political organisation. 
The first challenge to the consolidation of the regime‘s rule derived from 
the appearance and organizational activities of the Jordanian National 
Movement (JNM) during the 1950s which was a major coalition of leftist political 
parties highly influential during this decade (Anderson, 2005 p. 4). Its major 
demands were against the monarchical monopoly over power and their 
definitions of national identity, rallying calls ‗for the youth –the ―new‖ to replace 
the ―old‖ politicians of the Hashemite regime‘ (Anderson, 2005 p. 7). The 
movement‘s popularity and capacity to act as an umbrella under which other 
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groups found their place was due to the new types of collective action they 
propose, which took the form of a movement that gained political influence. 
The goals and demands of the JNM sometimes coincided with those of 
other major opposition groups, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Tahrir 
(Liberation) Party (Anderson, 2005 p. 142), which on occasions demonstrated 
their solidarity towards the movement‘s demands. Although the JNM was 
relatively homogeneous and unified along similarities in social class among its 
leaders and the strategies they used to recruit supporters, ‗the potential for 
fragmentation remained ever present‘ in the movement (Anderson, 2005 p. 
137). This potential fragmentation was due to the incomplete unity of the 
movement which is sometimes described as being an ‗umbrella‘ for different 
parties and groups, resulting in difficulties in unifying action when the movement 
became more successful. The movement‘s popularity and capacity to act as an 
umbrella under which other groups could position themselves owed to the new 
types of collective action they put forwards which ‗proved to be the most 
politically influential and popular‘ and the ‗ideological and emotional bond‘ 
provided by Arab nationalist ties (Anderson, 2005 p. 148). 
The Jordanian regime‘s response to the JNM‘s organisation during the 
events of major political agitation in Jordan went from brief cooperation to a 
stronger period of state repression. For the first time in Jordan, riots, 
demonstrations and political protests managed to threaten and undermine the 
authority of the regime. At that time, even groups which were then considered 
loyal to the regime, such as the Islamic Action Front (IAF), engaged in political 
activism against the state´s decisions like the Baghdad Pact which tied Jordan 
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to Iraq and Britain in a conservative alliance intending to buffer the region from 
Soviet influence (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2009 p. 34).  
The challenge to the consolidation of monarchical authority posed by the 
JNM during this period, resulted in a series of measures taken by the Jordanian 
regime that set it on the path toward liberal autocracy. First, this period served 
the monarchical regime a ‗linchpin‘ monarchy where the ‗monarch stands above 
and away from routine politics‘ (Lucas, 2004 p. 108). Two political actions 
illustrate this point. First, in order to assure its survival, the Jordanian regime 
engaged in successive changes of governments and prime ministers that were 
presented as conciliatory moves towards the JNM. Among these moves were 
the resignation of Prime Minister Hazza‘ Al-Majali and the subsequent 
dissolution of Parliament. Alongside this came the removal from office of famed 
British officer and Transjordan tsar Sir John Glubb ‗Pasha‘ (Anderson, 2005 pp. 
164-168).  
The second conciliatory move put forward by the Jordanian regime at the 
time was the inclusion of movement members into the government, with King 
Hussein granting Sulayman Al-Nabulsi, leader of the JNM, the right to serve as 
Prime Minister of a leftist government in 1956. Although these moves could be 
interpreted as a positive direct result of the JNM activities, they could also be 
interpreted as a strategy by the regime to try to consolidate its authority in this 
model of linchpin monarchy where the government has limited powers. Both 
these moves proved effective in retaining the regime‘s power and authority later 
when major differences appeared between the monarch and Al-Nabulsi‘s 
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government, as this last one ‗implicitly demanded that the king move into the 
shadows of the political stage‘ (Anderson, 2005 p. 180). 
The second strategy that the regime adopted during this period in order 
to assure the consolidation of its authority was to turn to external help in face of 
internal political turmoil. King Hussein supported the Eisenhower Doctrine 
outline of Congress in January 1957 whereby the United States sought a 
proactive, overt and covert, intervention in securing the neighbourhood from 
Soviet inroads. The United States perceived threats to its regional allies and 
saw pro-Western rulers such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia or Iraq as vulnerable to 
Nasserist and Soviet influence so it considered that there was a necessity to 
establish a new mechanism of intervention ‗to stabilise the region against Soviet 
threats of internal turmoil or revolution‘ (Hahn, 2006 p. 39).  
Political turmoil in Jordan built up to two coups in 1957 (Lucas, 2005 p. 
18), after which dissident activities would come to an end as a result of 
measures put forward by the state. The first coup, unfolding on the 2nd April 
1957, during the Al-Nabulsi‘s cabinet, resulted in his dismissal by the King. 
Eleven days later, on the 13th April 1957, a second coup by Arab nationalist 
forces managed to challenge the state, although it was effectively stopped by 
the monarchy and its royal Bedouin soldiers. According to Peter Hahn, the 
Eisenhower Doctrine guided US policy during the political crisis in Jordan in 
1957 when ‗King Hussein asserted his authority by summoning thousands of 
allied Bedouin warriors to Amman and dismissing al-Nabulsi and Army Chief of 
Staff General Ali Abu Nuwar on charges of conspiracy and insubordination. U.S. 
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officials promptly stabilized Hussein with tens of millions of dollars in aid‘ (2006 
p. 42).  
The US has subsequently considered Jordan to be a ‗critically important‘ 
state for two main US regional objectives, namely ‗the containment of 
revolutionary Arab nationalism and the preservation of Middle East peace‘ 
(Little, 1995 p. 512). This perception will be reflected in the sustained and 
increasing aid for Jordan until today. Jordan has been a clear example 
throughout history of how ‗autocracies channel aid and remittances to finance 
patronage by reducing their expenditures on welfare goods‘ (Ahmed, 2012 p. 3). 
This has become a determining factor that has been clearly reflected on the 
trends of contentious politics in the country and on the strategies put forward by 
the state in each period. 
The political turmoil and the two coups of 1957 resulted in the state‘s 
decision to declare martial law, banning political parties and generally limiting 
freedoms that affected citizens‘ lives at all levels including freedom of 
expression, association, political participation, assembly, or communication.xii 
Jordan‘s first ‗experiment‘ with liberalism ended in 1957, a year that became a 
turning point in Jordan‘s political life. This was particularly a turning point for the 
relationship between social movements and the state, which ‗would signal the 
end of any attempt at constitutional rule‘ (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2009 
p. 35). 
  The political decision made by the state of declaring martial law directly 
affected the JNM‘s activities. As argued by Anderson, in April 1957 the state 
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successfully destroyed the Jordanian National Movement (JNM) because ‗they 
were able to garner support from key components of society‘ such as the ‗king‘s 
men‘, Bedouin tribesmen in the army, peasants, and merchants, and the 
opposition was not able to garner as much support (2005 p. 5). This contrasts 
with the position argued for by other authors‘ arguments in studying leftist 
movements in the 1950s in Jordan who take as given the historical legitimacy of 
the Hashemite monarchy to rule the country and who consider that the political 
turmoil of these years solidified and legitimised their leadership.xiii  Anderson‘s 
argument goes further and considers that not only did the Hashemite monarchy 
need to garner support from national social groups, but furthermore, the same 
existence of the state ‗needed new alliances of unions with the surrounding 
countries‘ (2005 p. 171).  
  As well as the state‘s strategies to end all forms of political opposition, 
particularly that represented by the JNM, internal organisational factors 
influenced the fall and eventual dissolution of the movement and resulted in a 
period of ‗restoration of the Hashemite regime‘ (Anderson, 2005 p. 182-191). 
Despite its effective political organisation and Arab nationalism as a unifying 
ideology for the movement, major disunity among the movement as it included 
other groups in its action and the lack of resources undermined the continuity of 
the JNM as a major opposition movement.  
  Collective action during this first period had major repercussions in the 
relationship between the state and citizens which were reflected in the May 
1958 constitutional amendments. On one hand, these amendments limited the 
power of the Parliament; on the other, they empowered the state in its 
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relationship with social movements.xiv As for the increased power of the Royal 
Court and the limited power of the elected parliamentary representatives, the 
1958 amendments introduced a clause that allowed for a government to be 
formed without the presence of the lower house. Moreover, a clause was 
introduced which enabled the monarch to dissolve the Senate.xv Furthermore, 
after the harsh repression of 1957, the 1958 constitutional amendments made 
the resignation of government no longer compulsory in the event of dissolution 
of the Lower House, and the ministers participating in a current government 
were allowed to run for the next electionsxvi. In relation to the passing of laws, 
the power of the parliament and the members of this body was further limited by 
the amendments, since a clause was introduced stating that at least ten of its 
members should sign the petition to consider the drawing of new lawsxviixviii.  
  As well as limiting the Parliament‘s power, the 1958 constitutional 
amendments affected the state‘s relationship with the opposition. According to 
the 1952 Constitution, civilians could only be judged according to the 
Constitution and its subsidiary laws. When the 1958 amendments were passed, 
civilians could also be judged by other ‗regulations‘, which implied that they 
could also be judged by military regulations. Another relevant amendment to 
understand the way in which protests in 1957 altered state-society relations 
from a legal perspective was that granting the King and his government the 
powers to issue temporary laws even during a dissolve parliament so long as 
they gave three justifications. Before the 1958 amendments, the King and the 
government‘s power to issue temporary laws was only provisioned for periods 
when parliament was not in session, but forbidden for periods when it was 
dissolved.  
104 
 
 The way in which the King used its support base to retain power when 
faced with major opposition on the street during the 1950s has been considered 
a moment during which hopes for real participatory politics ended in Jordan 
(Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2009 p. 36). The monarchy limited the power 
of the parliament, jealously guarding the royal court‘s prerogatives and ‗elected 
representatives had no real power to formulate policies‘ (Milton-Edwards and 
Hinchcliffe, 2009 p. 36). In Betty Anderson‘s words, the strategies put forward 
by the state that resulted in its survival and in the destruction of the JNM are an 
example of how a ‗colonialist-designed state can generate support and garner a 
degree of legitimacy from the population‘ (2005 p. 191). This networked support 
base will be crucial in understanding the regime‘s survival strategies until today. 
Following the events of the late 1950s, the 1960s in Jordan were 
characterised by the predominance of martial law, that posed limits for 
dissidence and the opposition of Arab nationalists to the regime, which hindered 
the monarchy‘s consolidation of power. Two main conflicts between 1957 until 
1989 illustrate this point: 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and 1970 Black September 
war. In order to understand these two conflicts, and their meaning for the 
relationship between the state and dissent in Jordan, it is necessary to 
introduce briefly the concept of Arab nationalism and its political implications 
during this period for Jordan.  
The meaning of nationalism was a matter of debate among Arab leaders 
and states even before their accession to formal independence. The 
controversies resulted in major clashes and differing positions in relation to the 
concepts of nationalism and sovereignty in the period these states were 
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consolidating their rule. At a regional level, two positions emerged, which 
undermined the Jordanian King with the major trend of Arab nationalism headed 
by Egypt‘s Gamal Abdel Nasser.xix  King Hussein favoured the ‗interpretations 
of Arab nationalism that were consistent with the territorial division of the Arab 
world and exclusivity associated with sovereignty‘ (Barnett, 1995 p. 480). 
Moreover, Arab nationalist movements were also seen as representative of ‗the 
struggle of the Middle Eastern peoples for liberation from imperialist domination‘ 
(Galvani, 1972 p. 4) which stood in marked contrast with King Hussein‘s pro-
Western policies. As expressed by Alan Taylor, the years before the 1967 Six-
Day War against Israel were characterised by ‗a somewhat contrived dispute 
between self-styled ―revolutionary‖ states and the conservative regimes‘ (1982 
p. 73), with Jordan belonging to the latter. 
The first conflict that challenged the authority of the Jordanian regime 
during this period was the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Internal pressure from 
Palestinian groups inside Jordan built throughout the 1960s, which could have 
driven King Hussein to join Syria and Egypt in the preparations of the 1967 war 
against Israel. As explained by Russell Lucas, the Jordanian monarch saw 
defeat but decided to join the Arab coalition ‗for fear that his inaction would 
cause a domestic revolt‘ (2005 p. 19). Before the 1967 Six-Day War and the 
subsequent defeat of Arab states in what has been termed the Naksa 
(Setback), the attitude that prevailed was that ‗Palestinian interests were best 
served by coordinated Arab direction and not by independent action by 
Palestinian leadership‘ (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2009 p. 40).xx 
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Lucas explains that for Jordan the loss of the West Bank ‗may have been 
worth the price, as the threat of Arab nationalism to King Hussein‘s survival‘ 
decreased (2005 p. 19). The decrease of Arab nationalist threat referenced by 
this author was coupled with an increase in the activities of the Palestinian 
nationalist movement in Jordan. This was a new, and so far the greatest 
ideological threat for the Jordanian regime‘s consolidation and survival. Despite 
the general view among Arab states of Fatah and Palestinian militias as 
sympathetic groups that provided relief of some popular opposition and 
frustration after the Six Day War‘s Naksa. Their activities were also perceived 
as a major obstacle to the diplomatic agreements that would enable these 
countries to recover territories lost during the War. In the Jordanian case, 
discrepancies with Fatah went beyond these obstacles towards diplomatic 
arrangements, and built up to the 1970 Black September skirmishes. Michael 
Hudson already explained two years after the war, in 1969, that ‗Jordan suffers 
not only in human and economic terms, it also risks revolution or even extinction 
as a political entity‘ (1969 p. 301). 
The second conflict that challenged the authority of the Jordanian regime 
before 1989 was the 1970 Black September conflict. During the 1960s but more 
notably since the war and throughout 1968, guerrilla groups called Fedayeen or 
‗sacrificers‘ multiplied and showed discomfort for the Jordanian regime. At the 
end of the War, Fatah took the decision of establishing its bases in regions 
outside Israeli control that met specific requirements.xxi Given its proximity, East 
Bank of the Jordan river was an ‗obvious choice‘ (Jabber, 1973 p. 82). By 1969, 
the Palestinian guerrilla movement had ‗established itself as a regional actor on 
its own‘ (Sayigh, 1997 p. 20). The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
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(PFLP) ‗considered the Hashemite regime almost as much an enemy as Israel 
itself‘ (Hudson, 1969 p. 301) leading King Hussein to try and curb guerilla 
activities.  
The increasing Palestinian resistance would find its highest period of 
tension at the beginning of the 1970s. Fatah, the PFLP and the Jordanian 
regime confronted one-another during the 1970 Black September conflict. This 
resulted in a forceful expulsion of Palestinian dissenting groups from Jordan by 
the regime. The Black September civil war was triggered by the PFLP hijacking 
two Western airlines and bringing the planes to Jordan. The regime responded 
with force, killing up to 3,400 Palestinians and eliminating fedayeen. By July 
1971, there was no PLO military presence in Jordan (Lucas, 2005 p. 19). 
Following a similar pattern as the one of 1957, constitutional 
amendments were passed in Jordan after the 1970-1971 Black September 
skirmishes. The most relevant constitutional amendment that hindered any 
effective citizens‘ political participation and empowered the state was related to 
elections. The 1974 constitutional amendments now established that elections 
could be postponed under ‗exceptional circumstances‘. No further specifications 
on the nature of characteristics of these circumstances were defined, and the 
constitution expressed that these ‗exceptional circumstances‘ would be 
determined by the ministerial council when its members considered that holding 
elections was impossible. Before the 1974 constitutional amendments, elections 
could not be postponed.  
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 Finally, before engaging with the development of the liberal autocratic 
Jordanian regime since 1989, it is necessary to briefly introduce the semi-rentier 
economic nature of the regime, established in the 1970s. The oil booms of 
1973-74 and 1979-80 were two key moments when ‗oil-dependent sectors 
became increasingly important sources of finance for their domestic economies‘ 
(Brynen, 1992 p. 71). During this period, Jordan consolidated itself as what Rex 
Brynen defines a semi-rentier state. This new state form had important effects 
on state-society relations. Among these were the rentier state's access to large 
amounts of externally generated economic resources that strengthened the 
regime‘s autonomy.  
This meant that regime decision-makers were much less constrained by 
the interests of domestic actors, and could promote neo-patrimonial social 
structures based on family or tribal affiliations (Brynen, 1992 p. 74). The semi-
rentier nature of the post-1970s Jordanian state will be relevant to understand 
the state‘s response to internal instability and towards internal opposition in the 
form of riots and protests in successive years. As Brynen explains, ‗semi-
rentiers, such as Jordan, may find their ability to support established patterns of 
neo-patrimonial authoritarianism increasingly constrained as external incomes 
decline‘ (Brynen, 1992 p. 76). 
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1989-2000s. Establishing Jordan as a ‘liberalised autocracy’ 
The second analytical period starts with the 1989 April Uprising, and 
continues until the early 2000. This period was characterised by the initial 
development of Jordan as a liberal autocracy after the lifting of martial law and 
by the realignment of state interests in society. The year 1989 marked the start 
of the ‗political re-liberalisation‘ (Ryan and Schwedler, 2004 p. 139) and is a 
clear turning point in the phases of democratisation in Jordan. As a result of the 
implementation of the IMF rescue package in 1988-89, the oil crisis of 1989, 
and given the aforementioned semi-rentier nature of the Jordanian state by the 
end of the 1980s, subsidies on a number of basic commodities and everyday 
products were removed. The removal of subsidies primarily impacted people in 
rural areas.xxii 
This sparked riots in rural areas of traditional support for the monarchy, 
first in the city of Ma‘an, then in Kerak and Tafileh, which had been defined by 
Lucas as ‗disorganized displays of dissatisfaction‘ (2005 p. 23) in April 1989. 
These riots came to be known in Jordan as habet nissan (The Uprising of April). 
Caused by a worsening economic situation that resulted from the oil crisis, the 
economic crisis turned into a political crisis when riots started and ‗protesters 
voiced their support for the monarchy as an institution but called for returning 
the subsidies, new parliamentary elections, and the sacking of Prime Minister 
Zayd al-Rifa‘i‘ (Lucas, 2005 p. 27).  
The 1989 uprising posed social, economic, and political challenges to the 
Jordanian regime. Given its weak position, and its inability to continue 
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subsidising loyalties given its worsening economic situation, the Jordanian 
regime adopted the path of liberalisation. At that time, the regime did not 
respond with massive force but opted to set out liberal political measures that it 
presented as ‗the most extensive democratisation program in the region‘ (Ryan 
and Schwedler, 2004 p. 139). Without challenging its authority, these reforms 
would reduce internal and international pressures. It abrogated martial law, in 
force since 1957. This was supplemented with other measures including the 
restoration of parliamentary elections, legalising opposition parties and relaxing 
the repressive grip on civil society.  
These tensions were expressing desire for a new political pact. This was 
achieved in April 1990 through the creation of the National Charter, established 
by King Hussein ‗to complete and strengthen the process of Jordanian 
reconstruction‘ and ‗to lay the foundations and define the methods of national 
public activity‘ (1990). A sixty-member royal commission drew up the charter 
with the aim of pointing ‗out the way for the future, establishing general 
guidelines on the exercise of political pluralism in so far as it constitutes the 
second component of democracy. This would be accomplished in the basis of 
the constant tenets of the Constitution, as well as of political and national 
tradition. It would take cognisance of existing realities in Jordanian society in 
such a manner as would guarantee continued national progress and democratic 
change and protect them from taking adverse course‘(1990).  
The Charter was adopted in June 1991. Following this, the Jordanian 
Press and Publications Law was amended in 1993 and parliamentary elections 
were allowed to take place (Lucas, 2005 p. 27). Though the extent to which the 
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beginning of the process of political liberalisation in Jordan resulted from a 
genuine will to democratise is debatable, it was nevertheless a significant 
outcome of these protests of 1989, after its complete closure during the 
preceding decades (Milton-Edwards and Hinchcliffe, 2009 p. 48). After this brief 
period of political opening, the 1991 Madrid peace conference was an 
opportunity for Jordan to become an important regional actor in the resolution of 
the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.  
This strategy won back US financial support for the Kingdom. After this, 
the regime put forward measures to decrease the influence of the mainly 
Islamist opposition, mainly Islamist opposition, including via an amendment to 
the electoral law. As a consequence, 1993 elections saw a reduction of the 
influence of the IAF, which enabled the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 
1994, resulting in further economic rewards to the regime. As explained by 
Curtis Ryan and Jillian Schwedler, ‗since the signing of the 1994 peace treaty 
with Israel, the monarchy has become steadily less tolerant of the levels of 
pluralism, civil society and dissent that had flourished in the atmosphere of 
1989-93‘ (2004). With the increase of foreign aid, the period following the peace 
treaty with Israel saw further amendments in the press law which reduced civil 
rights and freedom of expression (1997). The 1994 peace treaty with Israel has 
therefore been defined as a ‗death knell‘ of any political liberalisation in the 
country (Brand, 1999, Peters and Moore, 2009) 
Socio-economically, after April 1989, ‗the need arose for the regime to 
negotiate a new social contract with society, resulting in a far-reaching process 
of political liberalisation and partial democratisation‘ (Brynen, 1992 p. 70). The 
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Jordanian regime had to re-construct loyalties in the country after its tribal base 
challenged its authority on April 1989, bringing to the surface the state‘s socio-
economic and political weaknesses. Given the Jordanian state‘s weaknesses, 
reconstructing loyalties in the country became difficult. Already in 1971 Johan 
Galtung described Jordan‘s regime as ‗militarily strong‘ yet ‗politically and 
economically so weak that it cannot last long – unless artificially propped up by 
the US and UK, perhaps also by Israel‘ (Galtung, 1971 p. 197). Since the 1989 
bread riots, loyalties in Jordan have not so much been built on traditional tribal 
links. Instead the regime has adopted a more liberal approach to loyalty that 
builds on the political and economic elite.  
Exploring the events of 1989 is key to understand loyalty in Jordan today, 
and the way in which the state has embarked in reconfiguring its loyal base 
through a new neoliberal track within the global structure. It is key to mention 
these events, which were followed by Jordan‘s first International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) loan. At that moment, state interests were realigned, and loyalty was 
established with the military and the security apparatus, which are majority 
Transjordanian Jordanian, and the business elite, who were primarily 
Palestinian that benefitted from the development of the private sector. Since this 
restructuring period, loyalty can no longer be completely understood in terms of 
the historically constructed Transjordanian-Palestinian ethnic division. 
Despite the Jordanian regime‘s rhetoric, political transition, 
democratisation, and political liberalisation since 1989, there have been no 
political openings and the country may even have seen a regression. The 
authoritarian-democratic continuum has given place to extensive terminology of 
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these ‗hybrid regimes‘ and political science debates on whether they are 
swinging from one to another side of the spectrum at different moments in 
timexxiii. These debates on the ‗democraticness‘ of Arab countries has further 
intensified since 2011 with the Arab revolutions. The term ‗liberalised autocracy‘ 
has been applied to regimes in this continuum that are characterised by having 
put forward a ‗mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections, and selective 
repression‘ (Brumberg, 2002 p. 56). In contrast to ‗full autocracies‘, where there 
is no space for debate or for competitive politics, ‗liberalised autocracies‘ allow 
for a certain degree of pluralism. These regimes are liberal in the sense that 
they ‗not only tolerate but promote a measure of political openness in civil 
society, in the press, and even in the electoral system of their country‘, but 
autocratic in the sense that ‗rulers always retain the upper hand‘ (Brumberg, 
2003 p. 3). The term ‗liberalised autocracy‘ does not only refer to the sets of 
strategies that authoritarian states chose to endure in time, but that they are ‗a 
type of political system‘ (Brumberg, 2002 p. 56) that is changing the 
authoritarian system and defying linear models of democratisation.  
Jordan is an example of this new form of non-democratic governance. 
The response of the Jordanian regime to social, economic, and political 
challenges posed by social mobilisation —regional and national— since 2011 
represents ‗a protracted cycle in which rulers widen or narrow the boundaries of 
participation and expression‘ (Brumberg, 2002 p. 57). Economic liberalisation, 
with a decreased role of the state in economic issues, combined with liberal 
political moves that are superficial and do not threaten the regime‘s authority, 
and a series of repressive and securitisation measures, all contribute to create 
Jordan‘s ‗adaptable ecology of repression, control, and political openness‘ 
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(Brumberg, 2002 p. 57). In Jillian Schwedler‘s words, until today ‗Jordan 
remains a security state, ―liberal‖ economically but not politically‘ (2012a p. 
259). 
 
2000-2011: Accelerated economic liberalisation and increased 
securitization policies 
Since the early 2000s, social, economic, and political repercussions of 
the liberal autocratic model have manifested themselves. This period coincided 
with the rapid acceleration of global capitalism, the Global War on Terror and 
increased securitisation policies. Moreover, in Jordan this decade coincided 
with King Abdullah II ascending the throne in 1999. The new King‘s ascension, 
although it greatly supposed economic and political continuation of the former 
King‘s system of authority, meant a symbolic rupture. The new King is son of 
King Hussein‘s British wife, and was educated in the West.  
The process of liberalisation in Jordan since its acceleration in the 2000s, 
could be described as a process that followed two distinct paths and rhythms: 
one economic and the other political. Economic liberalisation and a marked 
reduction in the involvement of the state has been accelerated, with deep social 
implications. At the same time, liberal political measures have been superficial 
and have not resulted in real political pluralism or freedoms for society. The 
unsustainable situation that would result from this two-way process has been 
controlled through repression and securitisation, expanding the military and the 
security apparatus. Overall, economic liberalisation and securing regime 
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stability have taken priority over political reform. This Jordanian strategy, similar 
to other regional countries, prepared the ground for Arab revolutions of 2011. 
Economic liberalisation in Jordan meant a decreased power of state 
institutions in relation to the free market, international financial agencies, or 
NGOs. As in other similar MENA cases, this trend intensified in the entire global 
south in the years preceding the financial crisis of 2007. In Jordan, economic 
liberalisation has continued sinking the country in further economic depression 
since then, resulting in socio-economic implications.  
 The development of economic liberalisation in Jordan in the 2000s can 
be exemplified at two levels. First, economic liberalisation can be understood by 
looking at partial reform of civil society laws and organisations. Although at first 
glance this move might look as more political than economical, it is important to 
analyse it from an economic point of view. Economic liberalisation implies a 
decreased power of the state in the economy, at all levels. As aforementioned, 
Jordan embarked in this liberalisation at a moment in which the country was 
suffering from a severe economic crisis, which was deriving into political 
conflict. The state was no longer able to provide social and health services, so it 
decided to adopt a series of economically liberalising moves. In this context, 
civil society laws and organisations were amended, encouraging the creation 
and empowerment of civil society organisations that would ‗assume some of 
these tasks‘  (Brumberg, 2003 p. 7) that the state was no longer assuming and 
that were needed to provide services to the people and contain social 
discontent. The political level of this measure, of course, relies in the fact that 
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this encouragement came hand in hand with making sure to retain ultimate 
control over these newly created social organisations. 
 Second, the partial reform of economy developed in such a way that the 
regime pushed for the development and expansion of the private sector at a 
time when the country was going through the economic crisis of the 1990s; with 
decreased oil-revenues and rising foreign debt. The strategy of the Jordanian 
regime was directed ‗to the business community to encourage foreign 
investment‘. Partial economic reforms have not solved the root causes of the 
economic crisis, they have just attracted ‗some foreign and domestic 
investment‘ (Brumberg, 2003 p. 7) to contribute to expand this private sector 
that benefits the loyal business elite. This type of liberal economic strategy, as I 
will expand on in the following paragraphs, has had deep socio-economic 
implications.  
The main socio-economic implication of partial economic liberalisation in 
Jordan, particularly since the 2000s, has been growing economic inequalities 
between the majority of the population and political and economic elites. The 
development of the capital city Amman illustrates the social effects of partial 
economic liberalisation, which are particularly relevant for social mobilisation in 
Jordan. When we talk about development, we tend to think about unequal 
development between the city and rural areas, at least about an unequal 
development between the capital city and the rest of the country. In Jordan, 
economic liberalisation has only benefited small, sparsely populated areas of 
West Amman, particularly the Areas of Abdoun or Dabouq, home for the 
political and economic elite of the country. Amman could be described as ‗two 
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cities in one‘, were East Amman is home for social, economic, and politically 
marginalised clusters of society, and West Amman for the national political and 
business elite, as well as international aid workers, or immigrants that call 
themselves ‗expats‘.  
West Amman has benefitted from major investment and infrastructure, 
including the best schools, hospitals, supermarkets, coffee shops, wide 
avenues, malls, and even some sidewalks and few green areas or parks. All of 
this creates a safe environment in which Jordanian elites and foreigners can 
live. East Amman, on the other hand, is a highly populated area, home for the 
Jordanian working class, or Palestinian refugee camps that have been 
absorbed by the city. In East Amman, streets are narrow —inside refugee 
camps extremely narrow, not wider than a metre—, unpaved, poorly lighted, in 
some areas with no appropriate sewage or electricity systems; you find the 
UNRWA schools and hospitals that increasingly struggle to provide services to 
the rapidly growing population of these neighbourhoods. Socio-economic 
conditions in East Amman, where increasing numbers of citizens, particularly 
youth, are unemployed or have precarious jobs, create frustrations that 
frequently result in violent and conflictive neighbourhoods. 
 So Amman is ‗two cities‘, but it is also one. Being one city means that 
these realities sometimes overlap. These two cities meet when workers of East 
Amman commute to West Amman, or when youth that live in ‗East‘ go to the 
‗West‘ to hang out on the clean and lit, almost conflict-free streetsxxiv. This 
physical access to the developed and richer areas of the city, does not mean 
full access to participate in that ‗other‘ city, where tourists, foreign ‗expats‘ (in 
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their majority with ‗foreigner‘ salaries), and elites, enjoy a cup of coffee for 3 
JOD (over 4$). This urban reality reflects a class phenomenon in which the right 
to the city is unequal and lies in a few hands; ‗it is the poor, the underprivileged 
and those marginalised from political power that suffer first and foremost from 
this process‘ (Harvey, 2003). These growing inequalities affect many aspects of 
society, from unequal opportunities to unequal development, which creates 
social marginalisation and disenfranchisement and frustrations in society. This 
psychological situation has, moreover, great implications for social mobilisation.  
At the same time as economic liberalisation accelerated, political opening 
stagnated and remained a façade. This ‗new political formula‘ (Kamrava, 1998a 
p. 138) has resulted in a system that does not challenge the authority of the 
regime, nor does it benefit the majority of the population. Already in 2004 some 
analysts pointed to the trend of Jordan having become a ‗liberalised autocracy‘ 
after the 2003 parliamentary elections, a case ‗in which initial political openings 
mark less an advancement toward democracy than the emergence of new 
hybrid forms of nondemocratic rule‘ (Ryan and Schwedler, 2004 p. 139). The 
aim of the Jordanian regime, as of the rest of liberalised autocracies in the 
region, has been to allow greater pluralism under control, through strategies 
such as partial reform of parliament and electoral systems, or partial inclusion 
and containment of Islamist and secular dissent.  
Since 1989, Jordan has been putting forward several liberal moves that 
include the reform of parliament or the electoral system, including the 
controversial electoral law, ‗to attract a modicum of legitimacy and popular 
support‘ (Brumberg, 2003 p. 8). Moreover, the Jordanian regime has partially 
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included a plurality of opposition groups, Islamists as well as the more secular 
left, by allowing them ‗to enter parliament as independents or as a formal 
political party‘ (Brumberg, 2003 p. 9). Both strategies are perceived as ones of 
regime survival in face of the increasingly plural political landscape. 
Despite this limited and superficial political liberalisation, the reform 
process has continued being a priority in the regime‘s discourse. Ministers have 
been given instructions to advance in political reform programs and 
commissions have been created to start the reform process towards the political 
liberalisation of the regime. Moreover, different top-down initiatives were put 
forward such as Jordan First in 2002, the National Agenda in 2005, and We Are 
All Jordan initiative in 2006, all of which had little impact on political and civil 
rights in the country (Hamid and Freer, 2011). This situation has resulted in a 
series of socio-political implications that are relevant to understand social 
mobilisation.  
The first of these implications is political stagnation or the continuation of 
the status quo. No substantial political reform or opening results from these 
superficial political moves, that only serve to assure regime survival at two 
levels: first, presenting the regime in society as a regime that is concerned 
about reform and is taking steps towards liberalisation, and second, in terms of 
securing foreign aid from international donors that value or measure 
‗democraticness‘ through the (liberal) variables of elections, constitutional 
amendments, or legal reform, at the same time as they value the role of the 
Jordanian regime in maintaining security in the region or its role in the peace 
process. However, these moves do not have a positive impact on the wellbeing 
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of the majority of the population. The type of institutional political moves –
elections, constitutional amendments, political parties law– are of concern to 
similarly institutionalised political actors in order to acquire political benefits.  
Moreover, liberal democratic moves divert political debates away from 
issues of real concern for society. Instead of tackling issues such as freedom of 
expression and communication, prices of basic goods, minimum wages, 
working conditions, the quality and provision of social services, education, or 
the development of marginalised communities or of excluded social clusters, 
debates divert into electoral law, political parties law or parliamentary quotas, of 
interest for political and economic elites. Liberal democratic moves are 
increasingly distant from what people need and demand through social 
mobilisation.  
Finally, this develops into a perception, among the majority, that politics 
and political institutions are, as Hassan bluntly expresses, a ‗joke‘ (AI20-
29.09.14). People become uninterested in politics and end up rejecting any type 
of participation in political life. This in turn is beneficial for the authoritarian 
regime, which can easily control a generally politically uninterested and 
overwhelmingly politically uneducated society. Moreover, when society rejects 
political participation, it becomes suspicious of any grassroots social movement 
that tries to take action, because they generally consider that anyone trying to 
promote political change will end up being absorbed by the system, and it would 
be difficult to give them their trust.   
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All of these socio-political implications of liberalised autocracies result in 
the ‗aggravation of ideological conflicts‘ between ‗groups [that] are torn by 
disputes pitting Marxists, liberal secularists, Arab nationalists, Islamists, tribes, 
or ethnic groups against one another‘ (Brumberg, 2003 p. 11). According to 
Brumberg, the worsening of ideological conflicts is ‗a by-product of a system 
that inhibits the growth of political society (that is, an independent realm of 
political parties that can mobilize constituencies that have a stake in what their 
leaders say and do)‘ (2003 p. 11). This is a particularly relevant implication for 
the development of social mobilisation in Jordan.  
A worsening economic situation at a grassroots, together with a stagnant 
political opening process, creates an unsustainable social, economic, and 
political situation characterised by increased social grievances, frustration, and 
political stagnation. In order to sustain this system, liberal autocracies use 
securitization policies and repression to contain social mobilisation and unrest. 
These moves are applied selectively, especially on those that do not belong to 
the system, or have been socially, economically, and politically excluded; 
among them, uninstitutionalized opposition and dissent groups. Liberal 
autocracies have developed legislative models that allow for this repression 
and control of dissidence. I will develop this legislative framework later in the 
article when I analyse regime response to social mobilisation since 2011.  
Before 2011 uprisings, mobilization and opposition across the region had 
worked under extreme police-state measures for decades. State repression 
included large-scale attacks on attempts of organization, unionization, or 
protest, and included the control of media, intellectual criticism, electoral 
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manipulation, and cooptation techniques that curbed any type potential of 
opposition. This overarching dynamic applied to almost every country in the 
region, including Jordan, at the same time as the economic situation continued 
to worsen under neoliberal policies, namely in the form of increasing inequality 
and poverty. 
In Jordan, securitisation moves are legitimised –for national and 
international audiences– by different episodes of instability at a regional level, 
especially since the 2000 Intifada. As Jillian Schwedler explains, ‗since the start 
of the second intifada in late September 2000, Jordan has witnessed its most 
extensive and violent demonstrations since April 1989‘ (Schwedler, 2003 p. 
18). Examples of other regional conflicts that followed are the conflict in 
neighbouring Iraq in 2003, the hotel bombings in Amman in 2005, or the victory 
of Hamas in the 2006 elections in the Palestinian Territories. The regime‘s 
response has been to develop and strengthen the security elite –military and 
security apparatus– and resisting reform processes. Among the regime‘s 
reactions to this regional instability before 2011 are the counter-terrorism law 
passed by the regime in September 2006 (2006), the political party law of April 
2007 (2007a), or the NGO law of July 2008 (2008a). In words of Choucair:  
 ‗Jordan‘s history shows that threatening regional 
scenarios undermine the reform agenda by increasing the 
influence of security-oriented figures in the elite and 
undermining reformist voices‘ (Choucair, 2006 p. 12). 
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Since the 2000s, social mobilisation in Jordan faced a double counter-
strategy from the regime. Social grassroots organisations worked under 
extreme repressive police measures. At the same time, the Jordanian regime 
approached opposition with co-optation strategies, and already was ‗beginning 
to master techniques for adopting forms of political reform (with various new 
campaigns, dialogues, and laws) while retreating in matters of substance‘ 
Brown (2006 p. 3). This overarching dynamic applied to almost every country in 
the region, particularly to other similarly developed regional systems of liberal 
autocracy such as Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco or Jordan. In Jordan, while the 
economic situation continued to worsen under neoliberal policies since mid-
2000s, three lines of sustained social mobilisation became notable before 2011: 
labour, students, and political opposition. First, the day-waged labourers, who 
started organising around wage levels and social security demands, became 
the most significant movement in terms of representation and continuity. 
Second, among students, a movement named thabahtunā (‗you slaughtered 
us‘) emerged in 2007 in reaction to the announcement by public universities of 
privatisation and increased tuition fees. 
Third, political opposition started organising around demands against 
neoliberal policies and frozen political reforms, as well as around regional 
issues such as the peace process and its implications for the state‘s stance on 
Israel‘s policies, or US policies in Iraq, Sudan, Libya or Yemen. Among these 
constituencies, Jayeen (Coming Forward) brought together different leftist 
activists and put forth specific demands such as the dismissal of the prime 
minister in late 2010. Moreover it called for a stronger presence of the state in 
the country‘s economy.  
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Muqati‟yūn min ajal al-taghyīr (Boycotting for Change) was another 
movement that brought different activists, mainly leftist political parties‘ 
members and objected the election law that was bound to frame the legislative 
elections of 2010. Other bodies and movements such as al-hamlat al-waṭaniyya 
min ajal al-khobzwa-l-dimuqratiyya (The National Campaign for Bread and 
Democracy) and naqabiyūn min ajal al-ʾislāḥ (Syndicates‘ Members for Reform) 
were other platforms that enabled activists to organise. Activists found in these 
constituencies an alternative to act given the weakness of traditional political 
parties that lacked dynamism to attract new members and to carry out an 
influential role in local politics. This was mainly done through state surveillance 
and oppression. On the other hand, these movements were less formal and 
offered alternative organisation methods as they were formed mainly from 
opposition figures, and influential activists that adhered to leftist parties and 
organisations. 
 
2011 and the State’s Instrumentalisation of Social Mobilisation 
The year 2011 marked a new era in the history of the Arab region. In 
Jordan, I argue the regime was able to capitalise on social mobilisation during 
the initial period of intense social mobilisation before the appearance of the 
HSU in 2012, and that it was precisely the continuity perceived in the 
relationship between the state and opposition in Jordan, what drove young 
activists to organise under an independent, informal, un-institutionalised 
movement, the HSU. In this final analytical part to this chapter, I situate the 
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appearance of the HSU in time, both economically and politically, and describe 
the movement‘s appearance in the Jordanian and regional context. 
In order to contextualise the appearance of the HSU, it is relevant to 
describe the socioeconomic situation that characterised Jordan in 2011. After 
the preceding decade of accelerated economic liberalisation and increasing 
reliance on foreign aid, the socioeconomic situation in Jordan was characterised 
by a decreased economic growth that continued since 2008, high rates of youth 
unemployment and an important relatively new problem of job creation for 
young university graduates, low wages and an unequal distribution of wages 
between job groups, high poverty rates and an ever-expanding informal 
employment sector. The data presented here draws mainly from the Jordanian 
Department of Statistics and should be considered as approximate, given that it 
does not take into account large numbers of non-passport holding residents of 
Palestinian and Iraqi descent, nor foreign guest workers.  
As we have seen in the preceding pages, Jordan‘s economy has been 
centred on foreign aid and assistance, ‗in all of its diverse regional and 
international forms‘ (KAS 2014 p. 15) since its creation, but particularly since 
1989 and increasingly so since the 2000s. As we have seen, ‗Jordan‘s relative 
economic success has been too dependent on financial transfers from abroad, 
including ODA, while its local economic base is structurally not yet very strong‘ 
(UNDAF 2017 p. 1). By the year 2011, Jordan had become heavily reliant ‗on 
revenue generated from remittances and external aid‘ (UNDAF 2017 p. 2) and 
followed a strategy for development that focused on the development of human 
capital and a large public sector. This development strategy enabled, on one 
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hand, Jordan to export educated labour to the Gulf, contributing to its reliance 
on remittances, while not creating sufficient jobs to retain educated workers.  
Economic liberalization in Jordan has meant that economic reforms that 
were undertaken in the years preceding 2011 focused on trade liberalization 
and privatization. In the case of Jordan, ‗trade liberalisation was supposed to 
reduce the trade deficit, but it still reaches 25% of GDP, financed primarily by 
worker‘s remittances and foreign direct investment inflows according estimates 
by the Central Bank of Jordan‘ (UNDAF 2017 p. 2) and privatization has mainly 
affected the telecommunications, water, transport and manufacturing sectors. 
Overall, growth rates were strong up until the 2008 global economic and 
financial crisis in Jordan, and education and literacy rates had notably increased 
over the past decade. However, given this heavy reliance on foreign aid, the 
financial crisis of 2008 which went together with decreasing aid internationally, 
affected Jordan‘s economy to a great extent. ‗Jordan‘s main partners in global 
trade and foreign assistance were steadily affected, both on the regional and 
international levels‘ (KAS 2014 p. 17), and this reduction in the availability of 
aid, together with the uprisings and movements in the region and internally, 
‗have altogether triggered the economic recession in Jordan since 2010‘ (KAS 
2014 p. 23).  
In 2011 it was clear in Jordan that the economic growth that the country 
had experienced did not translate into a sustained and stable trend of job 
creation that would meet the requirements of the increasing numbers of young 
graduates in the country. The challenges faced by Jordan in relation to the 
creation of employment opportunities had resulted in the country being reported 
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as ‗one of the lowest labour force participation rates (LFPR) globally‘ (ILO 2013 
p. 3). By 2011, as reported by the International Labour Organisation, ‗the private 
sector had been largely ineffective in absorbing job seekers (especially women) 
–something that is reflected in the declining share of private sector employment 
relative to that in the public sector over the past decade‘ (2013 p. 4).  
According to the data available from the Jordanian Department of 
Statistics (DoS) and Jordan‘s National Employment Strategy 2011-2020, 
employment, particularly among youth, is an issue of central concern. According 
to the National Employment Strategy for the period 2011-2020, along with 
macroeconomic stability, the government should make employment its central 
economic policy. By 2011, a new issue of major concern in Jordan in relation to 
employment was the increasingly educated youth in Jordan, which would 
eventually seek to enter the job market, for which the country was not prepared 
and trend that would suppose a challenge for the economy.  
According to national statistics, in 2010 Jordan had a working age 
population of almost 3.5 million people, which at the time was a substantial 
segment of the population (around 6 million people) and a result of the high 
percentage of youth. The challenge in 2010 was that, from those 3.5 million 
people, less than 1.5 million were economically active and more than 2 million 
were inactive, meaning that they were not actively searching for work. In 2010 
the National Employment Strategy estimated that the working age population 
would increase from 3.4 million in 2009 to 4.4 million in 2020 and to 6 million in 
2030 due to what they refer to as the ‗gift‘ of having a very young population, 
therefore, ‗unless enough jobs can be created for Jordanians, the ―gift‖ can turn 
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into a ―curse,‖ subjecting the country to economic, social, and political pressure‘ 
(2010 p. 6).  
This report also took Jordan‘s working age population compared it with 
that of other countries in the region to find that, first, economic participation rate 
among males in Jordan was only 65%, which was low compared to other 
countries in the region such as Syria (88%), Morocco (85%), Tunisia (79%) or 
Egypt (76%). Furthermore, economic participation rate among females in 
Jordan was only 15%, notably low in comparison with other countries such as 
Syria (38%), Morocco (30%), Tunisia (31%) or Egypt (24%). In 2010, the 
National Employment Strategy argued that ‗this reality of an almost 60 percent 
inactive working age population suggests that the high rate of unemployment in 
Jordan is structural‘ (2010 p. 7), and therefore called for dev eloping an 
employment strategy that would address the situation of employment in the 
country in light of the predictions of increase in the working age population.  
The same report points to the demographic characteristics of employed 
and unemployed in Jordan in 2010. First, out of the 1.2 million working 
Jordanians, the National Employment Strategy establishes that 84% are male 
and 61% have a high school education or below (2010 p. 10). According to the 
report, the proportion of workers with university degrees had steadily risen from 
17.6% in 2000 to 23.7% in 2009, however this increase was not enough to meet 
the supply of Jordanians graduating from university and seeking to enter the job 
market. Furthermore, the report establishes that in 2010, employment was 
mainly in the following sectors in Jordan: public administration and defence 
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(25.6%), education (15.3%), manufacturing (13.8%), retail (13.5%), transport 
(11.2%), construction (8.8%) (2010 p. 10). 
Second, the report presents the demographic characteristics of 
unemployed in Jordan (2010 p. 13).  According to national statistics, the first 
notable characteristic of the unemployed in Jordan was that they were 
overwhelmingly young, with 49% being younger than 25, 72% below the age of 
30, and 89% of unemployed being younger than 40 years old. The second 
characteristic of unemployment in Jordan was the fact that unemployment had 
risen in the preceding years among university graduates, phenomenon that was 
relatively new in Jordan. According to the report, this new trend in 
unemployment in Jordan was worrying given the ‗growing mismatch between 
the output of educational systems and market demand, with the proportion of 
university graduates doubling among the unemployed between 2000 and 2010‘ 
(2010 p. 14). Finally, increasing unemployment in Jordan results in an informal 
employment that continues to account for a sizeable share of the labour force 
(approximately 44%) (ILO 2013 p. 4). 
Important to understand the socioeconomic situation in Jordan in 2011 is 
the structure and distribution of wages among employed Jordanians. According 
to data presented in the National Employment Strategy, in 2009 the average 
wage in Jordan was JD 365 per month, and the distribution of wages reflected a 
very wide base of low wages, with the majority of workers making less than JD 
300 per month (2010 p. 17). According to this report, wage distribution ranged 
in Jordan from an average of JD 1,136 for law makers and managers to an 
average of JD 232 for those in elementary occupations (e.g., drivers, 
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deliverymen, etc.). However, this distribution was unequal as, with the exception 
of law makers and managers, the majority of job groups make less that JD 300 
per month, including technical and associate professionals, clerical workers, 
workers in crafts and related occupations, machine assemblers and operators, 
and the elementary occupations mentioned before (2010 p. 17). 
This unequal distribution of wages results in a substantial proportion of 
Jordanians are classified as ―working poor‖. In Jordan, according to the National 
Employment Strategy, a minimum wage of JD 150 puts a family of four below 
the poverty line, and a family of six (two parents and four children) would need 
two minimum wage earners to barely reach the poverty line (2010 p. 19). Given 
the fact that 68% of working males earn less than JD 200 per month, a 
substantive sector of society is classified as ―working poor‖. Furthermore, the 
data presented in the report by the National Employment Strategy is the most 
recent data available for poverty in Jordan and dates back to 2010. These 
numbers therefore do not take into account the more recent socio-economic 
developments affected by the influence of Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan 
since 2010, which have arguably continued worsening the socio-economic 
situation in Jordan since 2011.  
The effects of youth unemployment on political marginalisation have 
been analysed by Ann-Helén Bay and Morten Blekesaunen in ‗Youth, 
Unemployment and Political Marginalisation‘ (2002). In this work, the authors 
analyse three aspects of political marginalisation –political confidence, political 
interest and political extremism– and find that unemployed and socio-
economically marginalised youth in a society express less confidence in the 
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effectiveness and representativeness of established political processes, and 
tent to support more frequently revolutionary political ideas (2002 p. 132). 
Furthermore, in order to contextualise the appearance and activities of 
the HSU, it is important to describe the political context and the different political 
parties and groups therein. In this period, the context of various oppositions 
groups in Jordan can be classified into official opposition and alternative 
opposition (Bustani, 2011a). First, official opposition groups in Jordan are those 
legal opposition parties and professional associations expressing ‗weak 
reformist goals that constitute a continuation of its failed course since martial 
law ended in Jordan in 1989‘. One of my interviewees, Omar, activist and writer 
in his late thirties, meets me in a new small family-run coffee shop in what has 
become during the last years the hip neighbourhood in Amman, Jabal 
Lweibdeh. He had started working together with other activists of the movement 
on trying to reintroduce strategy back into the political movements in Jordan 
through the initiative Masār Taḥarrurī. During our interview, Omar explains that 
the official opposition in Jordan is formed by: Islamists, including the Muslim 
Brotherhood and its political wing the Islamic Action Front (IAF); Nationalists, 
including the two Ba‟th parties, connected to the Iraqi and the Syrian factions; 
and the traditional Left, including the Jordanian Communist Party, the Popular 
Unity Part, or the People‘s Democratic Party. This official opposition has been 
consistently criticised since 1989 for their absorption into the regime structure 
and their inability to bring about substantive political and social change (AI01-
31.07.13). 
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 Second, the alternative opposition, as Hisham Bustani names it, present 
themselves as the option capable of filling the political void. Its main 
characteristics are: an ―East Bank Jordanian‖ isolationist character; it bases 
itself on a post-colonial identity that does not enjoy internal consensus; it 
resonates with the political authority‘s identity propaganda ―Jordan First‖ and 
―We are all Jordan‖, which are regime led campaigns to build a ―Jordanian 
national identity‖; and has close ties to the ―old guard‖.xxv This is one of the two 
competing factions in the regime that has been marginalised since King 
Abdullah II‘s ascent to the throne (Bustani, 2011a)xxvi. These groups of the 
alternative opposition (except for the National Progressive Current, the National 
Committee of Military Veterans, and the Nationalists‘ Progressive Current) have 
tried to organise and managed to form the Movement of the Jordanian People 
(Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shaʾbī Al-ʾUrdunī) in September 2011, and all of them took part in 
the Jordanian Campaign for Change Jayeen. Omar continues explaining 
throughout our interview that the alternative opposition is seen as ‗the regime‘s 
answer to those groups who are frustrated with the classical parties who came 
out and wanted to have a voice during the late 2006, 2007, 2008, when this 
neo-liberal economics really kicked-in in Jordan and the social manifestations 
started to appear‘ and ‗the social arm of the old guard in a way, the political 
social progressive arm‘ (AI01-31.07.13). 
The revolutionary mobilisations in the region ignited the Jordanian 
opposition in all its shapes and forms, and its structure along with the state on 
the other side had shaped the course of organisation, protest, and mobilisation 
for the following two years. Ben Ali‘s escape from Tunisia on Friday, January 
14th, had found a charged environment in Jordan as in many other countries. 
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One week before that, the weekly Friday marches started in Dhiban, a remote 
village to the south of the Capital Amman on January 7th. Since then, many 
following Fridays had witnessed larger protests in the capital and in many other 
localities.xxvii 
These protests were generally spontaneous outpourings of anger. The 
Jordanian regime reacted quickly to social demands and popular protest 
movements during the Arab Spring. However, this response was seen by some 
as a way to buy time since the implementation of proposed reforms was being 
constantly delayed as a result of the perception that protests had not mobilized 
a critical mass (2012n). 
In February 2011, a new movement named mubadarat al-malikiya al-
dusturiya (The Initiative for Constitutional Monarchy) emerged with demands to 
limit the monarch‘s unlimited authority, and which would restore the balance of 
power to a situation that guarantees popular representation in governance. The 
Muslim Brotherhood (MB) denounced this initiative; stating from the very 
beginning that it aimed for reforms that respect the ―Jordanian specificity‖ 
(2012m p. 11) as they often referred to it. Everyone realised the new political 
atmosphere that Jordan and its neighbours had entered and reacted to the 
MB‘s attempt by establishing the General Student Federation, a large left 
coalition that came together to classify the MB‘s move as an example of 
solidarity towards the regime and as an attempt at marginalising other active 
and grassroots forces within the campuses and society at large.xxviii 
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Despite the fact that political parties had officially formed an opposition 
parties‘ coalition that brought together the MB and the major five left political 
parties, existing ideological polarisation in movements within universities and 
syndicates, as well as among campaign based movements, continued on the 
ground until the events of the 24th March 2011.xxix The protests on March 24th 
marked a shift in the history of Jordanian protest groups. As we mentioned in 
the introduction to this thesis, during these protests polarisation between groups 
of young activists seemed to diffuse and collective action started being put into 
practice. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have analysed the way in which the relationship between 
the Jordanian regime and social movements has been constructed historically. I 
have argued here that the counter-strategies put forward by the regime towards 
social movements today, and in particular towards the HSU, should be 
understood as a result of decades of careful management of opposition. In 
order to argue this, I have divided the history of Jordan into distinct analytical 
periods that are marked by episodes of conflict between the state and society. I 
consider the Jordanian regime has built different strategies in response to the 
different threats it has faced. As we will see in further chapters, the strategic 
management of the HSU responds to a careful combination between repression 
and concession that can be understood through the exploration of these 
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historical events which provide insight into the articulation of both repressive 
and conciliatory strategies in time. 
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Chapter 4 Mapping Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth 
Movement): Grievances, Aims, Structure and Ideology 
 
 
This chapter analyses the form that dissent takes in the HSU and the different 
constituencies and activists therein. The aim is to explore the structure of the 
movement, its degree of institutionalisation and its internal organisation. 
Moreover, the aim is to present the activists that take part in the movement and 
how they construct the movement‘s ideology. This chapter argues that this 
movement is an informal, uninstitutionalized, horizontal, network-like 
organization. Furthermore, it argues that this movement mobilizes the concept 
of ‗youth‘ and coalesces multiple ideologies. Overall, this movement contributes 
to re-defining what dissent looks like in Jordan today.  
In order to argue this, I first establish the HSU as my analytical object of 
inquiry. This is done by first defining it as a social movement and then 
presenting its grievances and aims. I go on to provide a demographic 
characterisation of the activists involved, outlining their age, ethnicity, gender, 
and class. Thirdly, the analysis turns towards the movement‘s internal 
organisation and mobilising structure. This is followed by an analysis of the 
main challenges encountered by movement activists in terms of organisation. 
Finally, I will analyse the main ideological characteristics of the movement, and 
its internal radical-reformist ideological variation.  
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Nature of the subject of inquiry 
The literature on social movements provides different definitions of this 
object of inquiry. I will now categorise the HSU in light of the definition provided 
by PPT. This theoretical framework defines a social movement as: 
‗A sustained series of interactions between national 
powerholders and persons successfully claiming to speak 
on behalf of a constituency lacking formal representation, 
in the course of which those persons make publicly-visible 
demands for changes in the distribution or exercise of 
power, and back those demands with public 
demonstrations of support‘ (Tilly, 1979 p. 12). 
In light of this definition of social movements provided by PPT, I will now 
define the HSU as my analytical object of inquiry. The HSUxxx, formally 
established in 2012, is representative of a broader new regional trend of youth-
led, youth-organised, informal, uninstitutionalized, horizontal, network-like 
organisation whose existence redefines the look of dissent in Jordan today. 
Political mobilisation among several HSU activists predated their formal 
organisation; particularly as a result of the 2011 Arab Spring.  
The HSU emerged out of a context of broader social movements; some 
of these have existed since the 1950s while others appeared following the 
aforementioned political opening of 2008. As outlined in the preceding chapter, 
some of these movements have retained their capacity while others have 
disappeared or amalgamatedxxxi. The consolidated, if disparate, effort of these 
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social movements seeking political, economic and social change in Jordan is 
popularly referred to as Al-Ḥirāk. The HSU has emerged as a self-cognisant 
impetus for youth mobilisation of social change. 
The movement was created and is organised by young people that, as 
Seraj explained to me during his interview, found it necessary to formulate ‗a 
social, youth, political frame which talks about us‘ (AI04-04.09.13), a model that 
Suleyman adds is necessarily ‗outside any traditional frame‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
Activists in the movement claim to speak on behalf of that part of the youth 
remaining without channels for official political representation. Jordan´s current 
electoral law precludes Parliamentary membership for citizens under thirty. 
Beyond this political role, HSU seeks to cater to a constituency of socio-
economically depressed youth. It also has a natural affinity for other social 
clusters with socio-economic grievances.The high proportion of young 
Jordanians, a trend reflected in the region, could be approached by the state as 
potential engines for future development. However as Khalaf and Saad Khalaf 
(2011a) have noted, this demographic group is often stigmatised and fearfully 
perceived as disruptive, parasitic forces owing to their socio-economic and 
political marginalisation However, at the same time they are stigmatised and 
feared as disruptive, parasitic forces, so they have tended to be marginalised 
from political, economic and social participation. 
Since the beginning of its activities, this movement has sustained public 
demonstrations of their political, economic and social demands that have been 
mainly directed towards the Jordanian regime. Movement activists agree on 
identifying the main socio-economic and political grievances and aims, even if, 
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as we will see in the following chapters, there is a variation in their preferred 
way of achieving these collective aims. For movement activists such as Khaled, 
socio-economic and political grievances are ‗of equal importance‘ (AI02-
24.08.13).  
 
 
Social grievances that motivate activists of the movement to engage in 
collective action are related to social injustice, lack of opportunities, and 
freedom deficit. Khaled asserts that their motivation to act and get involved in 
this uprising in Jordan is primarily social, seeing that ‗there is a clear social 
injustice‘ (AI02-24.08.13) affecting the country as a whole, resulting in a shared 
feeling of hopelessness, where the majority of them face a life in which, in 
words of Hassan, ‗there is no opportunity to do anything‘ (AI20-29.09.14). This 
feeling of social injustice and lack of opportunity is closely linked in their 
Image 1.Photograph of one of the signs used during a protest on the 14
th 
November 2012. The sign reads: ‗Bread, Freedom, Social Justice‘. 
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interviews to a shared feeling of, as Suleyman puts it, having ‗to fight for any 
right that has been stolen‘ (AI06-05.09.13). All the activists of the movement 
that have been interviewed or observed for this project express the feeling of 
having a duty to demand social justice that will result from political and 
economic change. The words of Suleyman clearly express this:  
‗There is injustice, the freedoms have been stolen, the amount of 
corruption that you see and feel in the country. So it was my duty as a 
citizen to exercise my right to demand justice, freedom, political and 
economic reforms; these were the main reasons for me to join‘ (AI06-
05.09.13).  
Activists of the movement such as Khaled identify this social situation of 
injustice ‗with the capitalist economy and it is related to the tyrannical authority 
in this country‘ (AI02-24.08.13). Activists highlight the importance of the 
regime‘s liberal autocratic model as a source of their recent social mobilisation. 
The socio-economic problems identified are explained in relation to the 
country‘s dependency, privatization, and its social effects, particularly in terms 
of inequality. In words of Khaled: 
‗The economic problem is related to the economic system that the regime 
promotes in the country. An economic system that is dependent on 
foreign aid and the privatization and selling of national companies. This 
caused the economic liberalization that impoverishes the Jordanian 
society. This has a reflection in social classes where the rich become 
richer and the poor become poorer‘ (AI02-24.08.13). 
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Sara, an activist of the movement in her mid-twenties, was born and raised in 
Amman and currently works in Advertising. Sara is currently one of the 
organising members of I‟tihaad Al-Shabab Al-Dimuqrati (Union of Democratic 
Youth), and member of the Palestinian Youth Movement since 2007. We meet 
in Jabal Lweibdeh for a coffee on a Friday afternoon in September 2013. Sara 
explains that:  
‗Mainly it is the economic system, it is the privatisation that we fight so 
much against, the capitalist economic system in Jordan, you know 
Image 2.Photograph of an activist of the HSU during a protest on the 31
st
 
May 2012 carrying a sign against privatization. On the left, a map of 
Jordan with the word ‗Sold‘ written over it. To the right, the sign a list of 
Jordanian companies that have been privatised. This list reads as 
follows: ‗The Phosphate company, the Potash company, the Jordanian 
Communication, the Jordanian Cement company, the Dead Sea 
beaches, and Aqaba beaches, the port of Aqaba, the Jordanian industrial 
city‘. 
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Jordan is not an independent country, it is a dependent country, so the 
loans of the country, the increasing prices all the time, everything going 
on the people basically‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
Second, Sara considers that although ‗the economy is what has spread a 
lot of this‘ (AI13-13.09.13), since it is what affects society and creates social 
grievances on a daily basis, people got interested in politics once they realised 
that the economic situation was linked to the political system. As explained by 
Ibrahim, ‗that connection, once it was made, it could not be separated‘ (AI23-
04.11.14). Ibrahim is a Jordanian activist and blogger with whom I met in early 
November 2014 in Second Cup coffee shop in Abdoun, Amman. Ibrahim is 
married and has a son. Due to his brave publications in 2011 and his work for 
controversial media platform 7iber, he decided to leave Jordan for a year with 
his family, before coming back in 2013. 
Political issues of concern for activists of the movement are, in words of 
Khaled, ‗related to the formation of governments, decision-making process, the 
lack of freedom, in general‘ (AI02-24.08.13), highlighting the authoritarian 
nature of the regime. As Seraj explained during an interview carried out for this 
project, ‗the problem is with the regime‘ (AI04-04.09.13), to which Ahmad adds 
that ‗we are not even able to have a parliamentary government, it is still 
appointed by His Majesty‘ (AI12-13.09.13). Ahmad is an Engineering graduate 
and activist in his early twenties who has been part of several initiatives within 
the wider youth movement including the Jordanian Youth Parliament, Le Café 
Politique or Insan. At the time of our interview over a coffee in Jabal Lweibdeh 
he worked in the private sector and continued studying a Masters in Business 
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Administration. He was part of the organising committee of the initiative 
Samsam, an initiative that started with the aim of addressing issues of diversity 
and ideological differences between political groups in order to create a national 
frame that could improve the dialogue between them. In line with the 
authoritarian nature of the regime, the movement has mobilised against the 
imprisonment of political opposition. 
 
 
 
 
Image 3.Photograph of a sign used by HSU activists during their protest 
on the 5
th
 October 2012 that reads: ‗The People are the source of 
authority‘.  
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As well as agreeing on the main problems, activists unite around their 
main collective aims. In the words of Seraj, Sara or Suleyman, their aims 
include ‗social equality‘ (AI04-04.09.13) and mobilising to change ‗the economic 
situation‘ (AI13-13.09.13) and to build ‗a country that is free and has its own 
choice and fights for its decisions‘ (AI06-05.09.13). Activists of the movement 
recurrently formulated a long term vision best expressed by Seraj as the need 
‗to uphold a civil power among civilians, in favour of the state of law, the civil 
state, [and] for social justice‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Sara explains that overall they 
claim to mobilise for ‗anyone who is oppressed right now‘ (AI13-13.09.13), and 
Seraj adds that this is so in order ‗to support the social powers in Jordan and 
working to find links between these groups, to achieve a real overarching 
change‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Khaled explained that his goal was: 
‗Changing the situation and seeing Jordan become a national state, in 
my definition of national state, that Jordan becomes disassociated from 
the West, related to the foreign aid from the International Monetary Fund 
Image 4.Photograph of a sign used by HSU activists during their protest 
on the 19
th
 October 2012 that reads: ‗Freedom for Prisoners of 
Conscience‘.  
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(IMF) and the World Bank. All the economic issues related to Israel, all of 
these issues make the country dependent on the imperialist power‘ 
(AI02-24.08.13).  
The defining political characteristics of the HSU are that it is uniquely 
constricted to the national level. It also distinguishes itself from fellow opposition 
movements in the sense that it retains organisational and ideological 
independence. Seraj and Khaled, in their interviews explain that, at its heart, the 
movement focuses on important ‗local‘ (AI04-04.09.13) and mainly ‗national 
issues‘ (AI02-24.08.13), even if these can overlap with other regional and global 
issues. In his interview, Khaled acknowledged the important influence of 
regional and global issues at a national level, and explain that ‗you cannot 
separate them practically, this is so hard‘ (AI02-24.08.13). This unique domestic 
focus allows HSU activists to claim that they are reintroducing submerged 
national socio-economic and political concerns.  
As explained by Khaled during his interview, political parties and 
institutionalised organisations in Jordan ‗are working for issues that are supra-
national, above the nation‘ (AI02-24.08.13). As a result of the focus on the 
Palestinian cause, the occupation of Iraq or the Islamist Umma, Khaled explains 
that ‗the situation in Jordan was, to a certain extent, overlooked‘ (AI02-
24.08.13). Because of the movement‘s national focus, Suleyman explains that 
they do not have organisational links with other youth movements in the region, 
and that the relationship with them is based on specific expressions of solidarity 
and support. We do ‗not have any links at all with other movements outside 
Jordan. There are solidarity links with, for example, the Egyptian revolution, with 
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the 6th April Youth Movement. Maybe one time the 6th April Youth Movement 
expressed solidarity with us‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
 As well as having a national focus, the HSU is politically characterised as 
being an alternative way to do politics in Jordan that breaks with traditional 
forms of political participation, such as political parties. In the words of Omar, 
the movement is mobilised around a shared feeling among activists of being 
‗fed up with classical parties, fed up with ideologies‘ (AI01-31.07.13) which 
conform to the political context in the country. As expressed by all of my 
interviewees, and in the words of Ahmad, their political participation through 
‗social activism is a new way, separated from the parties‘ way‘ (AI12-13.09.13). 
This break with institutionalised politics is explained by Sara in terms of the 
stagnation of political parties and their inability to adapt to a changing socio-
economic and political reality in the region and in Jordan. She considers that 
‗some political parties are stuck in the 1970s, and it is hard for them to move 
and to understand what is changing; to give the change to younger generations 
is hard [sic]‘ (AI13-13.09.13). Others explained this break with traditional 
political actors and political parties as they are part of the structure, and part of 
the system that they intend to challenge and transform. In the words of Ahmad, 
for movement activists, collective and direct action is the only type of political 
participation possible (AI12-13.09.13). 
In terms of overall support for the movement, there are no definite 
numbers available, and even the number of participants in each constituency is 
generally not known by the interviewees. However, data can be presented to 
provide a picture of the national support of the movement. First, numbers on the 
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national support can be presented from weekly protest data based on 
participatory observation, and data from the popular uprising of November 
2012. Weekly street protests were attended by a variety of followers, from small 
protests of around 100 participants, to protests of thousands of participants. 
This variation has normally depended on the theme of the protest. In November 
2012 Habat Tishrīn, which Omar explains was the only recognizable popular 
uprising in Jordan until today (AI01-31.07.13), attracted around 15,000 people 
onto the streets. Although many activists of the movement refer to this event as 
one that demonstrated popular support for their movement, this protest could 
equally be construed as a truly popular uprising, independent of any form of 
collective organisation and from the HSU.  
Second, data on the support for the movement can be found on social 
media, which have become the main mean of communication of the movement. 
The Facebook page of the movement, Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī – Al-
Ṣafḥa Al-Jdīda (The Jordanian Youth Movement, new journal)xxxii has over 
33,000 likers, and where the Twitter page, Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī (Jordanian 
Youth)xxxiii, has just over 800 followers. I have to acknowledge at this point the 
limits to the validity of these numbers on the aforementioned examples of social 
media. Although these two pages try to bring together activists into a shared 
platform, the reality on social media is far more complex. Fragmentation of 
constituencies inside the movement is clearly graspable when one looks at the 
proliferation of Facebook groups and pages that are formed by movement 
constituencies in different localitiesxxxiv. However, we can take these numbers to 
create a general picture of support for the movement, as long as we are aware 
of this point. 
148 
 
In sum, the HSU is a social movement because it brings together 
individual activists under a social organisation that claims to speak in the name 
of youth that lacks formal representation and is socio-economically 
marginalised. Moreover, this movement has sustained demands directed 
towards the Jordanian regime and has managed to mobilise social, economic, 
and political grievances to publicly demand a change in the distribution of power 
in the country. 
 
Demographic characteristics of movement activists 
After presenting the HSU as my analytical subject of inquiry, and as a 
social movement in light of the definition of social movement provided by the 
PPT framework, I will now turn to building an empirical mapping of the 
movement by first providing a demographic picture of movement activists along 
age, ethnicity, gender, and class. Seraj and Amin explain that the HSU acts as 
an organisational umbrella for ‗every young Jordanian‘ (AI04-04.09.13) that 
‗agrees with our ideology‘ (AI08-08.09.13), ‗without differentiating religion or 
ethnicity‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Amin, unemployed activist in his late teens who is 
part of the group Ahrar Azme Amman li-l-Tagheer (Freedom for Change in 
Amman) and who has not participated in any other political organisation, meets 
me at the Jordanian Writers‘ Association in Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman. Born and 
raised in Al-Zarqa Palestinian refugee camp, he currently lives in Abu Nser, 
Amman.  
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The fact that the movement is an organisational umbrella for young 
Jordanian of different ideologies has resulted to a certain extent in what Omar 
calls ‗samak-laban-tamer hindi‟ (AI01-31.07.13) (literally ‗fish, yogurt and 
tamarind‘ in the sense of a hotchpotch), meaning a movement that is formed of 
very different individual activists. As explained by Ahmad during our interview, 
‗in this generation we are like a flower from each garden‘ (AI12-13.09.13), and, 
as we will analyse in this demographic characterisation of movement activists, 
this movement reflects this social reality.  
The movement brings together both young individuals that used to be 
involved in political parties or other forms of participation who stopped believing 
in the effectiveness of this type of institutionalized participation in Jordan such 
as Seraj (AI04-04.09.13), and individuals that were never involved in any type of 
political activity before such as Amin (AI08-08.09.13). Moreover, many 
participants in the HSU express solidarity with other youth movements in the 
region, and many of them participate in parallel with the Palestinian Youth 
Movement, which has a transnational character (Salih et al., 2016). 
The HSU presents itself in society and among other movements as a 
youth movement; ṣhabābī in Arabic translates into English as ‗of youth‘. In the 
words of Ahmad: ‗it is a generation. We are looking at the country from another 
point of view‘ (AI12-13.09.13). Youth is about age, an age group or a 
generation, as the majority of its participants are aged below 30. Jordan is not 
an exception to the youth bulge that characterises the Arab region (Assad and 
Roudi-Fahimi, 2009 p. 1), over 75% of the Jordanian population is younger than 
30 years old, and citizens aged between 15-30 years constitute over 30% of the 
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total population (2011b). The movement presents itself as being representative 
of this social group.  
However, it is important to disentangle further the concept of youth and 
its relevance as a descriptive category. Youth is also more than age. As Ted 
Swedenburg asserts, youth should be better understood as a ‗socially and 
culturally determined category‘ (2007). Youth is a complex social category 
which I suggest is associated with a period of life transition during which 
individuals shared social grievances or the feeling of belonging to a social 
group. Youth is about transitioning from childhood to adulthood, with all the 
repercussions this entails politically, economically, and socially. In the Arab 
world, ‗people well into their thirties may find themselves in the life stage 
defined as ―youth,‖ usually meaning that they are unmarried (and not by 
choice), marginally employed and in a position of some dependence on parents 
or other elders‘ (Medani, 2013). This conceptualisation of youth as a social 
category is important to understand the role of youth movements in the Middle 
East and the centrality of their claims for ‗youthfulness‘, which Bayat defines as:  
‗a particular habitus, behavioral and cognitive dispositions that are 
associated with the fact of being ―young‖—that is, a distinct social 
location between childhood and adulthood, where the youngster 
experiences ―relative autonomy‖ and is neither totally dependent (on 
adults) nor independent, and is free from responsibility for other 
dependents‘ (2010 p. 28). 
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Shared grievances create solidarity between young people which derives 
from a lack of economic independence, and from a feeling of social and political 
exclusion from the centres of power. Young people have not yet become 
socially independent from the older generations as they still largely influence 
their decisions, and they feel excluded from political decision-making 
processes. In the words of Naseem Tarawneh, a Jordanian activist blogger, 
‗youth should not be treated like some special subset to be catered to or 
ignored. When you represent 60% of a population you are the population‘ 
(Tarawneh, 2011a). Moreover, in Jordan and in other Arab countries, youth face 
situations in which cultural scripts, messages, and codes of various agencies of 
socialization are often inconsistent with their ideas and the youth social 
movements of the Arab Spring ‗reveal the genesis of a new generation sparked 
by the desire for civil liberties, advocacy for human rights, and participatory 
democracy‘ (Khalaf and Saad Khalaf, 2011a p. 9).  
Ethnically, the movement includes citizens of Palestinian origin as well as 
Transjordanian citizens. To talk about ethnicity in Jordan means to refer back to 
the historical construction of ethnic divisions through an identity politics strategy 
put forward by the regime and through warfare and refugee construction in 
neighbouring countries (2012n, Anderson, 2005, Brand, 1995, Taylor, 1982). 
Transjordanian identity finds its roots in the 'ashira (large clan or tribe), which 
works as a base of affiliation and source of prestige and patronage. This 
community is constituted by tribes or clans that belong to the land that now 
forms the modern state of Jordan, making them what is popularly referred to as 
‗urdunī-urdunī‟ (‗Jordanian-Jordanian‘, meaning ‗original‘ Jordanian). This origin 
has been a discursive legitimiser of their position as first-class citizens vis-à-vis 
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the state. On the other hand, Palestinian-Jordanians, or Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin, base their communal identity on an ‗attachment to the village 
or town of origin, a sense of loss of homeland and of gross injustice at the 
hands of the international community, and the centrality of the notion of return‘ 
(Brand, 1995 pp. 48-49).  
Understanding this historical ethnic composition of society and the way in 
which the regime has tried to politically fragment ethnicities helps us to 
understand that the HSU contradicts this ethnic historical division by 
strategising frames in a way that challenges the state‘s identity politics, as we 
will analyse in detail in the following chapter on social movement strategies. The 
struggle of youth in Jordan is a struggle of Jordanians of Palestinian origin as 
well as Transjordanians. Palestinian-Jordanians have refrained from any type of 
political participation since the Black September civil war in the 1970s. 
However, the participation of young Palestinian-Jordanians in the HSU points to 
both a renewed Palestinian political consciousness and further underlines the 
movement‘s unorthodox approach to national politics.  
Moreover, Palestinian-Jordanian youth mobilisation is occurring in 
tandem with a newly politicised Transjordanian youth; a community that has 
traditionally been considered a loyal base of the regime. This again serves to 
underline the shifting political role of younger tribal generations in Jordan which, 
in the words of a Transjordanian blogger, are ‗a more pragmatic, decently-
educated segment of youth that (in many cases) has formed a layer beneath 
the advertised surface (i.e. the [elder tribal] ―dinosaurs‖)‘ (Tarawneh, 2014). 
Contrasting with this predominant idea of the tribal communities in Jordan, 
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Ibrahim explains that activists of the movement that are ethnically 
Transjordanian, are ‗young, fresh graduates, unemployed, in Tafileh, in Ma‘an, 
[who] regardless of their ideological ties, they are economically disenfranchised, 
economically alienated, they are not as adherent to tribal politics as their elders 
are‘ (AI23-04.11.14). 
This movement therefore challenges traditional frames of ethnic and 
religious understandings of social and political subjectivities in Jordan. Multiple 
identities have been deployed historically in the country, and reinforced through 
different episodes of conflict (2012n). Traditional political opposition parties and 
movements, including their ‗child‘ youth movements, are still working within 
these ethnic and religious frames (Jordanian-Jordanian, Palestinian-Jordanian, 
Islamist, tribal and others), however the HSU is trying to challenge these 
traditional frames by mobilising a different discourse that favours ethnic, 
identitarian and religious unity instead of fragmentation. They do so by 
mobilising socio-economic grievances and issues of class division and 
inequality that affect the majority of Jordanian citizens, which have been 
socially, economically, and politically excluded. This process of exclusion has 
been particularly noticeable and accentuated since the beginning of the 2000s 
and the realignment of political loyalties with the beginning of an accelerated 
economic liberalisation in the country. Mustapha, an activist and researcher at 
the University of Jordan, explained that this reflects how Jordanian youth 
mobilise in a way that contradicts the ethnic Jordanian-Palestinian divide which 
they consider the result of strategic exploitation of identity politics by the regime 
(AI14-15.09.13). At the time of our interview, Mustapha was starting to work 
together with other activists, among them Omar, in the initiative Masar 
154 
 
Taharruri, a small group which tried to engage other activists with concepts that 
they considered foundational to any political movement.  
Activists that participate in the movement are in their majority male. 
Women form a notable minority among the activists that participate in it and, as 
Isra explained during her interview, ‗we are only around 5%‘ (AI11-10.09.13). 
Isra is an activist in her mid-40s and is part of the group Ahrar Azme Amman li-
l-Tagheer (Freedom for Change in Amman), but states that her opinions do not 
represent the group as a whole given the ideological differences between 
individuals within the group. Isra has been married for over twenty years and is 
currently a housewife, mother of three. Some female activists of the movement 
such as Sara refer to the ‗cultural limits‘ for women‘s activism and the need to 
‗really understand and respect the culture we are in and work within this space 
and try to develop on it‘ (AI13-13.09.13). In a similar way to the findings of the 
analysis conducted by Ghada Barsoum in 2010 in Egypt, in Jordan ‗young 
females confine their economic and non-economic activities to the private 
domain of the household‘ (UNICEF, 2011 p. 30).  
Moreover, in their interviews and everyday meetings, the majority of male 
and female activists of the movement express their rejection of including 
gender-specific demands towards the social and political empowerment of 
women, which some of them like Sara considered ‗western thoughts‘ (AI13-
13.09.13) and others such as Kareem, a 20-year old Ammani activist, who was 
not part of any particular group within HSU, and considered himself an 
independent activist in the movement, critiqued as ‗liberal‘ (AI17-22.09.13). In 
general, the movement does not specifically address women‘s issues in their 
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demands. Activists such as Khaled argue that since they seek whole political 
and socio-economic change, any improvements for the whole would necessarily 
improve women‘s fortunes (AI02-24.08.13). This absence of gender-specific 
demands reproduces the trend of gender-inclusive political and institutional 
reform in other organisations in Jordan, as in the Day-Waged Labour Movement 
(DWLM) analysed by Sara Ababneh, where women became ‗embedded within 
communities and prioritised their economic needs‘ (2016 p. 87). 
Throughout the interviews and participant observation carried out to 
gather data on movement activists I have found class to be an important 
variable of self-identification. Activists in the youth movement belong to a 
working class, mainly from disenfranchised urban areas but also from middle-
income urban neighbourhoods and marginalised rural localities. Young activists 
such as Kareem try to make a living by undertaking precarious jobs, frequently 
multiple jobs at a time (AI17-22.09.13), that generally do not allow them to 
become economically independent. This applies to youth from poorer working 
classes as well as to youth of middle-income areas, although there is a notable 
difference related to the dependency their families have on them economically. 
Tobin has analysed the middle and working classes in Jordan, especially in 
Amman, arguing that the ‗heightened notion of middle-class status and ―aspiring 
cosmopolitanism‖ provides a new significant form of social organisation in 
Amman‘. This reorients the population ‗away from political reform‘ and serves 
as ‗a means to reinforce the status-quo‘ (2012 p. 96). In this situation, activists 
in the HSU, particularly those from middle-class, are confronting their families 
and environment, as well as risking their work places because, as Sara 
explains, ‗not everyone is so accepting, it depends on your surroundings, 
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working in this country is pretty hard, you actually need to sacrifice‘ (AI13-
13.09.13). 
In sum, the HSU is a movement that serves as an organisational 
umbrella that brings together young people with shared socio-economic and 
political grievances and aims. Moreover, as we have explored, the movement is 
demographically diverse in terms of ethnicity, with Palestinian-Jordanian and 
Transjordanian young activists participating together. Furthermore, 
demographic diversity is present in the movement in terms of religion –Muslims, 
Christians, and atheists–, and class, as well as in terms of gender, although 
activists are primarily male.  
 
Mobilising structure and organisation of Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī 
(the Jordanian Youth Movement) 
Having provided a demographic characterisation of activists in the 
movement, I will now turn the focus to the movement‘s mobilising structure and 
organisation. In order to build this analysis, I first map constituencies in the 
movement, and then explore the movement‘s internal leadership, participation, 
and membership. The HSU is formed of diverse constituencies, including 
individuals, groups or unions, that are loosely organised as an informal network.   
Locating the movement is challenging because of the fluidity of its 
extremely volatile constituencies. Constituencies frequently disappear, 
reappear, merge, or change namexxxv. During 2011, from the 24th March sit-in 
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until the movement was established at a national level in 2012, activists used 
the pre-existing social networks and connections at the level of localities, towns 
or neighbourhoods to start organising. Suleyman explains that these networks 
were based on family and friendship ties, and are crucial to understand that ‗the 
beginning was in our cities because our city has tribes and networks‘ (AI06-
05.09.13). Pre-existing social networks provided activists a safe base to start 
organising themselves in 2011 after the traumatic experience of the 24th March 
sit-in. Suleyman adds that, at that time, social networks built on friendship, 
family, or tribal relations provided security and trust to activists (AI06-05.09.13).  
When the HSU was constituted in 2012 however, it grouped all the local 
organisational efforts under a national movement that extended to ‗every street, 
every neighbourhood, every lane, every house‘xxxvi. Its main activities and the 
majority of participants are situated in the capital city Amman, and other smaller 
constituencies are located outside the capital in governorates such as Madaba, 
Zarqa, Irbid, Ma‘an, Kerak, Tafileh or Aqaba. The pre-existing social network 
that initially served as an important organisational base, continued playing a 
major role in the nation-wide network, linking all these small local constituencies 
together and providing a sense of security in face of challenges posed by the 
regime, particularly in terms of infiltration as I will develop further in chapter 7.  
Internal leadership in the movement‘s constituencies is non-hierarchical 
and leaderless, and participation is equal and democratic, therefore having 
similar characteristics of those radical social movements analysed by Fitzgerald 
and Rodgers (2000). In small constituencies, this form of internal organisation 
means every member has the same role and voice in terms of participation and 
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internal decision-making, which according to Hassan is reached through 
discussion and agreement of all members (AI20-29.09.14). In larger 
constituencies that sometimes group around 200 activists, such as the one to 
which Sara belongs, participants have opted to organise themselves into the 
different roles they undertake, or ‗in terms of specialisations‘ (AI13-13.09.13), 
which include street action, communication and media, or internal organisation. 
This organisation into specialisations does not imply hierarchy inside these 
constituencies, as although roles are distributed, decision-making remains 
democratic and every participant has a voice. In larger constituencies, decision-
making processes are not done through discussion and agreement as in 
smaller cases because of the larger numbers of members. In these cases, 
Yusef explains that decision-making is done through votes (AI10-10.09.13). 
Yusef is part of the group Ahrar Azme Amman li-l-Tagheer (Freedom for 
Change in Amman) and does not claim to represent any group, only himself. At 
the time of our interview, he was 20-years old and unemployed. He had 
experienced harsh repression inside as well as out of prison from the regime 
after some of his radical episodes of street action, and left Jordan two Turkey 
two days after our meeting, where he was granted political asylum from the 
United Nations. 
HSU‘s non-hierarchical, horizontal organisational structure, and 
participatory decision-making processes reflect a double rejection of traditional 
politics. Firstly, the movement distances itself from hierarchical agents of 
socialisation, mainly formal (educational, religious, and political institutions) but 
also informal (family), and secondly, to the Jordanian regime‘s authoritarian 
nature. Despite different social transformations derived from modernisation and 
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globalisation (Moghadam and Decker, 2014), family in Jordan remains 
hierarchical along sex and age (Barakat, 2005), and this reality at the most 
fundamental unit of socialisation is reflected greatly in the way society and 
institutions are perceived. Sara explains that this hierarchy is perceived by 
activists of the movement as tools used to exercise social and ideological 
control of the society (AI13-13.09.13). Moreover, activists rationally choose an 
organisational model in which decisions are reached through a democratic 
participatory process because of their rejection of the non-democratic political 
practices of the Jordanian regime, which will be explained further in the 
following pages when I develop the diverse demands of the movement.  
Finally, membership in the HSU is informal and based on the individual 
involvement of participants. Constituencies vary in numbers in different 
locations, with larger ones being present in Amman. The size of different 
constituencies varies from small ones of around 10 participants such as the one 
to which Khaled belongs (AI02-24.08.13) to larger constituencies that reach 
around 200 participants such as the one in which Seraj is one of the members 
of the organising committee (AI04-04.09.13). Given the informal nature of the 
process of joining the movement as a participant, and the lack of their formal 
membership, establishing clear and definite numbers of participation in each 
constituency is difficult. As well as activists frequently joining or leaving the 
movement, participants in the movement continuously move from one 
constituency to another, and some of them prefer to remain ‗independent‘ such 
as Kareem (AI17-22.09.13), meaning not linked to any particular constituency 
but to the movement as a whole. 
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The informality of the movement‘s organisational structure also derives 
from the way in which it is funded, which at the same time responds to its aim of 
remaining independent from other more formal and institutionalised actors in 
Jordan and in the region. The movement is, in Suleyman‘s words, completely 
self-funded and they do not take donations (AI06-05.09.13). Activists strongly 
insisted on highlighting this point in every interview carried out for this project. 
As we will analyse in the following pages, funding has become one of the main 
challenges to the movement‘s organisation. Despite this challenge, self-funding 
was defended by all activists as their favoured way to get resources for their 
organisational activities given that it preserves their independence from any 
external influence.  
Overall, the HSU is formed of diverse constituencies, including 
individuals, groups or unions, which are loosely organised as an informal 
network. This informal network is based on pre-existing tribal, family, and 
friendship ties, which provide safe ties for young activists to establish a trusting 
nexus and start mobilising at the beginning. As well as being a horizontal 
network organisation, internally the movement is non-hierarchical, and the 
internal decision-making process is democratic and participatory. Finally, the 
informal organisation of the movement is reflected by the lack of formal 
membership, where participation is based on individual involvement.  
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Organisational challenges for Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the 
Jordanian Youth Movement) 
After exploring the movement‘s mobilising structure and internal 
organisation, I will now focus the analysis on several organisational challenges 
that activists of the movement have faced when organising. Based on my 
interviews and during the participant observation for this project, it became clear 
that there were several organisational challenges that were of concern. Some 
activists, among them Omar in his interview, criticise their internal organisation 
as one that gives a sense of being mere ‗rotating initiatives‘ (AI01-31.07.13), 
where constituencies are unstable, the organisational structure is weak, and the 
movement of activists between constituencies is continuous. According to him, 
‗organising is a problem; is the problem‘ (AI01-31.07.13).  
The movement‘s informal organisational structure, and its internal 
volatility, has made it, in the opinion of some activists interviewed, increasingly 
vulnerable in terms of external threats. In the view of Omar, the absence of a 
clear hierarchical structure further weakens the internal organisation of the 
movement, making strategic building and collective action problematic: ‗they 
don‘t want hierarchy, and this is another problem‘ (AI01-31.07.13). As we will 
explore in further chapters, an increasingly threatening context at the national 
and regional levels has resulted in a reconsideration of internal strategies. 
Frequently, a reorientation in the specific strategic approaches of individual 
activists within the movement results in these organisational shifts, where some 
constituencies disappear or reorganise under the movement‘s frame, or where 
activists of different constituencies organise together under a new constituency 
that results from merging the previous ones.  
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When asked to reflect on possible causes of organisational weakness, 
activists pointed to the regime and traditional political organisations‘ competitive 
advantage followed by issues of funding, time, a lack of organisational 
experience, managing emotions, a lack of individual dedication and 
commitment, and individualist personalities. I will now address each of these 
issues in turn. The first challenge that all activists interviewed for this project 
refer to is the one posed by the Jordanian regime which, in Sara‘s words, ‗was a 
main obstacle for these groups so they did not have the real space to work with 
people‘ (AI13-13.09.13). More specifically, the regime has been the main 
obstacle for organising because, as we will further analyse in chapter 7, it has 
been responsible for promoting an increasingly threatening environment for the 
movement‘s activities, where activists such as Khaled were ‗being threatened 
with arrests and being fired of work‘ (AI02-24.08.13). Alongside imposing a 
threatening posture, the regime has relied on traditional political parties to 
further challenge the movement. Political parties work within frames that do not 
challenge the regime, and given their organisational experience, are able to 
incorporate activists outside this system into their ranks, thereby reducing the 
challenge for the regime. In words of Omar:  
‗The oppressive nature and the organization strategies of the regime... 
Then... the organizations themselves, the classical parties and the shifts, 
they did nothing and they became part of the regime and the young 
people reject automatically. They do not see that we want a different kind 
of organization‘ (AI01-31.07.13). 
As well as the challenge to organisation and strategic building posed by 
the Jordanian regime and traditional political parties, other critical challenges to 
163 
 
organisation have deeply affected the movement‘s development. These 
challenges are funding, time, experience, managing emotions, and 
individualism. First, funding has been a key challenge for young activists of the 
movement such as Khaled, and ‗the lack of money in the organisation is a real 
problem‘ (AI02-24.08.13). Suleyman says: ‗We are broke‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
Seraj and Abed in their respective interviews explain that the ‗shortage of 
internal funding‘ (AI04-04.09.13) ‗is very important‘ (AI05-04.09.13) and has 
determined the type and the number of activities that they have been able to 
carry out. Abed, activist in his early thirties, grew up in the Palestinian refugee 
camp of Al-Baqaa and is currently living in Sweileh, Amman. He holds a 
Masters degree and currently works as a teacher at the University of Jordan. 
Abed prefers to present himself as an activist for the Jordanian movement as a 
whole, as he is working with any group that puts forward interesting and 
thoughtful initiatives, and is also closely working with Abna‟ Al-Shatat-„Awdeh 
(Sons of the Diaspora - Return), which he explains works closely with the 
Palestinian resistance.  
Joint activities presuppose gathering individual activists in one place, for 
which public transportation is the less costly meansxxxvii. Abed explains that ‗if I 
want to go and attend a protest in Al-Husseinxxxviii, I need money to get there, 
and I want to attend because I am part of it, I am an activist‘ (AI05-04.09.13). 
The fact that some activists did not have economic means to be able to attend 
meetings underscores the extent of their challenging economic conditions. 
Moreover, other activities such as organising marches or sit-ins included further 
costs such as hiring audio material, which raised the economic cost of actions. 
Second, the lack of funds has deeply determined the action with other 
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constituencies of the movement, particularly constituencies organised outside of 
Amman, because of the economic inability of being able to travel to other cities 
and join other groups in their direct actions. Transportation between cities 
needed to carry out joint action further raises the economic cost of collective 
action.  
 Activists have tried to overcome this funding problem by asking for 
contributions of participants that enjoy a better economic situation. Other ways 
of solving this challenge, such as asking for grants or other types of external 
funding have been so far rejected by activists of the movement. As Sara 
explains, ‗funding is one of the main obstacles as well because we do not want 
to apply for grants and stuff like that. We do not want anyone watching our back 
and telling us what to do‘ (AI13-13.09.13). The rejection of external funds is 
explained by their will to remain independent and eliminating the possibility of 
being influenced in any way by any external actor. Another aspect of this 
funding challenge is that sourcing funds from wealthier members could 
potentially create informal hierarchies between activists within the movement. 
Activists, including Amin, explain that donations by participants are ‗voluntary‘ 
(AI08-08.09.13) and do not establish hierarchies within constituencies. As 
explained by Seraj in his interview, informal organisational leadership in the 
movement normally depends on individual activists‘ dedication in terms of time 
and effort (AI04-04.09.13). 
Related to the challenge of funding is the challenge of the time that 
individual activists are able to dedicate to movement activities. As we have 
mentioned before, in general, activists of the HSU try to make a living by 
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undertaking precarious jobs, many times multiple jobs at a time, that generally 
do not allow them to become fully economically independent from their families. 
Moreover, on occasions, activists work not to become economically 
independent but to support their families. For some activists such as Suleyman, 
time actually becomes the main obstacle to organising: the ‗main obstacle is the 
time that you can dedicate to your activism, and it varies from one individual to 
another, and also the financial situation, the social relations, the work 
conditions‘ (AI06-05.09.13). Multiple precarious jobs take over most of their 
time, limiting the time they have left to dedicate to the movement.  
 Another main challenge for organising expressed by Seraj has been the 
‗weak political experience in the youth groups‘ (AI04-04.09.13), which has 
become one of activists‘ main concerns. In words of Ahmad, ‗Egyptians were 
working to reform their country and fighting the heritage of Hosni Mubarak to 
Gamal since 2005; the beginnings of Kifayah movement, as you know. So eight 
years [that they have been active]. We are still in the third year so we do not 
have a great experience‘ (AI12-13.09.13). This lack of previous organisational 
experience has made them particularly vulnerable to the increased threatening 
context. In words of Ibrahim: 
‗To learn on the job in such an atmosphere, you are going to have to 
expect a huge pushback, from the state, from the security apparatus, 
from self-interested groups, from the business elite, from the loyalists... 
And because they were young and inexperienced, it left such a big 
vacuum to be co-opted, to be manipulated, to be hijacked‘ (AI23-
04.11.14). 
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Managing emotions inside the movement has also presented a 
challenge. In a changing political opportunity structure, and in an increasingly 
threatening context, Abed explains that ‗the issue of security is very important; 
you are afraid, you might be imprisoned, and not only imprisoned but beaten‘ 
(AI05-04.09.13). As well as emotions of fear, a shifting scenario makes activists 
of the movement continuously re-think their strategic approach and their 
choices of direct action. During an extended period where the context changes, 
activists feel they have to continuously reconsider their strategies. As Khaled 
told me during his interview, ‗there are people that get depressed sometimes, 
and get sad sometimes, they become frustrated sometimes, you need to follow 
up with them. The political situation affects them, and affects their work and 
their personal commitment‘ (AI02-24.08.13). This in turn has led to a lack of 
commitment among some activists, given that, as Sara explained during her 
interview, ‗people hate working towards long-term‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
‗Continuing to work with these people as well is hard, because some of 
them think ‗if some of our demands are answered, I am satisfied now and 
I give up‘. It is really hard to get people to work on long-term stuff. People 
get tired really easily and are not up to planning and let us see what 
happens after one year or five years‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
The final internal debate on organisational challenges that has been 
present in the movement is the one around the exacerbation of individualism as 
a result of consumerism and the use of social media. First, consumerism is 
debated among activists as being counterproductive for social organisation as, 
according to some like Omar, it is built on ‗everyday propaganda on the 
individual‘ (AI01-31.07.13), deterring the social and communal expression of the 
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individual. A second contributing factor is social media ‗because it magnifies the 
individual; everybody now has a voice, has an opinion, is a political analyst. You 
know, one hundred, a thousand likes; you are a big leader in your own domain‘ 
(AI01-31.07.13). Activists such as Omar consider that ‗this blow-up of 
individualism is contradictory to organization and social extensions‘ (AI01-
31.07.13), which in turn are vital for working on collective action.  
Linked to the internal discussion around the way in which the use of 
social media fosters individualism among participants of the HSU is the 
discussion around the use that HSU does of social media as an organising tool. 
As we have seen, the organisation of the HSU, unlike in other cases such as 
Egypt, started in neighbourhoods and through the mobilisation of family and 
friendship networks at a local scale, that then translated into wider links 
between local groups to organise under the HSU. Social media and particularly 
mobile telephones were used mainly for communicative purposes. Internal 
communication between HSU participants was done mainly by mobile phone 
and social media platforms were used as a space for communicating their 
action and sharing online content, given the limited attention that these received 
in mainstream media, as we will see in later pages.  
During my interviews, the discussion around the limitations to using 
social media and even mobile telephones as a tool for organisation in Jordan 
were highlighted by activists in several occasions. In the context of increased 
limits on freedom of speech, which will be addressed in further detail in later 
chapters, challenges related to surveillance were encountered by participants of 
the HSU on social media and mobile telephones. For example, Amin explains 
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that on one occasion, his group Aḥrār Azme Amman li-l-Tagheer had planned to 
join other groups, including Aḥrār Kerak, Aḥrār Madaba and Ḥirāk Ḥayy Tafaileh 
in Irbid, to join them in a protest for the freedom of political prisoners. This had 
been organised through Whatsapp and mobile telephone messages only, not 
through Facebook. They organised transportation jointly to Irbid, and on their 
way found a police control where they were stopped and forbidden from 
continuing their journey and return to their respective localities (AI08-08.09.13).  
Another example of the way in which communication channels through 
social media and mobile telephones between activists might have been 
monitored, making them wary of their use as an organising tool, was recalled by 
Seraj during his interview. Seraj recalled that on a Friday in 2012, participants of 
the HSU had organised a protest close to Al Hussein Mosque in Downtown 
Amman. They had done so in their meetings and gatherings. He recalled that 
just a few hours before the protest, he received a message saying that the 
location had changed to the Ministry of Interior, so at the time that had been 
arranged, he went to the Ministry of Interior to be surprised by the few number 
of attendees. Like him, other participants received messages regarding a 
change in location, to either the Ministry of Interior or the Fourth Circle, both 
frequent protests sites in Amman. Seraj recalls that they never knew what had 
happened on that Friday morning, as none of the participants was behind those 
messages. This moment made them aware of the fact that mobile telephones 
were limited as a tool for organising and communicating internally, given that 
their communication was probably being monitored (AI04-04.09.13).  
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For Amin and Seraj, and for the rest of participants, these incidents 
pushed them towards using social media only for publishing content and 
communicating their activities, and towards using mobile telephones only for the 
minimal communication for operational purposes, despite knowing that their 
communication was being monitored. In the HSU, although participants have 
encountered these limits to the use of social media and mobile phones in 
organizing, they have been used for some time as a space for communicating 
ideas and sharing online content, helping to create awareness and publish the 
activities of participants that were then active on the street. 
 Overall, several internal debates have been recurrent among activists of 
the movement concerned about the challenges to organisation that they have 
faced. Although all activists interviewed and observed for this project consider 
that the main challenge for organising has been posed externally by the regime, 
they acknowledge the existence of internal challenges to organisation. We have 
analysed these internal challenges which include issues of funding, time and 
dedication to movement activities, the lack of organisational experience, the 
difficulty of managing emotions, dedication and commitment, and individualism. 
 
Main ideological characteristic of the movement 
After describing the demographic characteristics of participants, the 
organisational structure adopted by the movement, and the main organisational 
challenges faced by activists, I will now analyse the movement‘s ideology. This 
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analysis is organised into two parts. First, I present the ideologies that activists 
interviewed for this project ascribe to, which reflect the ideological spectrum in 
Jordanian youth today. Then, I analyse the movement‘s ideological variation 
and the way in which activists‘ position towards change is expressed as radical 
or reformist.  
The movement serves as an umbrella to a variety of ideologies. For 
activists, the fact that the movement is able to provide an organisational 
structure under which multiple ideologies find common ground to put forward 
their shared activism is one of the points that gives it power. Hassan explains 
that the movement includes activists that are ideologically ‗Islamists, leftists, 
some with the Syrian regime, so there was a gathering of people that does not 
have a gathering [meaning that do not have a common ideology] really. So we 
had everything there, and this was what gives it power‘ (AI20-29.09.14). 
Activists do not consider ideological plurality inside the movement a problem. 
Khaled explains that ‗No. It is not a deep disagreement, just a difference in 
opinions, which there will always be‘ (AI02-24.08.13).  
Although the majority label their political ideology as leftist, socialist, 
communist, or nationalist, Hassan explains that there are some who are 
Islamists: ‗They are the Islamists that we can call ―defectors‖ of the Muslim 
Brotherhood‘ (MB) (AI20-29.09.14)xxxix. Activists of the movement that fall under 
this ideological group have all been members of the MB before. Hassan 
explains that his and others‘ decision to ‗defect‘ from that organisation as being 
conditioned first by the decision-making process within the organisation, which 
they saw as non-democratic, where young activists would meet and debate, but 
171 
 
their ideas would be passed to leaders of the organisation for approval: ‗the Al-
Ḥirāk Ash-Shabāb Al-Islāmī, it has the shell of democracy. It is not democratic 
because if you are talking and talking and talking and at the end someone 
decides for you; this is of course not democratic‘ (AI20-29.09.14). Second, his 
decision to leave the Islamist organisation was due to the distance of debates in 
relation to what, in their opinion, the Jordanian society needs. Hassan –one of 
these so-called ‗defectors‘ of the MB– explained that while he was part of the 
youth movement of the MB, ‗the points of the meetings had nothing to do with 
what the street wants, they were what they wanted. So at the end they are 
working conditioned by the vision of the political party IAF and the Muslim 
Brotherhood, not thinking about the vision of the people. This was clear‘ (AI20-
29.09.14). 
As well as bringing together youth of many different ideologies under a 
shared frame, a second ideological characteristic of the movement is the 
radical-reformist spectrum therein. I will now define the concepts of ‗radical‘ and 
‗reformist‘ and their meaning in the Jordanian political context. The term ‗radical‘ 
has multiple connotations and has been defined as the complete restructuring 
of the system rather than incorporation into that system (Fitzgerald and 
Rodgers, 2000). The radical ideology in social movements is conceptualised as 
one that emphasises structural change, based on ‗a belief that reforms cannot 
change the fundamental problems and instead that structural obstacles must be 
exposed (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000 p. 581). An ideology that is flexible, 
builds radical networks, has a high degree of global consciousness and 
connections, and presents an antimilitaristic stance (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 
2000 p. 578). Overall, radical ideologies seek ‗a transformation of systemic 
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power relations perceived to sustain ongoing injustices‘ (Eschle and 
Maiguashca, 2013 p. 13). 
In defining the radical conceptualization of change in the HSU, I 
understand radical constituencies as those that demand a complete change in 
the political, economic, and social system in the country through direct 
confrontation and opposition to the monarchical regime itself. In line with the 
aforementioned theoretical conceptualisation of radical ideologies, activists in 
the HSU that I define as radical seek structural change. Through interviews and 
observation, as well as through their active presence on social media, 
movement activists that adhere to a radical ideology consider that the 
monarchical regime, and more specifically the King, is the reason for all the 
problems at these three levels. For them the only possible way towards change 
in the country inevitably starts with the removal of the regime. As the central 
arrogating power, the regime is seen as being beyond reform by radical activists 
of the movement such as Seraj: 
‗Radical. Why not reformist? Because the political regime that we have in 
Jordan, the core of it, it is not able to reform. It is not able to change. For 
several reasons. First, that Jordan is connected to the international 
economic system, and the political decisions made in agreement with the 
US. And our economy is linked to the IMF. So your demands are to 
change the regime radically and in a peaceful way. Reform will be just 
superficial, not from the root‘ (AI04-04.09.13). 
The movement‘s aforementioned informal structure and its detachment 
from any formal, institutionalised political actor are characteristics that have 
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allowed for the existence of these radical constituencies and a radical ideology. 
In this sense, the movement does not contradict PPT‘s assumption that social 
movements which organise around grassroots informal structures and 
temporary organisations offer ‗fertile ground in which radicals can flourish and 
thrive‘ (Cross and Snow, 2011 pp. 118-119).  
Turning to the term ‗reformist‘, it has been defined by PPT as an ideology 
that incorporates ‗much needed cultural and socio-psychological components‘ 
(Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000 p. 576) and assumes ‗that the main goal of 
achieving political gains for SMOs lies within the existing political structure.‘ 
(Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000 p. 576) According to the framework, a reformist 
ideology is one characterised by an ‗emphasis on being a contender in the 
existing political system, national focus, [and] support [for] government military 
involvement.‘ (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000 p. 578) 
Activists of the HSU that adhere to this reformist ideological 
conceptualisation of change look at other regional countries to justify their 
orientation. For example, Abed explains during his interview that ‗what 
happened in Egypt and Tunisia has affected us also. They achieved the 
overthrow of the regime, OK. And now what?‘ (AI05-04.09.13). They consider 
that, in Jordan, change cannot come in the form of a rupture because of the 
political context, but also because of the society‘s acceptance of this type of 
ideologies, which Ahmad explains in the following way: 
‗Change and development have to be gradual and step by step, and here 
we are not waiting for this. We want to change the conditions in one day 
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or one year. It is not applicable. You know the culture of change in 
societies; societies will not accept this in one day‘ (AI12-13.09.13). 
Apart from this shared idea that change should be progressive and 
should not involve any rupture of the political system, reformist activists of the 
HSU do not seem to agree with what specific variables would constitute the 
reformist ideology. Different factors fall under activists‘ understanding of reform, 
which are related to reforming institutions, greater representation of political 
bodies, reforming laws or revisiting the way in which legislation is implemented. 
However, there is no consensus among reform activists of what specific aspect 
of the political system should be changed. As Ibrahim explained: 
‗No one agrees on what reform is. We do not know how to define it. We 
know that it is the safer word to use for change, as opposed to other 
words that start with ‗R‘, but at the same time, we don‘t agree on what 
that means because we come from different backgrounds, we come from 
different interests, and most of it is self-interest of course‘ (AI23-
04.11.14). 
The radical-reformist ideological spectrum in the movement is flexible 
and changes in relation to the opening and closing political opportunity 
structure. Although these changing dynamics in time will be further analysed 
and developed in the following chapter on social movement strategies, it is 
important at this point to highlight the fact that the radical and reformist camps 
in the movement are not static but flexible.  
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Theoretically, two main characteristics define the way in which these two 
ideological approaches for change relate to each other. On one hand, radicals 
consider that ‗a belief that reforms cannot change the fundamental problems 
and instead that structural obstacles must be exposed‘ (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 
2000 p. 581). On the other, reformists tend to discredit radicals (Fitzgerald and 
Rodgers, 2000 p. 581). In the HSU, reformists tend to criticise radical activists 
and constituencies, which they consider to show a lack of flexibility and are not 
able to adapt to the changing political context which has become increasingly 
threatening for political action. During his interview, Suleyman explained how: 
‗I am trying to ask for reform from a position that is far from radical. The 
idea of radicalism is related to a lack of flexibility. I have a certain idea 
and this idea has to be imposed. It does not accept to be revised or 
debated‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
Reformist constituencies and activists such as Sara argue that there is a 
need to be flexible in terms of reconsidering a more confrontational strategy at 
particular moments of time where the context becomes increasingly threatening: 
‗For me being radical is sticking to your principles no matter what. You 
have to change with what is happening around you, without changing 
your principles‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented the HSU as my analytical object of 
inquiry. In order to do so, I have characterised it as a social movement, 
analysed the movement‘s mobilising structure, and the ideologies present 
therein. This chapter has outlined the HSU as a movement with an informal, 
uninstitutionalized, horizontal, network-like organisation. The HSU is unique in 
its mobilisation and of the concept of ‗youth‘ in a country where the young 
people dominate the demographics. Other features of the HSU distinguish it. It 
has retained financial and political independence in the face of competition from 
larger, traditional, political parties and increasingly intolerant authorities. Its 
primordial focus on the domestic political scene also differentiates its politics. 
Despite this fresh approach the HSU faces traditional and novel organisational 
challenges. Its focus on national politics allows it to bring together a range of 
varying ideological views yet consensus is not sought, thus perhaps limiting the 
directionality of the movement. More basic challenges such as travel funding, 
internal hierarchies were also discussed by interviewees. A striking feature of 
discussion with activists was their apprehension of social media as tool that 
undermined organisational coherence through the promotion of individualism.  
HSU´s originality contributes to complementing the picture of dissent in 
Jordan. It also denotes the fundamental impact of the Arab Spring in shaping 
new forms and expectations particularly among an educated and transnational 
youth. It also denotes that fundamental limits of a self-organised movement that 
seeks to limit ties to traditional sources of political and social power (Mann, 
2012). More broadly, this has important insights for traditional accounts of the 
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Arab Spring´s dissent (i.e. social media) and generic literature on social 
organising to the extent that it does not represent a movement that was formed 
in united opposition or through the sponsorship of a regime or foreign actor. And 
in fact despite the transnational and educated views of its activists, the focus is 
domestic. 
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Chapter 5 Strategy in Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian 
Youth Movement) 
 
This chapter analyses the development of confrontational, conflict-oriented, and 
non-confrontational, consensus-oriented strategies in the HSU and the events 
underlying these varied responses. The chapter frames activists‘ construction of 
social movement strategies through the concepts of political opportunity, 
mobilising structure, and framing processes as discussed in Political Process 
Theory (PPT) theoretical framework presented in the theoretical debate of this 
thesis. I argue that movement strategies are reactive and context-specific; they 
vary in time. Moreover, although the HSU is certainly a unified movement, there 
remains an apparent strategic variation between its constituencies that adopt 
more confrontational strategies and those opting for non-confrontational 
approaches. Finally, strategic weaknesses or limits of the movement are a 
result of the challenging context and of activists‘ lack of previous organisational 
experience.   
In order to develop my arguments, the analysis is structured into four 
parts. First, I identify the spectrum of the movement‘s strategic choices in terms 
of confrontation and non-confrontation. Second, I analyse the way in which the 
varying political opportunity structure affects the strategic choices of the 
movement, in terms of increased and decreased confrontation. Third, I evaluate 
the way in which activists of the movement have strategically chosen the 
movement‘s mobilising structure, and the way in which this mobilising structure 
has resulted in the appearance of radical voices in the movement, that favour 
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conflict-oriented strategies. Moreover, I present the way in which the mobilising 
structure affects coalition-building with other opposition figures. Finally, I explore 
the three phases of strategic articulation and identify the moments of strategic 
disagreement between the movement‘s constituencies.  
 
Radical-reformist variation in the movement’s strategic articulation: 
applying the theory 
The analysis of social movement strategies is central for Political Process 
Theory (PPT). The theory conceptualises social movement strategy as a 
strategic conversation with opponents, in which ‗mutually independent and 
instrumental decisions‘ (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008) are generally ‗confined to 
actor-opponent interactions‘ (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008). PPT considers that 
‗much of the history of movement/state interaction can be read as a duet of 
strategy and counterstrategy between movement activists and power holders‘ 
(Tarrow, 2011 p. 8). For the model, once a social movement is formed, that 
social movement‘s strategy and a regime‘s counter-strategy should be 
understood as mutually dependent and no longer independent of each other:  
‗After the onset of protest activity, the broader set of environmental 
opportunities and constraints are no longer independent of the actions of 
movement groups. The structure of political opportunities is now more a 
product of the interaction of the movement with its environment than a 
simple reflection of changes occurring elsewhere‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b 
p. 13). 
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Gamson proposes to study strategy along the following binaries: single 
vs. multiple demands, radical demands vs. demands that do not challenge the 
legitimacy of the constituency, or influencing vs. substituting elites (Gamson, 
1975). PPT frames the construction of social movement strategy along these 
lines, which become mutually exclusive according to the model. According to 
this framework, these demands should necessarily be one or the other. They 
can either be single or multiple, radical or reformist, and either intended to 
influence or to substitute elites. As I will demonstrate, this framework is useful to 
study strategy in the HSU, although this case presents a series of 
characteristics that contradict the model‘s binary divisions for conceptualising 
strategy along these fixed dichotomies.  
First, the strategies of the movement vary between constituencies from 
confrontation to non-confrontation. As explained in the preceding chapter, the 
HSU is ideologically a movement which demonstrates both radical and reformist 
voices. This ideological variation is then translated to the movement‘s strategic 
articulation; a variation cutting across a radical-reformist spectrum. The HSU 
has put forward both confrontational and non-confrontational strategies at 
different moments in time. Therefore, this movement challenges the fixed 
conceptualisation of strategy assumed by PPT in the sense that the movement 
as a whole has not chosen between confrontational and non-confrontational 
strategies. In one single movement, different constituencies adopt strategies 
that vary in terms of confrontation. Second, strategic articulation in the HSU 
changes over time, contributing further to challenge the fixed conceptualisation 
of strategy in PPT. Therefore, the analysis of the radical-reformist spectrum in 
the movement has to be done taking into account these trends of 
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confrontational and non-confrontational movement strategies which greatly 
depend on the context. 
Before engaging with these trends of increased and decreased 
confrontation, it is necessary to explain these terms for the Jordanian context. 
Increased strategic confrontation in Jordan is defined as an escalation of 
demands, from economic and social to political. Demands can thereafter 
continue to escalate from demanding specific political reforms, for example in 
the executive branch by asking for the Prime Minister‘s removal, to outright calls 
for an overthrow of the regime. Using Gamson‘s model, this process of 
escalating confrontation would involve moving from dispersed and multiple 
demands, to more focused ones that potentially coalesce into a single demand 
for the overthrow of the regime. Further demands could include voice 
challenges to the regime‘s legitimacy and intend to substitute elites.  
Decreased confrontational strategies in Jordan imply the opposite 
process. This emphasises a return to requests for political reform, on such 
issues as parliamentary representativeness, electoral law, or a postponement of 
all political demands for the sake of socio-economic and cultural issues that 
avoid any discussion of regime substitution. Referring back to Gamson‘s model, 
this process of decreased confrontation would again mean returning to a less 
focused action that involves multiple demands rather than a single cohesive 
one. It would also entail including demands that do not challenge the regime‘s 
legitimacy and aim at influencing rather than substituting elites.  
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 These two tendencies in social movement strategies can be described 
along three main lines: first, they are related to events occurring at a particular 
time; second, strategic orientation is a product of the expanding/constraining 
political opportunity structure; and third, it is defined by decisions to increase 
resonance of movement demands in society. Overall, I argue that the strategies 
of the HSU are reactive and context-specific, and fluctuate over time, making it 
weak and limited in the face of regime counter-strategies.  
The strategy of the HSU has been, in the words of Omar, generally 
‗reactive, you know, just moving around without having a target point, a 
strategy, an ideology‘ (AI01-31.07.13), although according to Seraj sometimes it 
is ‗planned‘ (AI04-04.09.13). This frequent lack of strong strategic planning has 
been widely criticised, and activists have been considered ‗brainless in the 
sense that they don‘t have [a] theory, strategy‘ (AI01-31.07.13). As Omar 
explains during his interview: 
‗They want to be together but they don‘t agree on 90% of the topics, but 
they want to be together because they are small and I guarantee you 
today that if tomorrow they want to do something they want to be 
together‘ (AI01-31.07.13). 
Activists themselves acknowledge their strategic weaknesses. For 
example, Sara explains that ‗we are not the best strategy builders so far. We did 
not sit and plan a strategy‘ (AI13-13.09.13). She relates this strategic deficiency 
firstly to their lack of previous experience in organising: ‗it has to do with 
previous experiences, like get your space, work on the ground or start working 
on the ground, then you are going to learn some new stuff and then you can 
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build your strategy gradually‘ (AI13-13.09.13). Because of this lack of previous 
experience, Ahmad explains that they ‗have to find new ways‘ (AI12-13.09.13), 
and in a highly politicised context, and conditioned by a shifting political 
opportunity structure, Ibrahim explains that ‗a lot of it was trial by error‘ (AI23-
04.11.14). According to him, trial and error in organisation and in building 
strategies might work ‗before things were so politicised, before revolution was in 
the tongues of people‘ (AI23-04.11.14). However, as we will see in this chapter, 
this lack of experience has greatly conditioned their capacity to build their 
collective strategies. 
 
Strategy and a varying political opportunity structure 
In this second part of the chapter, I will turn my analysis to exploring the 
way in which the development of movement‘s strategy has been affected by the 
political opportunity structure. Strategies of the movement according to Seraj 
‗are affected and respond to contingency‘ (AI04-04.09.13) therefore Ahmad 
adds that strategic building becomes challenged by a context that ‗differs from 
stage to stage‘ (AI12-13.09.13). The political opportunity structure provided by 
the regime has varied in time, impacting the strategic articulation of the 
movement.  
A changing political opportunity structure in Jordan has resulted in a 
variation in social movement strategies that can be framed in terms of periods 
of increased and decreased confrontation. In order to present this scenario, I 
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first analyse the November 2012 peak of confrontation in Jordan; second, I 
explore activists‘ perceptions on the context and the political opportunity 
structure, and how they affect social movement strategies; third I explain the 
fluctuation between ‗conflict‘ and ‗consensus‘ oriented strategies of the 
movement in time; and finally I present the current process of decreased 
confrontation of the movement through two specific examples of two more 
recent initiatives put forward by movement activists.  
 
 
In November 2012, confrontation and conflict-oriented strategies 
articulated by the HSU reached their peak after an increase in oil prices. This 
confrontational peak was represented in the form of an unprecedented national 
widespread action that came to be known as habit tishrīn (‗The November 
Uprising‘) taking a name similar to habit nissan (‗The 1989 April Uprising). For a 
week, protestors openly called for the downfall of the regime, pointing to the 
Image 5. Sign of habit tishrīn. Posted on the HSU‘s 
Facebook page on the 16
th
November 2012. 
185 
 
monarch himself, for the first time attracting large numbers under such a radical 
slogan (2012o). Slogans chanted during the November protests included: 
„Yabitsalih al-hin, ya bi-tilhaq al-Abidine (Either fix it now, or follow [Zine El-] 
Abidine [Ben Ali])‘; „Hatha al-urdun urdunnawa-al-khayinyab'id 'anna [This 
Jordan is our Jordan, and the traitor should get away from us]‘; „Hurriyya, 
hurriyya, mish makarim malakiyyah [Freedom, freedom, not royal handouts]‘; 
„Hurriyya min allah, ghasbanʿannak Abdullah [Freedom from God, against your 
will oh Abdullah]‘; „Al-shaʿb yurīd isqāt al-niẓam [The people want the fall of the 
regime]‘; and „Yasqut, yasqut hukm al-azʿar [Down, down with the rule of the 
scoundrel]‘.  
 
 
These slogans reflect the increased anger and frustration among activists 
of the movement, and among the Jordanian population as a whole, however 
they should not be thought of as representative of the whole HSU, neither of the 
Image 6.Photograph taken during one of the protests that took place during habit tishrīn. 
Posted on the HSU‘s Facebook page on the 29
th
November 2012. 
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majority of mobilising forces in Jordan (Abu-Rish, 2012). The majority of 
activists in the movement at that time led marches and chanted the 
aforementioned confrontational slogans although, as Omar explains in his 
interview, some already refused to cross what was perceived as a ‗red line‘.  
‗It was very radicalised. These demonstrations, they demanded the 
removal of the king, the fall of the regime, some of them a Republic in 
Jordan. Many of the slogans were talking about ‗no East, no West‘, 
meaning that we don‘t care about these divisions that the regime is 
promoting and so on. The funny thing is that those were the most 
radicalised demonstrations in Jordan since 1989, they were more radical 
than the 1989 Uprising in Maʿan‘ (AI01-31.07.13).  
According to Hassan, ‗Habet Tshreen was the end of everything. It was 
the ―final destination‖‘ (AI20-29.09.14). Under severe and violent state 
repression, protests were brought down in a week. With this use of force, the 
Jordanian regime severely closed the political opportunity in the country, and 
this severely affected the strategies of the movement from that moment 
onwards. Although, as we will see in the following chapter regime counter-
strategies overall included apparently concessive alongside repressive 
measures, a opportunity was clearly shut in Jordan after this peak of 
radicalisation in November 2012. As Sara noted: 
‗Sometimes you plan a strategy that you consider perfect, but you forget 
what you can do on the ground. So it is important to keep in mind what 
you are and what you can actually do within the space you have, with the 
members you have, with the techniques you know‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
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The continuously varying national and regional context has affected the 
movement strategies given the internal decision-making process based on 
discussion that the movement bases its strategy on. The words of Suleyman 
reflect this point:  
‗The national and regional situation has affected us for sure. Each issue 
will have a time for discussion inside the group, so of course it will affect 
it negatively or positively. This will result in a united vision towards a 
certain situation, or mixed opinions that sometimes are very polarised 
around certain issues‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
At a national level, the closing political opportunity structure, where the 
regime has put forward varying responses to the contentious situation as we will 
develop in the following chapter, has resulted in a reactive rather than planned 
strategy, where movement activists decide their actions in response to a 
political move taken by the regime. As Suleyman said: 
‗We are affected by what surrounds us and we cannot take anything 
positive from it. It affects us negatively. And the proof is so clear. We are 
dispersed‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
Finally, at a regional level, the shifting regional scenario has been critical 
for the movement‘s strategies. Regionally the opportunity structure in which 
social movements pursue their strategies has closed as a result of the 
development of violent conflicts in the region. During the first months of 2011, 
the regional situation was one where activists found a space to pose demands, 
and in this regional context activists of the HSU found their space to start 
organising. However, the violent repressive episodes in Syria in March 2011, 
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and the radicalisation of that neighbouring conflict, as well as the worsening 
situation in Egypt during 2012 and particularly in 2013, framed the regional 
situation in which the movement pursues its strategies.  
The effects were twofold. First, as we will develop in the following 
chapter, with respect to the regime‘s counter-strategy or response to 
mobilisation; and second, in terms of internal strategic decision-making as 
explained by Suleyman:   
‗Our escape is the shared demand that we went out for in the first place. 
The movement is still trying to overcome this challenge. The regional 
situation is affecting the people a lot and this is reflected in their opinion 
and in the work‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
Activists and constituencies in the movement have moved between 
negotiation and confrontation strategies, and have adopted both approaches. 
As explained by Suleyman, their strategic choice between both depends on the 
time and the context, as ‗circumstances are the ones that pressure you to take 
one or another decision‘ (AI06-05.09.13). For him, ‗negotiation and 
confrontation have conditions, and with confrontation we do not mean violence. 
Nonviolent confrontation is always the beginning; later you will reach the 
negotiations under the condition that these negotiations should have a solid 
base‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
With a closing political opportunity structure, and greater levels of regime 
repression being exercised upon activists of the HSU by the regime, social 
movement strategies have overall tended towards greater negotiation rather 
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than confrontation, and radical voices and demands that were widespread in 
November 2012, have been silenced. As Khaled expressed during his interview 
‗At a certain moment you do not have the power to confront. So you need to 
work more at an organisational rather than at a political level‘ (AI02-24.08.13). 
Suleyman added that: 
‗The main demands of the movement are now postponed until the 
situation in the region becomes clear. So of course it affects the 
movement internally and it has demobilised us‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
Increased threats to mobilisation since 2013, and especially during 2014, 
have resulted in an almost complete absence of confrontational strategies in the 
movement, where initiatives have tended to postpone political demands, and 
shift to cultural and social issues. Before analysing the strategic shifts in detail, 
it is important to note that this decreased confrontation of the movement has 
developed differently between constituencies. Some constituencies and 
individuals such as Yusef have continued being confrontational (AI10-10.09.13), 
but have become an exception within the movement and in the country as a 
whole, situation that has made them less vocal. Other constituencies have 
followed different lines in this process of decreasing confrontation that we will 
see in detail in the following pages. Overall, it is important to highlight at this 
point the heterogeneity in the process of decreasing confrontation, as it is 
relevant to understand the current almost complete demobilisation of the 
movement.  
As a result of a shifting political opportunity structure at a national and at 
a regional level, and to the weak strategic coordination within the movement 
190 
 
that resulted from its mobilising structure and challenges to strategizing frames, 
the movement has gone through a clear process of strategic decreased 
confrontation. The fact that the development of strategic reform has been 
different between constituencies has resulted in greater strategic disarticulation 
within the movement which can be classified around four main strategic 
approaches.  
First, Khaled, Amin or Yusef are part of the constituencies and individual 
activists of the movement that still retain their radical stance towards the socio-
economic and political situation in the country, although they have become an 
exception, and their action is not vocal or public (AI02-24.08.13, AI08-08.09.13, 
AI10-10.09.13). A second group of constituencies in the movement are those in 
which Abed, Suleyman, Mustapha, Basil, Hakim or Hassan participate, which 
have favoured a reformist strategy that adopts frames and discourses shared 
with other political opposition actors, including reforming electoral law, the role 
of institutions, the constitution or legislation (AI05-04.09.13, AI06-05.09.13, 
AI15-15.09.13, AI16-20.09.13, AI19-22.09.14, AI20-29.09.14). Third, several 
constituencies, which include those in which Seraj, Rashid or Sara participate, 
have opted for removing or postponing any political demand from their strategy, 
and returning to taking action and working at a grassroots level, including socio-
economic grievances of different marginalised social clusters (AI04-04.09.13, 
AI07-07.09.13, AI13-13.09.13). Finally, several constituencies have identified 
other issues as being central for Jordanian society and culture, and now base 
their action on discussions centring on identity or citizenship, as explained by 
Ahmad and Kareem (AI12-13.09.13, AI17-22.09.13). 
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Given the different trajectories and paths taken by each constituency, 
internal strategic coordination has significantly weakened, and internal rivalries 
between constituencies has appeared because of the different strategies 
adopted. For example, Hassan explains that the decreased confrontation of the 
majority makes them alienate and reject those individuals and small 
constituencies that still believe in adopting more conflict-oriented strategies: 
‗Now, there is no confrontation. If there is someone who wants confrontation, he 
is stupid. He is opening his chest to the fire‘ (AI20-29.09.14). The majority‘s 
rejection of a confrontational strategic approach of some individual movement 
activists is explained in an interview I carried out with an activist of the 
movement that discussed the question of adapting to the post November 2012 
political environment: 
‗The idea of reform can accept a definition of social equality, and this will 
depend on the circumstances in time and space. And because of this, 
dealing with your environment to put forward the idea that you believe in, 
will find greater acceptance through reform than radicalism. Radicalism 
believes that the strategy should be put forward as it is without taking into 
account the environment‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
Although some individuals and constituencies continue pushing for 
confrontational strategies, the majority of constituencies in the movement have 
gone through a process of decreased confrontation. This process by which 
strategies of the majority of activists have shifted from highly confrontational to 
non-confrontational can be analysed following two lines: first, the de-
politicisation of the movement, where all conflict-oriented political demands and 
actions have been postponed; second, a shift to action thatdoes not involve 
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neither confrontation nor visible direct action; based on discussions focussing 
on cultural and social issues.  
The first line of analysis, the de-politicisation of the movement, has 
occurred in two distinct phases that have had results for the movement‘s 
strategies. First, moving from confrontational socio-economic and political 
demands to liberal reformist demands. Second, removing or postponing all 
political demands. The first phase involved diverting the movement‘s radical 
socio-economic and political demands to liberal political demands that mimic 
the discourse of political parties, and the way opposition groups converse with 
the regime. This first phase of the movement‘s decreased confrontation 
occurred right after the aforementioned confrontation peak in November 2012, 
and at the same time as the parliamentary elections of January 2013 were 
being prepared, and is marked by the creation of the Jordanian Youth 
Parliament in January 2013.  
 
 
Image 7. Drawing representing the members of the Parliament in 
the form of a crown. Posted on the HSU‘s Facebook page on the 3
rd
 
January 2013. 
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The HSU as a whole boycotted the parliamentary elections, reflecting 
once again the increasing detachment from the political system of 
disenfranchised young participants in the movement (Banks and Ullah, 1987 p. 
201). Following this boycott, this shift towards reform strategies is clearly 
represented in the creation of the Jordanian Youth Parliament. The Jordanian 
Youth Parliament presents itself as a youth initiative formed by twenty-seven 
members that work to develop reform programs including the vision of different 
social, regional, and political backgrounds.xlThe heterogeneity of the Jordanian 
Youth Parliament is reflected in its logo, which uses the national flag‘s seven 
pointed star coloured in a mosaic of different colours:  
 
 
 
Hassan explains that this initiative by the movement started ‗like a joke, a 
comedy of the reality that we have‘ (AI20-29.09.14). The initial idea was 
basically one of satire or mockery towards the ineffectiveness of institutions 
Image 8. Logo of the Jordanian Youth Parliament. 
Posted on the HSU‘s Facebook page on the 10
th
 
February 2013. 
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such as the Jordanian Parliament and their limited role in bringing about change 
to the country. Hassan continues explaining that:  
‗We announced elections, we collected money, and we created an 
application on Facebook that created an electronic voting system in 
which the same person could only vote once. We advertised this thing 
strongly. We worked with the media in a very nice way. So it became 
very popular. The time of the elections that we did, was one day before 
the parliamentary elections. We did this intentionally because we did not 
want our media echo to vanish. When the elections happen, they take all 
the attention from media‘ (AI20-29.09.14).  
Because of the attention received from media towards this initiative, 
something that had not happened during the previous peaks of radicalism at the 
end of 2012, what started as a small initiative intended at being critical of the 
stagnant political system became serious, and activists of the movement 
invested all their time in the Jordanian Youth Parliament‘s meetings. In terms of 
organisation, the initiative became probably the single best organised action by 
the movement. ‗The Jordanian parliament does not have a system like ours‘ 
(AI20-29.09.14) explains Hassan. The Jordanian Youth Parliament developed 
its structure to include ‗departments inside the parliament‘, among them 
departments for education, economy, legislation, international relations, media, 
or students and youth (AI20-29.09.14). 
 As Hassan explained during his interview, the main strategy that activists 
sought to enact through this initiative was the creation of ‗a shadow parliament 
for the existing parliament‘ (AI20-29.09.14), to ‗invalidate‘ the work of the 
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Jordanian Parliament to a certain extent. In this sense, activists structure their 
work and discourses in the same way as the parliament: ‗we amend laws that 
the parliament is discussing, from our vision as youth (AI20-29.09.14).xli 
The procedure was to hold meetings and discuss a particular law that 
was being discussed at the time in Parliament, trying to reach an agreement, 
and finally voting on a new draft for the law. The next step, Hassan continued 
explaining, was to submit their proposed draft for the law to the Jordanian 
Parliament for consideration. According to Hassan, some of these drafts were 
actually taken into consideration by the formal Jordanian Parliament, such as 
the Law of Weapons and Armoury or ‗Law 308, the Jordanian rape marriage 
law‘ (AI20-29.09.14). 
 
 
The Jordanian Youth Parliament faced limits to their action at two main 
levels. First, ideological differences existed in the Parliament, making 
Image 9. Photograph of some of the members of the Jordanian Youth 
Parliament. Posted on their Facebook page on the 9th February 2013. 
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cooperation difficult because, as Hassan explained, ‗no one accepted to be part 
of something‘ where they worked with others, especially ‗radical leftists, and the 
Islamists‘ (AI20-29.09.14). However, ideological differences were not the 
biggest problem for activists. The second and main challenge to this initiative, 
as we shall examine in the next chapter, was the regime‘s response (AI20-
29.09.14).  
This involved degrading the image of the Youth Parliament in society, 
offering funding to activists, and rejecting the initiative‘s inscription as an official 
association. First, Hassan explains that the regime ‗started putting forward 
propaganda against us, because our role started being evident‘ (AI20-
29.09.14). Second, he continued, the regime offered activists funds, which they 
rejected because they perceived it as a move toward institutionalising their 
action, they did not want to be linked with any institution.  
‗After the elections, the day after, the NDI (National Democratic Institute) 
announced that they were ready to support us with an amount of 300,000 
Euros. You establish your headquarters, and work in an institutionalised 
way, and do this and that and the other‘ (AI20-29.09.14).  
Finally, when activists organised the HSU, they wanted to inscribe it as an 
official social association. Hassan explained that their application for this 
process was rejected several times. He recalls that the last time they tried they 
were told that there was already an organisation inscribed with that same name, 
which they claim was created by the regime as a way of taking over their 
initiative (AI20-29.09.14). 
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The way in which activists of the movement were strategizing their action 
through the example of the Jordanian Youth Parliament already represented a 
substantial shift from the radical strategies pursued in November 2012. This 
initiative clearly presents a shift from the radical demands put forward through 
direct action on the streets to a less confrontational discourse that talked to the 
regime about reform. After the strong repression of November 2012, activists 
that took part in this initiative, among them Hassan, consider that this was the 
only tool available for them at that time.  
‗While we express complete rejection to the existing parliamentary 
system, we need to fight with the tools that we have. And that was the 
tool that was in our hands at that time‘ (AI20-29.09.14).  
This first phase of decreased confrontation during which activists of the 
movement turned to liberal political demands that mimic the discourse of 
political parties and the way opposition groups converse with the regime, drove 
the movement to move away from its socio-economic background. The 
movement started conversing in the same terms as other political actors, 
thereby starting to talk about elections, the role of parliament in political life, or 
the release of political prisoners. As we will see in the following chapter, this 
shift in the strategic approach of the movement is related to a set of seemingly 
conciliatory measures offered by the regime. Such measures tended to be 
related to liberal political moves such as calling for municipal or parliamentary 
elections, constitutional amendments, or legislative reforms. As Omar explained 
during his interview: 
‗Now they have diverted our hirak from economic, social, whatever, to 
demanding the release of the arrested hirakis, stopping the prosecution 
198 
 
and state security court trials, so the hirakis are now diverted into another 
area which has less social background‘ (AI01-31.07.13).  
As a consequence of this shift in the movement‘s strategies, and as a 
reaction to the further closing political opportunity structure in the form of further 
repressive laws in 2013 and particularly in 2014, several constituencies moved 
into the aforementioned second phase of strategic de-politicisation. In this 
second phase of de-politicisation, several constituencies in the movement 
removed or postponed political demands from their action. As Seraj explained 
during his interview, ‗maybe you delete one or two items, and you postpone 
them until a future period‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Seraj continued explaining that: 
‗When you see that the regional situation gives the regime push and 
strength, and you feel that it is stronger than before, we understand that 
achieving these political demands completely is difficult. So we demand 
less‘ (AI04-04.09.13).  
Seraj‘s group is an example of how some constituencies of the 
movement have decided not to work with political demands is the creation of 
parallel political associations or groups, to which all the political discussions are 
transferred, and which are the ones that hold the political responsibility (AI04-
04.09.13). Transferring political discussion to other parallel groups has 
eliminated the political agenda and demands of these groups, making them de-
politicised.  
This has been useful for these constituencies at two levels. First, Seraj 
explains that by transferring political discussions to other groups, these 
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constituencies have now managed to avoid political discussions within 
constituencies that became extremely fragmented, particularly in relation to 
activists‘ stance towards other regional conflicts (AI04-04.09.13). Second, as 
Sara explains, the strategy of removing political demands from their agenda has 
facilitated their work with social groups or workers that became increasingly 
reticent to working with any organisation that gets involved in politics (AI13-
13.09.13).  
 To a certain extent, the strategic decision of some constituencies of the 
movement to remove political demands in this second phase of de-politicisation 
can be analysed as a reaction to the political liberal turn that the movement took 
in the first phase of decreased confrontation. The liberal turn taken by some 
movement activists, particularly by those involved in the Jordanian Youth 
Parliament, was interpreted as a strategic move that brought these 
constituencies of the movement closer to the official political discourse of 
parties and opposition, and away from societal needs.  
Activists and constituencies that held this stance then decided to 
strategically move away from that political discourse and back to a more social, 
grassroots action. This de-politicisation is explained Sara as a way of returning 
to the original aim of their action: 
‗It has to do with the economic situation and I think we have to keep on 
following this line in order not to develop or to change into a purely 
political party that forgets these demands which happen to other groups‘ 
(AI13-13.09.13).   
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At a regional level, as a result of the changing situation, and particularly 
given the growing regional instability and violence, activists such as Sara that 
took this strategic decision to stop working on political issues explain that, at a 
given moment, when the constituency became less political, this decision made 
‗it easier to deal with people and really answer and work on their demands‘ 
(AI13-13.09.13). 
As well as this two-phase de-politicisation, the movement‘s decreased 
confrontation has involved a shift in some constituencies and among several 
individual activists towards action that does not adopt neither confrontational 
strategies nor publicly visible and vocal direct action. Constituencies that defend 
this shift now adopt a strategic approach that is based on discussions behind 
closed doors and public conferences or talks that limit themselves to social and 
cultural issues. Some examples of the topics covered during these recent public 
talks are identity and identity fragmentation, or the situation of sexual 
harassment and patriarchy.  
This new strategy intends to promote critical debate in the Jordanian 
society, and is explained by Ahmad as a way of working to change the people 
from within: ‗We are trying to change from the bottom of the pyramid, not from 
the top. And it is a philosophy of change‘ (AI12-13.09.13). For activists such as 
Ahmad that advocate this shift in strategy, what has become central is ‗to 
overcome diversity and ideological differences between parties, situations and 
points of view to create a big national frame that can create a ground that will 
make dialogue about the main problems, not just politics‘ (AI12-13.09.13). 
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Activists that prefer this strategic approach, such as Hassan, explain that 
‗they are youth constituencies that are not political, but they are spreading 
awareness to the people‘ (AI20-29.09.14). Others such as Ahmad criticise that 
the movement experienced a phase in 2013 where they moved away from their 
demands for social justice into liberal political demands, and other key problems 
for organising were ignored. ‗We are always thinking about electoral law and 
constitutional amendments but we are facing many problems, like identity, 
citizenship‘ (AI12-13.09.13). 
 With the exception of the few individual activists and small constituencies 
that retain their radical character, overall constituencies have shifted away from 
strategies of confrontation towards strategies of negotiation, moving from highly 
confrontational political demands that ask for elite and regime substitution, to a 
wide range of demands that move away from the political demands directed at 
substituting elites. This change in the strategic approach of the movement can 
be further understood through an analysis of the regime‘s counter-strategy 
towards which will be developed in the following chapter. 
 
Strategy and mobilising structure 
After defining the increased and decreased confrontational strategies in 
Jordan in light of the shifting political opportunity structure, I will now turn to 
analyse the way in which activists of the movement have articulated their 
strategies in light of the mobilising structure analysed in the preceding chapter. 
202 
 
Following the central PPT assumption regarding the rationality of social 
movement activists, I argue that this structure has been deliberately chosen by 
activists of the movement and responds to a strategy and a political and 
ideological position towards the context and their action.  
In order to do so, I first explore how different episodes of contention 
initially drove activists to favour a loosely organised, network-like, structure, and 
the way in which they strategically chose an informal model of organisation. 
Then I explore the way in which this structure has in turn affected their strategic 
repertoire in terms of their level of mobilisation, the level of outside subsidies, 
and the alliance structures with other actors such as political parties, unions, 
religious institutions, and authorities. Finally, I present the way in which this 
mobilizing structure has facilitated the appearance of voices in the movement 
that favour confrontational and conflict-oriented strategies. The case of the HSU 
follows PPT‘s assumption on informal, horizontal, network-like structures 
allowing for the flourishing of more radical strategies. 
The HSU‘s mobilising structure has been rationally chosen by activists of 
the movement in response to a series of contentious episodes that occurred in 
2011. Two main episodes of contention drove movement activists to select their 
mobilising structure: the 24th March and the 15th June sit-ins. As described in 
the introduction to this thesis, the 24th March sit-in was dissolved through harsh 
regime repression, and was followed by a period of intense negotiation between 
Islamists and the assorted young activists, that resulted in a major 
disagreement with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB), who were accused 
of trying to take over their sit-in, and create divisions among the young activists. 
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Activists that moved closer to the MB later created what is considered by HSU 
activists as the MB‘s ‗child‘ movement, Al-Ḥirāk Ash-Shabāb Al-ʿIslāmī (Islamist 
Youth Movement). This movement attracted part of the young activists that 
were mobilising together on the 24th March, partly because of the links to the 
MB which provided them an ideological base and an organisational solid frame 
and experience.  
Despite the weakened 24th March Movement –as it came to be popularly 
known–, new calls for mobilisation appeared in May 2011, calling for a protest 
on the 15th July 2011 that would gather as many factions and groups as 
possible. Just as with the 24th March sit-in, the 15th July event also ended 
violently, and the regime decided to forbid any protest in the form of open sit-
ins. This second episode of contention contributed to further divide young 
activists from more structured and organised opposition actors. If the 24th March 
event resulted in tension with the MB, the 15th July event resulted in the division 
between young activists and other leftist opposition groups who decided to 
leave the movement –still called March 24th.xlii 
These two episodes of contention in 2011 marked a shift in the initial 
structure-led strategy that young activists were trying to mobilise under. Initially, 
young activists tried to mobilise a more ‗hybrid‘ structure that was inclusive for 
other organisations; activists favoured a pragmatic strategy through which they 
would benefit from the organisational experience of other groups. The words of 
Sara on their strategic approach to organise at that time clearly reflect this point: 
‗I think there was a need that was bigger than agreeing or disagreeing with the 
ideology... [a] need to organise and try to have much better outcome for 
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something that is happening right now rather than start the typical discussions 
about disagreeing on ideology‘ (AI13-13.09.13).  
As a result of those two contentious episodes, activists shifted their 
strategy towards favouring a more informal organisation that would mark a 
rupture with other opposition groups and their more formal or institutionalised 
mobilising structures. This was a move by young activists at the time to 
strategically break with more institutionalised movements in Jordan with which 
they had been trying to build coalitions in 2011, and that had ended by 
absorbing other young activists into their structures, and thereby weakening 
their initial action. Once the informal, non-institutionalised structure was created, 
radical voices had space to appear in 2012 and develop until 2014. 
Moreover, the deliberate process of strategically adopting an informal 
mobilising structure can be analysed as a clear rejection of institutionalisation 
and hierarchy present in other opposition groups, which activists of the 
movement such as Sara perceive as tools for top-down social control. ‗It is the 
typical hierarchy... which gives everything a hard time to work‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
Activists consider that control is exercised through hierarchical organisation in 
two ways. First, traditional hierarchical structures in the country limit the 
flexibility or freedom of action and choice within their structures, making it 
necessary, according to Sara, to have alternative structures ‗that are in a way 
flexible for people to be able to move‘ (AI13-13.09.13). Second, this lack of 
flexibility, she continues, reduces the degree of democratic participation in 
constituencies and movements, particularly in terms of decision-making, 
therefore activists advocate for ‗less hierarchy‘ (AI13-13.09.13). The horizontal, 
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non-hierarchical mobilising structure adopted by the movement can be 
understood, therefore, as part of their strategic choice, and a political and 
ideological position towards the context and their action.  
 As well as being horizontal and non-hierarchical, the mobilising structure 
of the HSU is informal and non-institutionalised. The degree of formality of the 
movement is again partly a result of their strategic choices and their political 
and ideological position towards the context and can be analysed with respect 
to their internal intra-movement relations and their external inter-movement 
alliances.  
Internally, strategic organisation of the movement can be described along 
decision-making processes, internal coalition-building between constituencies, 
and internal communication. First, internal decision-making within 
constituencies of the movement is done through agreement, followed by voting 
in the cases of bigger constituencies. As an activist of one of the smaller 
constituencies in the movement explains, ‗any issue or topic is discussed until 
we reach an agreement. We were not voting. It was about agreement. And we 
gave each topic enough time for discussion‘ (AI06-05.09.13). Overall, activists 
of the movement consider this decision-making process democratic as it 
represents the voice of each individual participant of the collective. As explained 
by Sara, ‗you choose your representatives, you always have to give long 
discussions for the basic things that you agree with and disagree with for these 
representatives to be able to represent you much better‘ (AI13-13.09.13).  
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However, the interviews carried out for this project show that activists of 
the movement do reflect on the fact that this consensus approach to decision-
making, despite being the most representative and democratic, has had 
negative effects on their action. Given that their strategies are reactive 
responses to specific moments of contention with other actors, mainly with the 
regime, and there is a lack of planned strategy, strategic decisions have to be 
taken in a short time.  
However, their internal decision-making process based on agreement 
has on occasions taken a long time, becoming a challenge to their effectiveness 
in taking immediate action. Seraj said: 
‗When we choose our strategies, we make a plan to implement this 
strategy. And we face the fact that implementing this strategy is not easy. 
There are difficulties. Among them alliances, among them the overall 
political situation in the country, the situation of the regime at the time 
when we decided our strategy and at the time when we wanted to 
implement this strategy was a different situation‘ (AI04-04.09.13). 
Turning to internal coalition building between constituencies inside the 
movement, it tends to be built at specific moments in time around isolated joint 
actions. These strategies of building coalitions between constituencies of the 
movement are not part of a planned strategy, but they respond to eventual state 
decisions related to, for example, imprisonment of activists or rises in the 
electricity and gas prices. Suleyman explained that coalitions inside the 
movement are coordinated through a spokesperson that acts as a link between 
constituencies (AI06-05.09.13). Given the lack of planning that results in the 
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weakness of an overall planned action strategy for constituencies of the 
movement, coalition-building between constituencies has been conditioned by a 
number of challenges. One of these has been the issue of ‗trust‘ between 
constituencies has been significant for collective action. Sara explained that 
issues of distrust were maximised with the presence of infiltrators which, as will 
be developed in the following chapter, have resulted in continuous 
disagreements between constituencies (AI13-13.09.13).  
Another difficulty concerns the variety of ideologies within the movement, 
which has undermined coalition-building efforts, according to Hassan 
particularly at moments of intensified national and regional conflict (AI20-
29.09.14). More precisely, severe disagreements have emerged between 
constituencies –and arguably within constituencies– in relation to their political 
position regarding the events in Egypt or in Syria. A third problem that has 
hampered coalition building in different governorates has been the lack of funds 
of activists. On occasions, as Suleyman explains, they do not have the 
economic capacity to attend protests in other governorates and support 
constituencies of the movement in other areas, or to organise and attend joint 
meetings with other constituencies (AI06-05.09.13).  
Moreover, regime surveillance has been another challenge to building 
coalitions between constituencies. Seraj and Amin explain that surveillance, as 
we will analyse further in the following chapter, has been mainly done through 
social media and mobile phones (AI04-04.09.13, AI08-08.09.13), which Hassan 
adds are the main communication channels used by movement activists (AI20-
29.09.14). Internal communication within the movement has been carried out 
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through informal channels mainly using social media and mobile phones. Seraj 
explains that decisions are communicated through ‗mobile, message, 
Facebook, email, any available way, direct calls‘ (AI04-04.09.13), and Ibrahim 
adds that this type of informal communication, particularly through the use of 
the internet, helped them initially to organise (AI23-04.11.14).  
Finally, the informal, non-institutional, network-like structure of the 
movement results in movement strategies that are reactive rather than planned, 
making them vulnerable to being deeply affected by the context, national and 
regional, in which the movement works. The horizontal organisation model of 
the movement gives it greater volatility and less commitment from activists that 
participate in it, as well as the absence of leaders. This makes the movement 
more vulnerable to external threats —including the presence of infiltrators, 
imprisonment, threats, harassment— than more hierarchical organised 
structures that would have greater commitment from fixed members, 
established leaders, and clearer objectives. Regionally, the shifting scenario in 
different cases, particularly in Egypt and Syria, has affected the movement in 
terms of strategy and organisation. 
 
Strategy and framing processes 
In this fourth and final part of the chapter, after analysing the way in 
which the movement‘s mobilising structure plays a role in the strategic 
articulation of demands put forward by movement activists, I will now turn the 
focus to the way in which the movement has mobilised framing processes in the 
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diagnostic, prognostic, and mobilisation moments of its development. In the 
HSU we will see that, although there is agreement among activists in the 
movement during the diagnostic framing phase, when the problem is identified 
and attributed to a particular actor, disagreement between the radical and 
reformist camps occurs at the moment of prognostic framing, or finding a 
solution to the problem and articulating it jointly. With existing competition 
between activists in terms of articulating a solution to the problem, motivational 
framing, or the third step in framing processes, is further weakened. 
 In order to analyse these three distinct moments of framing processes in 
social movement strategy, and as explained in detail in the theoretical chapter 
of this thesis, PPT presents four frame alignment processes –or strategic uses 
of framing process by social movements– that are relevant for my analysis. 
These frame alignment processes are frame bridging, frame amplification, 
frame extension and frame transformation. I will now analyse what frame 
alignment processes have been put forward by activists of the HSU through 
specific examples of their discourses mobilised during the three key moments of 
framing processes in social movement strategy. 
According to PPT, the diagnostic framing phase is where social 
movement activists identify the problem and attribute it to a particular actor. In 
the HSU, there is agreement between individual activists and constituencies of 
the movement, as explained in the preceding chapter, on identifying the 
problems as social and economic, and on attributing them to the regime which, 
as expressed by Ibrahim, in turn makes the problem also political (AI23-
04.11.14). There is agreement in the movement that social and economic 
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problems are central for their action, and affect socio-economically marginalised 
groups that suffer from shared grievances. Two major framing processes have 
been articulated by social movement activists in this context.  
 First, activists of the HSU have put forward a ‗frame transformation‘ 
whereby they intend to change old understandings and meaning of the way in 
which the Jordanian society is structured. Traditionally, social structure in 
Jordan is thought to be based on ethnic and identitarian fragmentation; primarily 
between Transjordanian/Palestinian-Jordanian ethnicities as a result of 
historical identity politics, as explained in detail in chapter four of this thesis. 
These ethnic and religious frames have been historically constructed and 
reinforced through state-led political processes such as the electoral system, 
characterised by a system of quotas, gerrymandering, and individuality, which 
‗generates inequality in voting power‘ and contributes to fragmenting society 
(Hussainy, 2014). 
 
Image 10.Jordanian and Palestinian flags during a 
protest organised by the HSU. Posted on their 
Facebook page on the 28th November 2014. 
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Activists of the HSU are working together to transform these social 
understandings into other forms of social belonging that they consider to be 
more real, related to socio-economic grievances of the poor and working 
classes that are ethnically of both Transjordanian and Palestinian-Jordanian 
backgrounds. Seraj explains that activists of HSU are seeking to recover ‗the 
debate on class, on national identity, on unity‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Other young 
activists such as Hassan explain that, with this strategy, they ‗are trying to go 
against traditions and culture of people that have grown up with it‘ (AI20-
29.09.14). Mustapha considers that this reflects the way in which youth 
mobilises in a way that contradicts the Jordanian-Palestinian divide which they 
consider has been promoted by the regime in its historical divisive strategy 
based on identity politics (AI14-15.09.13). 
 
 Putting forward this strategic framing in Jordan has been extremely 
difficult for the HSU because frames are devised not only by social movements, 
but also by their counterparts, therefore becoming a contested process during 
which movement leaders have to compete with authorities (Tarrow, 2011 p. 
145) in developing frames that are resonant in society. As we have seen in 
previous chapters, in Jordan the regime has historically promoted identitarian 
politics that has resulted in contingent identities and constructed frames of 
understanding which, reinforced through different episodes of national and 
regional conflict, have left deep marks on communities. Trying to transform this 
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historically-constructed frame of ethnic fragmentation into a frame of class 
struggle has been a challenge for activists given the deeply rooted divisions 
between these two social groups in Jordanian society.  
 
 
 
Second, the HSU has put forward a strategy of ‗frame bridging‘ with different 
groups of workers. Activists of the movement identified socio-economic 
grievances faced by workers of different companies, particularly grievances 
related to the ever-expanding informal job sector or the deterioration of workers‘ 
rights, to base this strategy. They have tried to direct their action towards 
workers that are facing a particular unfair situation in their work, but are not 
politically mobilised. Sara explained that: 
‗We work with workers of the electricity, workers of the Telecom that 
have actually left their work, workers who work on daily basis, the day-
labourers, and agriculture with the government.  We have worked with 
the ones that were with the water company and have left as well, workers 
Image 11.The complete sign reads ‗yawm al-ʾumāl‟ 
which in Arabic means ‗Labour Day‘. However the sign is 
broken and the last Word (in green) reads ‗māl‟, which 
means ‗capital‘. Posted on the HSU‘s Facebook page on 
the 1st May 2013. 
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of the potash company, the ones who were making demands and have 
actually left as well‘ (AI13-13.09.13). 
Sara explains that this strategy directed to different groups of workers 
‗has much more to do with meeting these people, working with them, helping 
them, providing them with support and showing them that we are a clean part. I 
am there to support you‘ (AI13-13.09.13). This has been particularly difficult for 
movement activists given the movement‘s political stance, which is radical at 
specific moments in time. Activists interviewed for this project explain that, 
taking the words of Sara, workers ‗do not want to work with any group that has 
anything to do with politics. What are you representing? Who is behind you? 
Who is supporting you? And things like that. Because of our country, it is very 
hard. And you can understand this in a way‘ (AI13-13.09.13). Moreover, it has 
been difficult for activists of the movement to sustain their work with these 
workers in time because, as she explains, ‗some of them think if some of our 
demands are answered, I am satisfied now and I give up. It is really hard to get 
people to work on the long-term‘ (AI13-13.09.13).  
Prognostic framing for PPT is the second phase in frame articulation at 
which movement activists have to find a solution to the problem previously 
identified, and then articulate a solution collectively. In the HSU, the variety of 
ideologies and a weak organisational structure have created competition 
between constituencies and activists of the movement. This competition has 
impacted their capacity to reach agreements. More precisely, it has resulted in 
the inability of the movement as a whole to agree to a coherent approach to 
addressing these grievances. This disagreement resulted in an internal 
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differentiation between the radical and the reformist conceptualisations of 
change: while some constituencies of the movement favoured a solution that 
involved gradual changes in policies, other constituencies, such as the one in 
which Yusef participates, favoured a solution that would necessarily come from 
more vociferous confrontation aiming at the ultimate removal of the regime 
(AI10-10.09.13). The strength that each of these camps inside the movement 
acquired at any given moment greatly depended on the national and regional 
context. 
Finally, in terms of motivational framing, different constituencies of the 
movement strategically put forward nonviolent tactics to construct a rationale for 
engaging possible adherents in collective action. Activists of the HSU have 
agreed on frames of nonviolent direct action, and constituencies of the 
movement have engaged independently and jointly in different tactics including 
strikes, sit-ins, campaigns, boycotts, mass meetings, and demonstrations. In 
this way, ‗frame amplification‘ is used to resonate with potential adherents in 
society by incorporating the existing cultural values (Benford and Snow, 2000 p. 
624-625); namely, in words of Suleyman, Jordanian society‘s ‗security-minded‘ 
standpoint that completely rejects the reproduction of any episode of national 
instability or violence as witnessed in the neighbourhood (AI06-05.09.13).  
Moreover, movement activists put forward a strategy of ‗frame extension‘ 
where their interests were extended in order to include issues and concerns of 
importance for society, which would potentially increase the probability of 
mobilising other social groups. Some examples of this strategy were the 
campaigns of ‗Samtak bi kalfak‘ (your silence will cost you), which Hassan 
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explains took place in February 2013 after the government announced that the 
prices of electricity would increase (AI20-29.09.14).  
 
  
 
 
 
During these campaigns, the aim of activists of the HSU, in the words of 
Hassan, was to address potential adherents by addressing the rise of prices on 
everyday products, which would result in further economic stress for Jordanian 
society (AI20-29.09.14). They did so by going house to house to talk to people 
in different neighbourhoods, particularly in popular and working-class 
neighbourhoods, about the intention of the government of raising prices, and 
trying to convince them to join them on the street (AI20-29.09.14).  
Image 12. Signs used during the Samtak bi kalfak campaign. The sign on the left 
reads ‗No to rising prices‘; the sign on the right reads ‗Your silence will cost you. Don‘t 
help the corrupt and don‘t pay the electricity bill ‘. Both signs were posted on the 
HSU‘s Facebook page on the 4
th
 February 2013.  
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However, resting the movement‘s foundations on these initiatives without 
having previously articulated a joint vision in the prognostic framing phase, led 
activists to fall into the trap of the ‗normalisation of protest‘ (Meyer and Tarrow, 
1998 p. 4). Their weekly organised protests during 2011, 2012 and 2013 
became a recurring feature of Jordanian politics at the time. Some activists 
interviewed for this project explain that the high frequency of direct action, 
together with the great variety of claims in each action, had negative 
consequences for the movement at two levels.  
First, it changed this direct action into a conventional political instrument 
in the eyes of society, making the movement ‗lose its power to inspire 
challengers and to impress antagonists and authorities‘ (Meyer and Tarrow, 
1998 p. 4). Second, it created disagreements among activists of the movement 
on whether to continue taking direct action without having articulated a joint 
Image 13. Activists of the movement carrying signs during the Ṣamtak bi-kalfak campaign. 
The sign to the left reads ‘Expired options and possibilities‘, posted on the HSU‘s Facebook 
page on the 4
th
 February 2013. The sign on the right reads ‗Your silence will cost you. No to 
the rise of electricity prices‘, posted on the HSU‘s Facebook page on the 3
rd
 March 2013.  
217 
 
solution for the problem, or moving away from the streets and focusing more on 
organising at a grassroots level. The result was that some individual movement 
activists decided to avoid participating in direct action, projecting an idea to the 
general public, the regime, and media, of a weakening movement.   
Overall, in terms of limits to the movement‘s strategic framing, the 
movement has not been able to effectively move away from the current political 
dynamics and strategies of other parties in Jordan and effectively convey the 
real ideological alternative that they represent. In a similar way to other 
opposition groups, their overall discourse has been framed in discussing 
political steps with the state, and the main political practice of the movement is 
still fed mostly by the historical experience characterised by state centralisation 
and directing demands towards the state at a political level, instead of working 
to achieve a greater popular representation, support, or mobilisation. In the 
words of Mustapha, ‗even the chants, even the programs, even the Friday 
protests, it is always talking to the state instead of building something popular‘ 
(AI14-15.09.13). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that movement strategies are reactive and 
context-specific, changing over time, and that, even if we are talking about a 
movement as a whole, there is a strategic variation between the radical and 
reformist camps. I have analysed this variation and the varying set of strategies 
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pursued by the movement through the PPT concepts of political opportunities, 
mobilising structures, and framing processes, which have provided useful 
lenses for my analysis. Strategic weaknesses or limits of the movement are a 
result of the challenging context and of their lack of previous organisation 
experience.  
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Chapter 6 The Jordanian State’s Counter-strategies: Challenges for 
Collective Action 
 
Following the analysis of social movement organisation and strategies in 
preceding chapters, this chapter explores the counter-strategies that have been 
executed by the Jordanian regime, focusing on those targeting activists of the 
HSU. Although the movement has faced organisational and strategic 
challenges, which have already been analysed in preceding chapters, the main 
challenge encountered by the movement has been posed by the regime. 
Therefore this macro level of inquiry is necessary to analyse the contextual 
elements that have affected the movement‘s development. The regime‘s 
response to the HSU has been complex and has critically challenged the 
movement in terms of its internal organisation and its strategic articulation.  
This chapter aims to explore the regime‘s complex response to the 
movement‘s strategies. This includes analysing what repression looks like in 
Jordan and how it has become the main challenge to mobilisation. I argue that 
the Jordanian regime has responded through balancing apparently conciliatory 
and repressive counter-strategies. This in turn has meant that the HSU has had 
to adapt to shifting landscape when it comes to political opportunity. Finally, this 
counter-strategy has challenged the HSU organisationally and strategically to 
the point that it has become a major challenge for this movement‘s survival. The 
Jordanian regime‘s resilience is therefore the result of a planned balancing act 
and a carefully calculated strategic management of collective action that 
combines apparent conciliation and repression.  
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In order to support these arguments, I first introduce the overall power 
imbalance between the regime and the movement, framing their strategic 
dialectic as one of subordination of the movement to the regime. The second 
half of this chapter analyses the Jordanian regime‘s counter-strategy in two 
parts. First, I look at what might be initially understood as regime conciliatory 
measures. These include government reshuffles, the publication of a roadmap 
to reform that includes constitutional amendments, and a plan for reforming 
elections and political party rules. However I explore the limits to these 
apparently conciliatory moves in meeting the movement‘s demands, as well as 
the success of some of these measures towards weakening the movement‘s 
organisation and strategy.  
The second part of this chapter looks at specific repressive measures put 
forward by the regime to target activists of the HSU, which defined the overall 
closing political opportunity structure. In this part, as well as talking about direct 
repression in terms of surveillance, arrests and harassment, I include an 
analysis of the selective application of law to activists of the HSU, and the legal 
umbrella and specific legislative amendments that have marked the closure of 
the opportunity structure and the increased threatening environment under 
which constituencies of the movement have been pushed to reassess their 
initial strategic approach.  
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The Jordanian regime and the Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the 
Jordanian Youth Movement): an imbalanced strategic conversation 
Analyses of social movement strategies and regime counter-strategies 
are central to the PPT approach, and are approached by the framework as an 
‗actor-opponent‘ (Downey and Rohlinger, 2008) conversation, or as a ‗duet‘ 
(Tarrow, 2011 p. 8) where both variables are mutually dependent (McAdam et 
al., 1996b p. 13). This theoretical approach to strategy and counter-strategy is 
relevant to the study of the HSU as these two variables affect each other 
becoming, as Ahmad explains, ‗a circle or sequence‘ (AI12-13.09.13). For the 
sake of organisation of this thesis, I have presented social movement strategies 
and regime counterstrategies in two separate chapters; however these two 
levels of analysis converse and mutually affect each other.  
In introducing this analytical chapter on regime counter-strategies, it is 
necessary to present two initial considerations to this conversation and the 
analytical limits posed by the PPT framework for the Jordanian case study. 
First, the relationship between social movement strategy and regime counter-
strategy in the case of the HSU has to be understood as one conditioned by a 
power imbalance between the regime and the movement. As Omar explained, 
‗it is an over-statement to say that there is dialectic between social movements 
and the regime; there is subordination‘ (AI01-31.07.13). This strategic 
conversation between the two actors has to be necessarily understood while 
taking this imbalance into account; not as a dialectic between equals as 
presupposed by PPT. This can be explained through the way in which the 
framework relates strategy to organisation. In the preceding chapters we have 
analysed the organisation and strategic articulation of the HSU. In this chapter, 
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when talking about regime counter-strategies, it is relevant to mention its 
relation to the organisation of the regime and its high level of centralisation. 
Looking at the internal organisation of parties in this dialectic –the HSU on one 
side and the Jordanian regime on the other– will help us present the power 
imbalance in their strategic dialogue. As Asaf Bayat explains: 
‗The political agency of youth movements, their transformative and 
democratising potential, depends on the capacity of the adversaries, the 
moral and political authorities, to accommodate and contain youthful 
claims.‘ (Bayat, 2011 p. 107) 
Despite having embarked on a process of political liberalisation as 
presented in chapter four of this thesis, the Jordanian regime‘s process of 
democratisation and power sharing has been limited, and it remains an 
authoritarian state with a highly centralised and hierarchical power structurexliii.  
The Jordanian regime has historically depended on a balancing act 
between authoritarian centralisation and localisation or distribution of power 
which has been effective in absorbing institutions and political actors, leaving no 
space for independent dissent. In its strategic conversation with the HSU, Omar 
explains that ‗the regime is the one playing all the cards and the most powerful 
of all the elements. And it worked. You know, to reach this position it worked 
hard‘ (AI01-31.07.13). This centralised power structure, and the regime‘s 
historical experience in managing episodes of national and regional turmoil, as 
analysed in chapter four of this thesis, has been determinant for the regime‘s 
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strength and effectiveness in putting forward counter-strategies during this 
period of contention.  
As analysed in the preceding chapters, the HSU has been marked by its 
informal structure when articulating its strategy, fragmenting it and making it 
vulnerable to the shifting conditions of a fluctuating political opportunity 
structure. In contrast, the regime has been greatly unified during this period of 
contention and in responding to grassroots pressures engendered by HSU. Its 
hierarchical and centralised organisation has helped it to formulate a complex 
and effective counter-strategy that has helped it survive and has arguably even 
strengthened its foundations by instrumentalising on the movement‘s existence. 
Overall, it is key to acknowledge this power imbalance between the movement 
and the regime when analysing their strategic conversation.  
 Second, it is important to remember that the overall political opportunity 
structure and regime counter-strategies in Jordan are not only framed at a 
national level, but have also been greatly determined by the evolution of other 
episodes of contention and conflict in the region. The PPT framework 
conceptualises the political opportunity structure as the series of constraints and 
opportunities posed by the state, thereby limiting its scope of analysis to the 
‗national context‘ (McAdam et al., 1996b p. 3). Although this chapter will focus 
on the Jordanian regime‘s counter-strategies with inevitable discussion ofthe 
national landscape, it is necessary to analyse these counter-strategies by taking 
into account the development of other regional conflicts.  
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National trends of opportunity and threat are strongly related to regional 
events, which in turn affect the amount of international support the Jordanian 
regime receives to ensure its stability, as was analysed in depth in chapter four. 
It is therefore important to take into account this level of regional analysis in this 
chapter on regime counter-strategies at a national level. As pointed out by Lina 
Khatib and Ellen Lust: 
‗The geopolitical dimension is playing a far larger role in shaping 
outcomes of the Arab Spring than in previous waves of regional 
transformation in other geographic settings. To this effect, the range of 
external interventions into domestic political struggles has varied greatly. 
In the most benign instances, institutional actors, such as the monarchies 
of Morocco and Jordan, leveraged their support from Western powers 
like the United States and France to bolster their perceived standing.‘ 
(2014 p. xi) 
 
Regime counter-strategies: between conciliation and repression 
The regime has developed a very carefully calculated strategy of 
contention which can be analysed as a combination of repressive and 
apparently conciliatory moves. Overall, as explained by Khatib and Lust, ‗the 
regime‘s response to such demands has been timid and lukewarm, 
characterized more by frantic cabinet shuffles and superficial constitutional 
amendments than an authentic process to build a new political order‘ (2014 p. 
x). Several elements have contributed to facilitating this response in Jordan, 
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which are at the same time part of the reason for the aforementioned 
asymmetry of power. As explained by Ibrahim:  
‗The agenda has always been to be one step ahead. That is relatively 
easier to do in a country like this where there is relative stability, there is 
a huge population that works for the government or the state, roughly 
40% of the employed population works for the state, which is similar to 
other countries in the region, like Egypt for example, and that usually 
creates a situation where you are unlikely to rebel against your employer‘ 
(AI23-04.11.14). 
The analysis that I will provide now looks at regime counter-strategies since the 
24th March 2011. The analysis will continue until 2014, a year that was marked 
by the approval of ambiguous laws, among them reforms to the anti-terror 
legislation, and when the Jordanian regime had managed to close the window 
of opportunity significantly. As expressed by Anderson, ‗the relative alacrity of 
the responses of the kings of Jordan, Morocco, and Oman in sacking their 
cabinets and promising further reforms seemed to have staved off, and possibly 
diffused altogether, more serious calls for the downfall of the regime‘ (2015 p. 
54). Although the structure of the movement exists until today, the movement‘s 
mobilisation in terms of strategic articulation and direct action has been 
practically suspended since 2014 given increased fear and threats from the 
regime. The appearance of Daesh (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Bilād Ash-Shām, or ISIS) in the regional context since 2014, as we will see, has 
been used to legitimise greater securitization policies in Jordan, and, given the 
ambiguity of the new anti-terrorism law and its selective application, movement 
activists are now considering the costs of action as too high in Jordan.  
226 
 
Although apparently conciliatory moves have been put forward together 
with direct and targeted repression against movement activists, at times 
simultaneously, the overall counter-strategy of the regime has provided a 
political opportunity structure that has moved from an initial period of political 
opening due to the international focus on the region during the initial months of 
the Arab Spring, to one of closure. In other words, in Jordan the political 
opportunity structure has transitioned from a period of closure before the Arab 
Spring, to a period of greater opportunity during 2011 and 2012, to a period of 
increased threats and closure of the opportunity structure since the end of 2013 
and most noticeably in 2014.  
PPT assumes that ‗a political environment that transitions from political 
opportunity to threat will likely initially throw the entire social movement sector 
off guard‘ (Almeida, 2003 p. 351). As we have already seen, this shifting 
political opportunity structure has deeply affected the movement 
organisationally and strategically, as after ‗investing time and resources in 
organisational founding, membership recruitment, and strategies consonant 
with a liberalising authoritarian state, challengers facing a transition to a 
threatening environment find that the old ways of organising and seeking 
political influence are inadequate‘ (Almeida, 2003 p. 351). This chapter 
analyses the specific measures put forward by the regime that have marked this 
shift in the political opportunity structure in Jordan and that have affected the 
HSU internally.  
Overall, the Jordanian regime‘s counter-strategy revives the strategy of 
‗controlled political liberalisation‘ (Kramer, 1992 p. 2) in response to growing 
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demands for social justice, economic development, and political reform put 
forward at the end of the 1980s in response to the April 1989 uprisings in 
Jordan. As Ibrahim explained, ‗there is this unspoken policy, and we see it 
manifesting many times, in which social rage builds up and the state is smart 
enough to deal with it as a pressure cooker‘ (AI23-04.11.14). This strategy of 
controlled political liberalisation, characteristic of liberal autocracies in the 
region, is explained in four phases: accumulation of socioeconomic tension over 
time; irruption of urban riots; threat to regime legitimacy and survival; regime 
responds with promises of more political freedom, respect for human rights, 
elections, and greater participation in decision-making (Kramer, 1992). In this 
way, the Jordanian regime has become the main player, as Omar expresses, 
‗that can calm everything down and can absorb the entire scene‘ (AI01-
31.07.13). 
These overall strategies of controlled political liberalisation have been 
key for the Jordanian regime‘s survival since the 1980s, and have continued 
framing the regime‘s counter-strategies since 2011. Liberalisation does not 
affect the pillars of state control over society or the economy, and its main 
purpose has been argued to be system maintenance in a situation of 
socioeconomic crisis (Kramer, 1992). As we will see in the following pages, this 
strategy has been used by the regime to co-opt wider circles of the political 
public, directing political and religious organisations into controllable channels, 
and excluding all those outside the ‗national consensus‘ defined by the regime. 
The HSU has been one of the few organisations in the opposition that has been 
excluded from this national consensusxliv, remaining independent from other 
opposition actors in the country.  
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Since the 24th March 2011, the Jordanian regime has tried to remain one 
step ahead, which in words of Ibrahim ‗is relatively easier to do in a population 
of 6 million people where you employ half‘ (AI23-04.11.14). Given the regional 
period of turmoil and the focus of international media on the region‘s 
contentious events, the Jordanian regime put forward a set of moves after the 
24th March 2011 sit-in that were intended to help portray the regime as one with 
conciliatory intentions and as one capable and willing to meet the demands of 
protestors (2012n, 2011d). This initial move provided activists of the movement 
the political opportunity to organise in a low-risk environment.  
The regime put forward a roadmap for reform that included several 
initiatives created with the aim of managing reforms to satisfy the official 
opposition‘s demands. These initiatives are in line with previous ones, such as 
the 2002 Jordan First policy, the 2005 National Agenda, and the 2006 We Are 
All Jordan campaign, which, as analysed in chapter four of this thesis, were put 
forward since the beginning of King Abdullah II‘s reign with the intent of 
establishing a top-down controlled political liberalisation in the country. 
Moreover, as part of this reform and liberalisation strategy, the Jordanian 
regime has promoted the organisation of civil society within the limits deemed 
acceptable in the political discussion in Jordan. Maha Abdel Rahman has 
provided a critique within the contemporary development debate in the Middle 
East around the concept of civil society. Abdel Rahman sheds light on the 
complexity of civil society in Egypt and the way in which civil society 
organisations can also repress interests of other groups in the same arena 
(2002 p. 22). 
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Conciliatory moves put forward by the Jordanian regime have been 
defined by some as a ‗first step in the right direction‘ (Muasher, 2011b), at the 
same time as they are seen by others as a way of buying time, given that their 
implementation is constantly delayed as a result of the perception that protests 
have not mobilised a critical mass (2012n). Among apparently conciliatory 
moves, the regime has consistently forced government reshuffles through the 
repeated destitution of Prime Ministers. In the words of Ibrahim: ‗that is what a 
Prime Minister is, a scapegoat‘ (AI23-04.11.14). Moreover, it has put forward a 
roadmap for reform that includes the formation of reform committees as well as 
constitutional amendments, creating a constitutional court, reforming the state 
security court, or calling for elections. Overall, all these reforms have been 
limited and their implementation has been superficial, reflecting ‗neither the 
priorities of political forces, nor those of the masses‘ (Khorma, 2014 p. 1). 
The National Dialogue Commission (charged with drafting new legislation 
for elections and political parties), and the Royal Commission for Constitutional 
Amendments, were created with the aim of institutionalising the state‘s plan for 
managed reforms that intended to satisfy the opposition‘s demands. As it is true 
for other liberal political measures, reform committees have had limited effects 
in achieving further political openness or democracy in the country. These two 
examples illustrate this point.  
First, the National Dialogue Commission (NDC), led by Taher Masri, was 
constituted in March 2011 to gather former and current government officials, 
opposition members, entrepreneurs, and religious leaders. Its mission was to 
draft proposals for new electoral and political parties‘ laws (2012n). The 
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commission had two main problems, namely that the main opposition group 
with most popular support, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), refused to participate, 
and that its role was only advisory. Some of the young activists that were 
organising independent, un-institutionalised social movements at the time, were 
drafted into this commission.  
One of them explained how they sacrifice otherwise ideologically rigorous 
opposition in favour of pragmatism, in the hope that it might be a way to achieve 
their aims and demands. The words of Seraj for this project present this 
experience: 
‘When the situation reached a real conflict between the regime and the 
people, the regime decided to calm the situation down with this National 
Dialogue. We were part of calming the situation down. I thought that the 
National Dialogue could result in something good, but I made myself 
forget that it is not possible for the regime to make concessions for the 
people. It would continue pressuring the people without any discussion. 
Unfortunately it has been proved that this was right‘ (AI04-04.09.13). 
The other constituted commission, the Royal Commission, created in 
April 2011 and formed by ten senior officials, aimed at reviewing Jordan‘s 
Constitution (2012n). A somewhat fundamental lacuna of this committee was 
that it did not include any political opposition or civil society representatives. In 
the summer of 2011, the state published the proposed reforms via the Royal 
Commission, the Cabinet, and the Royal Court.  
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Several groups from the traditional opposition parties, as well as young 
activists that had initiated their organisational efforts in early 2011, announced 
their rejection of these reforms, claiming that they did not meet the basic 
demands voiced in demonstrations. Both the National Dialogue and Royal 
Commision‘s proposals have been criticised by sectors of Jordanian youth. 
Their criticism has mainly been directed towards the implementation of the 
proposed amendments. These initiatives have been particularly spurned 
because of a perception that there is a lack of real representation for popular 
voices, and youth representatives such as the leaders and organisers of 
grassroots social movements such as the HSU since 2011 (Tarawneh, 2011a). 
Despite this criticism, the Royal Commission‘s proposals were enacted 
as constitutional amendments in 2011. Among these amendments, in 2011 all 
the clauses related to the dissolution of parliament, in force since 1974, were 
deleted. Currently, it is not possible for the country to be ruled without the 
existence of the parliament. Probably of greater relevance for activism and 
social mobilisation, the 2011 constitutional amendments introduced a clause 
ruling that no civilian can be judged by a court not entirely composed of 
civilians, thus outlawing mixed courts with military judges. However, this clause 
comes with three major exceptions: grand treason, terrorism, and espionage. 
As we will explain later, the ambiguity and selective application of laws related 
to freedom of expression or terrorism have resulted in a situation in which 
activists are being judged through the State Security Court, also introduced in 
2011, under the ‗grand treason‘ exception. Amal, activist and legal researcher at 
7iber in Jabal Amman, whom I interviewed for this project to talk about the legal 
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framework in which activism exists in Jordan, particularly in relation to laws 
governing freedom of expression and freedom of the press, explained that: 
‗The most interesting part about the State Security changes is that they 
keep telling you that civilians will no longer be trialled under a Military 
judge, under a Military system in the State Security Court. However the 
changes say that you can have a civilian judge that is determined and 
identified by the Military institution while the lawyer that defends the 
government side can still be Military and it is only two out of three judges 
in the trial who can be civilian, and even these people are even decided 
by the Military institute on its own. So it is still very militarised while they 
try to tell people that it is otherwise‘ (AI22-20.10.14). 
The 2011 constitutional amendments furthermore introduced a 
constitutional court while dissolving the country‘s previous highest court. This 
constitutional court, explains Amal, is intended to be a space where ‗you can 
question the constitutionality of certain laws‘ (AI22-20.10.14). However, she 
continues, ‗the entities that can question the constitutionality of different laws 
are already entities that have been selected by the king‘ (AI22-20.10.14). 
Citizens are not entitled to access this court and question the constitutionality of 
laws; ‗you cannot use it as a citizen‘ (AI22-20.10.14). 
This liberal move, that apparently intends to advance the 
‗democraticness‘ of the country, does not reduce the power of the regime. Nor 
does it increase possibilities for participation in any way. In words of Aida, 
colleague of Amal at 7iber with whom I meet before lunch at 7iber in Jabal 
Amman to talk about the legal framework in which activism exists in Jordan: 
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‗Creating a constitutional court, for example, with a lack of democracy, I 
think was actually very harmful rather than beneficial. In the past 
individual judges were able to say that this law is unconstitutional, 
obviously in particular cases. Now only specific people have the authority 
to send it to the constitutional court, so individual judges no longer can 
say that.  The constitutional court, like the higher court of justice, is not 
independent‘ (AI21-09.10.14). 
As part of the set of liberal political moves from the Jordanian regime, the 
Jordanian Constitution was ‗written to ensure that the president or king has 
ultimate power‘ (Brumberg, 2003 p. 8). Constitutional amendments are the 
continuation of this initial aim of constitutions in liberal autocracies; amending 
the constitution in these states will only provide a superficial reform, without 
substantially changing the core authority of the regime. Blogger Naseem 
Tarawneh posted in his The Black Iris website that ‗much of the praise over 
these amendments are akin to a hungry dog being given a bone; convincing 
him it‘s a steak isn‘t much of a problem‘ (Tarawneh, 2011b). As we have seen 
with the 2011 constitutional amendments, the Jordanian regime has continued 
with its long-term strategy. 
 In response to the 2011 constitutional amendments, activists of the HSU 
launched an online petition against what they considered ‗constitutional 
patches‘, rejecting them for being ‗superficial‘ and ‗cosmetic‘xlv. Through this 
initiative, activists demanded more substantial reforms in the Constitution that 
would result in a completely elected parliament, in an elected parliamentary 
government, and guarantees of public freedomxlvi. This initiative by the HSU had 
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a positive response in society. Only two hours after being launched, the 
campaign managed to collect 142 signatures. According to movement activists, 
soon after being launched, the website created for this online petition suffered 
disruption attempts (2011h).  
As well as the aforementioned reforms, conciliatory moves by the 
Jordanian regime have included holding elections, both municipal and 
parliamentary. The call for elections at specific moments of time can be 
analysed as part of this overall controlled political liberalisation strategy, and 
have had negative effects in weakening the HSU‘s collective organisation and 
strategy. These political moves by the Jordanian regime are a matter of divide 
and rule, where formal electoral processes drive activists to shift the national 
focus of their activism. Before the end of 2011, the Jordanian regime called for 
municipal (in mid-2011) elections, a move that had severe organisational and 
strategic repercussions in the formation period of the HSU. Municipal elections 
had a negative impact on the national character of collective action that was 
gaining strength during the first months of 2011, and managed to temporary 
localise collective action into municipalities.  
They were proposed as a way of introducing a decentralisation of power 
deemed necessary to cluster the country regionally and introduce matching 
economic development plans that were often the state‘s official plans 
throughout the 2000s. At the same time as municipal elections were called for, 
the state introduced a plan that was widely seen as a move intended to 
disperse activists into local groups that were easier to manage and less prone 
to widespread national mobilisation that would pressure the state. This plan 
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evolved around the fact that the law allowed new municipal detachments. 
Around thirty-five new municipalities were introduced, pushing local groups to 
organise as a way to defend their regions‘ rights and public spending 
allocations.  
 Balancing centralised authoritarianism with the decentralisation and 
localisation of power has been a balancing act put forward by the Jordanian 
regime since the 1980s (Abu Shair, 1997, Al Oudat and Alshboul, 2010, Doan 
and Adas, 2001). This strategy, whereby power was localised through tribes in 
different municipalities, in conjunction with a method that co-opts tribal leaders 
to become pillars of support for the centralised regime has been critical to 
preventing local groups, particularly with tribal adherence, from turning against 
centralised power during periods of national and regional turmoil. As well as 
through the creation of municipal detachments and holding municipal elections, 
other specific examples of local policies as part of this strategy have included 
local development plans, among which the most recent ones put forward since 
2011 have been the As-Samra Wastewater Treatment Plant (WTP) in Az-
Zarqāʾor the improvement of Treatment Plants in Al-Karak and Al-Shobak 
(OECD, 2014).  
Due to the effectiveness of the call for municipal elections in localising 
the national struggle, and activists focus on mobilising to secure their localities‘ 
resources, the start of 2012 was marked by political polarization, local 
mobilisations, increasing and decreasing coordination of activity, and the state‘s 
initial success in co-opting the Muslim Brotherhood and independent figures 
known for the tribal base or influence through favouring openness for a 
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negotiated reform. The state at that point responded through a new wave of 
neoliberal policies and legislations, as a continuation of the controlled 
liberalisation strategies. This had become a characteristic state strategy since 
1989, which relates to budget, restructuring the public sector, and drafting new 
laws on taxation and social security. During the first half of 2012, activists took 
their position on the laws that were being introduced.xlvii Escalating mass 
mobilisations took place around the decisions of structuring the public sector. 
The teachers‘ movement for unionisation actively mobilised around negotiations 
to draft the legislation and regulatory code for their newly established union. 
They managed to mobilise densely against restructuring decisions on the 14th 
February 2012 attracting around 10,000 demonstrators to the door of the Prime 
Minister‘s office.xlviii 
Further sector-based mobilisations continued throughout the spring.xlix 
These mobilisations became more influential at a local level where more 
successful mobilisations took place due to the increasing politicisation of 
activists who positioned themselves against the aforementioned liberal moves. 
After a period of localisation that followed the municipal elections, and in 
response to the liberal moves put forward by the regime, activists reacted by 
starting to come together on calls for reforms, anti-corruption, against cuts, and 
neoliberal designs for price increases in gas, electricity, and food items. At this 
point, in spring 2012, the HSU was organised as the umbrella for these young 
activists who had been organising since the 24th March 2011. Regime counter-
strategies continued following similar dynamics of reform, considered superficial 
and ineffective by activists of the HSU. Discontent built up to the peak of 
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radicalisation in the episodes of habit tshrīnin November 2012 analysed in the 
preceding chapter.  
The peak of radicalisation of November 2012 has been considered, as 
Omar puts it in his interview, ‗a true popular uprising‘ (AI01-31.07.13). Although 
for the movement habit tshrīnin 2012 reminds them of the wide-spread protests 
of 1989 analysed in chapter four of this thesis, the conciliatory moves put 
forward by the regime in response have been more limited. In words of Omar:  
‗When you compare what happened in 1989 and these benefits I told you 
about, with November 2012, when nothing happened, not a single 
concession was given, this gives you an idea about the strength that the 
regime saw in the ‗89 Uprising as compared to the proposed or prospected 
strength in the November 2012‘ (AI01-31.07.13).  
The apparently conciliatory moves that the regime has proposed, framed 
under this controlled political liberalisation, have been possible through the use 
of other actors included in the aforementioned ‗national consensus‘, particularly 
political parties and other traditional opposition groups. As asserted by Albrecht, 
it is important to recognise that: 
‗in the authoritarian Middle East, these institutions exist, often as part of, and 
an expression of, a larger landscape of societal challenge and opposition… 
however the objectives and functions of these institutions are not as 
significant an influence on political participation in these regimes as they are 
in democracies… the majority of citizens in the Middle East do not express 
themselves politically through these institutions of political participation… 
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[as] they play a very limited role in political participation compared to 
democratic countries‘ (2008, p. 22). 
After the 24th March 2011 sit-in, organised by young activists 
independent of political parties, these groups managed to move the initial 
demands of social justice, dignity, freedom of expression, and the end of 
economic and political corruption in the country, to liberal political moves that 
would not threaten the economic or political power of the regime. In the words 
of Omar, the trend in Jordan was one where you saw ‗elites trying to win over, 
or trying to create street or to create popular protests for their own opportunistic 
benefits‘ (AI01-31.07.13). 
 As well as being useful to divert initial demands forcing young activists to 
reconsider their claims and strategy, using the card of political parties was 
useful to absorb part of the youth that had participated in the 24th March 2011 
sit-in. A clear example of this strategy is the Muslim Brotherhood organisation, a 
traditional opposition organisation in Jordan that has been part of this national 
consensus since the 1980s (Larzillière, 2012). The MB played a key role in 
absorbing part of the unorganised, independent, and unaffiliated youth that 
mobilised on the 24th March sit-in into the MB structure in the form of what 
activists among them Hassan call a ‗child‘ movement (AI20-29.09.14), the Al-
Ḥirāk Al-Shabāb Al-Islāmī (Islamist Youth Movement). The creation of this ‗child‘ 
movement has been widely seen as a top-down move to control youth. As 
expressed by Bondokji, ‗it took effort and wisdom from MB leaders to control the 
youth and clarify that what happened in Tunisia and Egypt could not be 
attempted and would not be appropriate in Jordan‘ (2015 p. 8).  
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 This strategy put forward by the Jordanian regime through the use of 
traditional opposition parties resulted in a win-win situation for both the regime 
and the Muslim Brotherhood. On one hand, the regime was able to divide youth 
along religious and ethnic divisions, mobilising once again its identity politics 
strategy analysed in chapter four of this thesis, which ‗precludes the articulation 
of a universal vision for social change‘ (Bernstein, 2005 p. 51). As expressed by 
Khaled during the interview carried out for this project, ‗the regime has 
succeeded, to a certain degree, in creating a feeling of hatred, and in dividing, 
the people on the streets through the traditional and classical political parties‘ 
(AI02-24.08.13). On the other hand, as explained by Hakim and Hassan, the 
MB managed to preserve its social support base gaining legitimacy by 
‗including‘ youth into their structure, and found the opportunity to divert part of 
the youth towards putting forward demands that would benefit them politically 
(AI20-29.09.14, AI19-22.09.14). I meet Hakim at the Muslim Brotherhood 
Association Headquarters in Jabal Hussein in Amman, an evening in 
September 2014. Hakim, university graduate and Journalist in his early twenties 
at the time of our interview, had started organising the Hirāk Al-Shabābī in 
Kerak at the beginning of 2011, before moving later to Amman to become one 
of the organising members and spokesperson of Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabāb Al-Islāmī 
(the Islamist Youth Movement).  
 Young activists that resisted this move and organised under the HSU 
expressed their belief in the impossibility of creating coalitions with these other 
youth movements, considered ‗child‘ movements compromised by their 
relations to ‗controlled‘ political parties. As explained by Seraj, ‗youth groups 
that are related to political elites, organizationally they depend on the political 
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leaders, so maybe this can be difficult for our relationship with them... Some of 
them, they have to inform their leaders and tell them that we will do an activity 
with this group‘ (AI04-04.09.13). These alternative youth movements created 
during this period have managed to absorb part of the youth that initially 
participated in the March 24th events. This could be due to several factors, 
including: these movements‘ organisational experience; the institutional 
character they provide as ‗mother‘ institutions; and their resonance in society 
that results from their strategic use of ethnic and religious frames for 
mobilisation, which still have huge resonance in Jordanian society. As explained 
by Ibrahim, ‗because they were young and inexperienced, it left such a big 
vacuum to be co-opted, to be manipulated, to be hijacked‘ (AI23-04.11.14). 
As well as in terms of notably reducing the HSU‘s participants, this 
strategy by the regime resulted in reducing the radical positions among young 
activists. Although the example I have presented here of the MB‘s child 
movement is the most significant in this sense since 2011, the strategy of trying 
to absorb radical elements outside the scope of the regime by using political 
parties of all the ideological spectrum already existed before 2011. As explained 
by Omar during his interview for this project: 
‗The last time that I was arrested was in 2002, a long time ago, I have 
been harassed and arrested by the regime. But during those times of 
arrestment, all the time interrogators were telling me: ―why the hell aren‘t 
you in one of the leftist parties?‖ They were kind of encouraging me, in a 
way, to join kind of the classical leftist parties in Jordan because it is 
obvious that then the hierarchy of the party, the infiltration, being itself 
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part of the regime‘s framework, it is much better for the regime to control 
these elements‘ (AI01-31.07.13). 
 
 
 
Apparently conciliatory moves by the regime have been coupled with repressive 
ones towards activists of the movement which can be classified into two lines: 
through legislation and through direct harassment, surveillance, and arrests. In 
this last part of the chapter, I will now turn my analysis towards these repressive 
moves and the overall closing of the political opportunity structure in Jordan 
since 2013, particularly during 2014. As Suleyman explained, ‗the challenge is 
the challenge of the regime, it is the strongest, repressing through laws, and 
arrests, threatening workers, threats of arrests‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
Image 14. Photograph of a clothes-shop‘s 
showcase on popular Rainbow street in central 
Amman. Taken by the researcher on the 16th 
July 2013. 
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This closing opportunity structure has meant increasing threats to 
activists of the HSU, to the extent that the regime has become the main 
challenge to mobilisation today. In words of Ibrahim: 
‗In that window of opportunity as many of us see it, you have people 
driving home their ideals, and protests are here, and people write very 
brave articles, etc. And then slowly that window closes. There is always 
this conscious realisation that the window will eventually close, and with 
that comes this unconscious fear of what happens when that window 
closes. And usually that means arrests, usually that means rounding 
people up, detaining people, coming up with new legislation to address 
new contexts and find new ways, and that was something else that they 
did‘ (AI23-04.11.14). 
It is necessary to frame this second part of our analysis on the Jordanian 
regime‘s counterstrategies towards the HSU‘s action in a regional context of 
intensified conflicts, particularly in Egypt and Syria, and as part of an intentional 
use of the discourse of instability that has been utilised by Arab regimes, 
including Jordan, as a justification for closing the grip on political activism. 
Throughout the extensive periods of participant observation carried out for this 
project, it became obvious that securitisation was legitimised in mid-2011, when 
the conflict in neighbouring Syria started escalating to eventually become the 
current civil war. The conflict brought about a huge influx of refugees into 
Jordan through the northern border, posing a potential destabilising threat to an 
already internally unstable country. With the intent of stabilising the country, 
there has been an increase of foreign aid to Jordan (Obeidat, 2011), and the 
King has added over $1 billion to the subsidy bill (Pelham, 2011).  
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The foreign aid that Jordan receives comes not only from the US and the 
EU, but so too from the Arab Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, a bloc 
of countries that has become an important donor in its objective of consolidating 
the stability of its neighbourhood (Kamrava, 2012). Jordan has asked for Saudi 
Arabian support to push the development of a free trade agreement between 
Jordan and the GCC, intended to boost investment ties between Jordan and the 
Arab Gulf monarchies, especially with Saudi Arabia (Obeidat, 2012b). 
Moreover, the invitation of the GCC to Jordan and Morocco is seen as a Saudi 
initiative aimed at stabilising the region (2012a), and including these two Arab 
monarchies in the council would create a sort of ‗club of Arab monarchies‘ 
(Razoux, 2011).  
This foreign aid has served to further develop the security apparatus and 
the military in Jordan during this period as a policy of further securitisation. This 
increased aid towards Jordan could have resulted in an increased awareness 
and presence of the (already massive) security forces which is reflected in the 
creation of 21,000 new security positions, only in the first months of 2011 (Vogt, 
2011). Security in Jordan mainly depends on the General Intelligence 
Department (GID), commonly referred to as the mukhabarat.l As Ibrahim 
explained: ‗they are dealing with millions, they are dealing with so many people 
that they employ that are everywhere. It is not a centralised thing, it is 
everywhere‘ (AI23-04.11.14).  
Leen Kayyaht, activist of the HSU who is also a human rights lawyer, 
explains that ‗authorities use instability to justify a ―security mentality‖ in Jordan‘ 
(Su, 2013). This national discourse is strengthened during periods where 
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regional conflicts are intensified and radicalised. Since the radicalisation of the 
conflict in neighbouring Syria, Jordan has seen an influx of high numbers of 
Syrian refugees which have worsened the economic pressures in the country, 
and these refugees and revolutionary processes have been used to justify 
further securitisation policies in Jordan. This has been particularly the case of 
the new anti-terrorism law approved in June 2014 which we will analyse in the 
following pages. Kayyaht explains that ‗they say, ―Do you want security or 
freedom of expression? Do you want to see your house safe from bombing or 
do you want freedom of assembly?‖ When you construct a choice like this, 
people start to feel fear‖‘ (Su, 2013).  
 Repressive moves put forward by the regime towards activists of the 
movement have firstly been possible through legislation. The application of the 
law in Jordan is, as explained by Amal, ‗selective‘, but ‗rigorous‘ ‗when it is the 
government wanting to limit or constrain certain groups because they have not 
been abiding by the law‘ (AI22-20.10.14). This dichotomy is made possible 
through the ambiguous language used in drafting laws. As described by Aida, 
this is one of the ‗well established practices in Jordan, where the law is vague 
and the implementation is arbitrary‘ (AI21-09.10.14). The theme of arbitrary law 
and selective application of legislation towards activists of the movement is a 
recurrent one in the interviews to activists carried out for this project. In the 
words of Ibrahim: 
‗So many international eyes were on Jordan and the rest of the Arab 
world, that instead of just doing things kind of arbitrarily, they found ways 
to do it through legislation, through Press and Publications Law, and 
amending the constitution through the latest one which is the Anti-Terror 
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Law, and now they are rounding up people who are posting things‘ (AI23-
04.11.14). 
In Jordan, two laws passed since 2011 have been particularly harmful 
and repressive for the organisation and the strategic articulation of the HSU: the 
new Press and Publications Law passed in August 2012; and the new Anti-
Terrorism Law, approved on the 1st June 2014. These two laws are intended to 
regulate, control, and limit freedom of speech in the country, guaranteeing 
‗freedom of speech but not freedom after speech‘ (Brumberg, 2003 p. 8). 
Offering greater freedom of expression, particularly of the press, and removing 
some restrictions on freedom of association are among the steps in classical 
mechanisms of contention ascribed to processes of controlled political 
liberalisation (Kramer, 1992). However these freedoms are accompanied by 
limits to the laws which include taboo topics and limiting the scope of legitimate 
political expression and action. The Jordanian New Press and Publications Law 
approved in August 2012 is a clear example of this.  
During her interview, Aida explains that the new Press and Publications 
Law of August 2012 intends to regulate ‗speech‘, understood as speech through 
any medium, this is from newspapers and publications (as in the name of the 
law), to ‗screaming it in public‘ or expressing yourself online. From the 
beginning we see that the application of the law is ample and ambiguous; it is: 
‗overreaching. You don‘t know how this will be applied‘ (AI21-09.10.14). 
Moreover, Amal adds that it is used to regulate public and private speech 
through any channel, by leaving loop holes and open areas. The law, she 
continues, has been developed to regulate was described by one interviewee 
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as the ‗seven sins of speech‘ (AI22-20.10.14), namely criticising the King or his 
family, calling for an overhaul of the governing system, criticising the military 
institution, criticising public morals and religion, disrupting the relationship with 
other countries, disrupting public conduct, and expressing support for terrorism. 
Let us disentangle the ambiguities of the law, particularly through how it can 
affect social mobilisation.  
 Overall, the major problematic presented in the law is the ambiguous 
language used in it. The first ‗sin‘ of speech, criticising the King and his family, 
is presented literally as insulting the king and his family (lèse majesté), without 
further specification of what this includes. This ambiguity affects the sin of 
‗changing the system of governance‘, crime that activists have frequently been 
charged for and that has been passed to the State Security Court, as we will 
see later. Criticising the military, again, can be applied to anything that harms 
‗national security‘, without any further definition of what ‗national security‘ 
means.  
Amal explains that the law also protects areas of public morals and 
religion that have public and national support, ‗using the national religious 
agreement in order to give yourself more authority to control other aspects of 
speech and information‘ (AI22-20.10.14), which is characteristic of liberal 
autocracies as we mentioned before. Finally, expressing support for terrorism is 
another of the criminalised sins of speech. This clause of course finds the 
ambiguity of what terrorism means and what can be considered a terrorist 
organisation. This ambiguity is not clarified neither in the Penal Code nor in the 
Terrorism Law that we will look into now. The result in words of Amal is that ‗you 
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never know when you will be trialled based on this Terrorism Law in a Military 
State Court on in a Civil Court‘ (AI22-20.10.14).  
We have briefly looked into the ambiguities and loop holes of the 2012 
Press and Publications Law, and its dissuading effects on social mobilisation. 
However, the regulation of freedom of expression in Jordan cannot be 
understood without taking into account the Anti-Terrorism Law and the way it is 
applied. Several ‗crimes‘ that would have to be regulated through the Press and 
Publications Law, such as changing the system of governance, criticising the 
military institution, criticising religion or public morals, or disrupting the 
relationship with other countries, have been sometimes trialled by the State 
Security Court. For example, many of the activists that were demonstrating 
since 2011 were not charged based on the Press and Publications Law, but 
through the State Security court, specialised on terrorism.  
The new Anti-Terrorism Law was approved on the 1st June 2014 as an 
amendment to the original law n°55 of 2006 (2006). It has been denounced that 
these amendments ‗are not in line with international Human Rights standards 
and treaties ratified by the Hashemite Kingdom‘ (2014d). Activists of the HSU 
and other young activists such as Hakim consider it a ‗customised Terrorism 
Law, a law of the security services, and a law that can trial you for the simplest 
thing, just for thinking‘ (AI19-22.09.14). The first problematic point about the law 
is its broad definition of terrorism which ‗criminalises facts unrelated to violent 
actions such as "disturbing public order", harming "the environment" or just 
presenting an "economic risk"‘ (2014d). In words of Hakim, ‗the law came under 
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pressure from the security services and is specific for five situations, but it has 
huge ambiguities, and it can be used for many other things‘ (AI19-22.09.14).  
As in the case of the Press and Publications Law, this ambiguous 
language allows authorities to bring perpetrators of alleged violations, before 
the State Security Court, with an extraordinary jurisdiction. This court lacks 
independence as it is directly linked to the executive branch and its members. 
Overall, this law has been perceived as a strategy from the Jordanian regime ‗to 
offer a window for the government for criminalising and repressing any political 
opposition under the pretext of fighting terrorism‘ (2014d). Since its approval in 
2014, activists of the HSU have been consistently trialled through the anti-
terrorism law, and in the State Security Court. As expressed by Omar, ‗whoever 
is outside the scope is arrested, sent to the state security court‘ (AI01-31.07.13).  
‗Labelling speech ‗terrorism‘ doesn‘t hide the reality that Jordan is still 
intent on muzzling its citizens who speak freely. Jordan claimed credit for 
limiting the jurisdiction of its State Security Court, but in reality it left 
gaping loopholes for authorities to carry on business as usual‘ (2014a) 
Legislative amendments and the selective application of the law have 
increased threats, becoming major contextual challenges for the organisation 
and strategic articulation of the HSU. Legislation is frequently presented by 
movement activists like Seraj as one of the ‗substantive problems‘ (AI04-
04.09.13), to which Suleyman adds that laws determine ‗to what extent you 
were allowed to express your opinion and make demands that in your opinion 
are fair‘ (AI06-05.09.13). As well as increasing threats for activists of the 
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movement, Seraj explains that they pose threats for their families and for 
potential adherents of the movement:  
‗There is a set of laws and there is a security apparatus that can put 
pressure on you in the work as activist, or puts pressure on your family, 
in the rights in general, at different levels‘ (AI04-04.09.13).  
As well as through an ambiguous legislation and a selective application 
of the law, the Jordanian regime has used infiltration, surveillance through 
social media and mobile telephones, street repression, and imprisonment to 
repress activists of the HSU. The Jordanian regime accepts the existence of 
individual radical voices as an approach that is used to show the increasing 
political openness of the regime. However, the way in which the regime has 
repressed activists of the HSU signals that individual radical activists become a 
problem when they became organised. In words of Omar:  
‗There are radical individuals. And the Jordanian regime is tolerant of 
radical individuals, along its history, because they are a good source of 
saying ―look at the democracy‖ [but] once the radical individual starts to 
organise, then it is hard line repression‘ (AI01-31.07.13). 
The first repressive move the Jordanian regime has promoted toward 
activists of the HSU has been infiltration. As explained by Ibrahim, ‗these 
groups are eventually infiltrated, they are co-opted, and those that are not, that 
remain the minority, are rounded up‘ (AI23-04.11.14). Infiltration in the 
movement has aimed to first, divide the movement by creating clashes between 
activists to result in the movement‘s internal fragmentation, and second, inform 
the regime about movement participants, their organisation, ideology or 
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strategies. Infiltration in the movement has been possible due to its informal 
internal organisation, and the fact that belonging to the movement is based on 
participation and not on a formalised membership process. Suleyman explains 
that ‗it was easy for them to infiltrate the groups because of the lack of formal 
membership. So it was easy for anyone to access groups and create rumours 
about others. They made people doubt about the honesty of these activists‘ 
(AI06-05.09.13). 
As well as gathering information on activists and on the movement‘s 
strategies through infiltration, a second mechanism of control was put forward 
by the regime through the surveillance. The internal communication of the 
movement was monitored, particularly on online media and mobile telephones, 
which, as expressed by Amin, were the main communicative channels used by 
activists (AI08-08.09.13). Social media and mobile telephones have been also 
used by the regime to create fear among activists and their families, thereby 
increasing threats to mobilisation. Activists have been frequently harassed and 
threatened for their action, and the majority of times these threats have been 
carried out by anonymous individuals who openly express their loyalty to the 
regime.  
Although activists consider that they do not have proof to ascribe these 
surveillance and harassment moves to particular actors, some of them, such as 
Amin, do recall having received threats ‗in the name of the King‘ (AI08-
08.09.13). Furthermore, as Hakim expressed during his interview: 
‗Activists receive threats through their wives, their mothers, their children, 
through SMS, Facebook, Whatsapp, threats related to death, kidnapping, 
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beating, some activists received bullets to their houses. Social media 
pages of the regime threaten the activists and misinform about them, say 
lies about them, they fabricate videos, full of lies, fake and not true to put 
pressure on activists‘ (AI19-22.09.14).  
Another strategy of repression put forward by the Jordanian regime to 
target activists of the movement has been repression on the street. Open 
attacks on protestors and harsh street repression has not been a strategy 
consistently adopted by the Jordanian regime; however, it has been put forward 
at particular moments in time.  
 
 
As well as through the use of anti-riot police, public repression on the 
street has been mainly exercised indirectly through the use of thugs or 
balṭajiyya. Thugs have become well known among activists of the movement, 
and their presence and action has become a factor that has further increased 
the costs of mobilisation, as, in the words of Hassan, ‗they follow protestors and 
break their cars, beat them, insult them‘ (AI20-29.09.14). 
Image 15. Street repression against movement activists on the 15th July 2011 in 
Downtown, Amman. Photo published on the HSU‘s Facebook page.  
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‘The mukhabarat is the one who moves them [...] they already have 
shops in the Downtown. All of a sudden they gather all together and they 
start beating protestors. The first time when protestors were beaten in the 
Downtown, it was by these groups. They are known. They are known in 
the media. They are known by the police. They were standing with the 
police, normal. And everyone sees them [...] One time they followed me 
because I took a video of what they were doing. I was taking a video 
while they were hitting people, so they started following me because I 
took a video of them. I went to the police, and the police told me it was 
not their problem. As simple as that. And then I started running. We hid in 
a coffee shop‘ (AI20-29.09.14).  
However, several incidents of repression on the street have been directly 
perpetrated by the security forces. An example of this direct repression during a 
nonviolent action undertaken by the HSU took place on the 30th March 2012. In 
a statement issued by activists of the movement the day after the events 
(2012p), the movement organised a peaceful sit-in in front of the prime 
minister‘s office to demand the release of political prisoners who were being 
trialled in the State Security Court. This action was framed in the same way as 
previous ones organised by the movement, however during 2012 the use of 
force against activists of the movement was becoming a ‗norm‘, and as soon as 
the protest started ‗a Public Security Official addressed the protesters through a 
speaker warning them not to cross redlines‘ (2012p). A participant recalled that: 
‗After about thirty minutes, a field official signalled the Gendarme and 
suddenly the protesters were raided and fiercely attacked, injuring five 
and arresting twenty-seven, all of which was documented by the cameras 
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of the press members that were present. The attacks were not meant to 
only dismantle the protest, but rather to humiliate and terrorise 
participants. The activists arrested were transferred to the centre police 
station in al Abdali Area, where a group of people later that night 
gathered in solidarity. For the second time that day, police forces 
suddenly attacked the group, brutally beating two members of the JYM 
before arresting them‘ (2012p). 
Finally, the Jordanian regime has exercised repression through waves of 
imprisonment of activists. Hakim explains that it affected ‗a huge number of 
activists, we are talking about more than 400-500 activists that were arrested‘ 
(AI19-22.09.14). This move further increased the cost of mobilisation by 
creating fear among social movement participants, their families, and in society 
in general. Ahmad explains in his interview that these waves of imprisonment 
are interpreted by activists of the HSU as ‗a tool of pressure from the regime‘ 
(AI12-13.09.13) which is ‗the best way to press and to squeeze the movement‘ 
(AI12-13.09.13).  
Hassan explains that authorities ‗identify the most vocal activists in the 
movement and directly imprison them. They charge them for asking for the fall 
of the regime, the head of state‘ (AI20-29.09.14). Furthermore, activists of the 
movement, their lawyers, and human rights organisations have condemned the 
mistreatment they received in prison. Activists in retention suffered from ‗death 
threats, keeping them in solitary confinement, and forcing them to consume 
epilepsy medication‘ (Al-Samadi, 2012).  
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Imprisonment and bad treatment in prisons have on occasions made 
activists more convinced of the need to continue organising and taking action in 
Jordan. As one of the activists of the movement publicly stated, ‗my detention, 
which has now surpassed thirty days, has made me more convinced that our 
demands for freedom and equality within a safe community are just‘ (Al-Samadi, 
2012). During the interviews carried out with individual activists of the HSU, I 
was able to get a closer understanding of their experiences during their periods 
of imprisonment.  
Although I could include many additional references to bad treatment in 
prisons in line with what I have described before, I have chosen the following 
account from Yusef‘s interview where he narrates the way in which his actions 
conditioned his life, his experience during that period, and the way in which it 
framed his activism afterwards: 
‗In two days in prison I saw death over 20 times, just because I burnt the 
photo of the king‘. Yusef describes that during his arrest he asked to see one of 
the heads of the mukhabarat to tell him that: ‗because of you I do not have a 
life, I do not have a job, I do not have education, I do not have family, I do not 
have anything‘. In response he explains that he was beaten ‗in the name of the 
King‘ and told that they are unable to control the way in which he has been 
‗rejected by the society‘. After describing this episode of physical and 
psychological violence, he expressed: ‗I do not care about my life because 
someone else took it and now I have decided to fight back‘ because this ‗jungle‘ 
has ‗made me an extremist‘ (AI10-10.09.13). 
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 Despite this account, generally the aforementioned repressive moves by 
the regime have been effective in creating a general feeling of uncertainty and 
fear among activists of the movement. Hassan explains that being imprisoned, 
‗this is something that one is scared of [...] the family might say [things], the 
people might gossip about you. Maybe you will not be able to find another job, 
maybe, maybe, too many things‘ (AI20-29.09.14).  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the HSU has been challenged by the 
state‘s counter-strategies to mobilisation, and the varying timescales of political 
opportunity structures, which has managed to almost completely demobilise the 
movement. Regime counter-strategy, as well as regional instability, have had an 
effect on the collectivities that had a more network-like less hierarchical 
organisation. Repression and violence on the HSU has resulted in wide-spread 
demobilisation and partial de-radicalisation of constituencies therein. 
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Chapter 7 Enduring Social, Political and Cultural Transformations: 
Framing Significance in Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian 
Youth Movement) 
 
 
 
In this chapter I analyse the way in which HSU participants frame the political, 
social and cultural significance that the movement has had until now. I argue 
that HSU participants frame the significance of the movement mainly in the 
social arena concerns the creation and organisation of an informal, 
noninstitutionalised movement in Jordan and that it has altered the limits or ‗red-
lines‘ of political action or political expression tolerated by the Jordanian regime. 
Moreover, participants of the movement consider that it has been key in 
reintroducing national issues in the political debate. Finally, for participants of 
the HSU, their organisational efforts have been important in transforming the 
culture of activism in Jordan, which for them has the potential to transform the 
future of political participation and organisation. Despite these achievements, 
participants of the movement consider that there remain limits to the 
significance of this movement that result from various contextual factors which 
are important to point to in this analysis.   
In order to support these arguments, this chapter is structured in the 
following way. I start by arguing against the static conceptualisation of ‗success‘ 
offered by the PPT framework, and explain why it is not a useful term to study 
the case of the HSU. I then define social and political significance, and explain 
how this conceptualisation is more useful than PPT‘s concept of success for the 
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case of the HSU and for analysing the way in which individual participants 
frame this significance as part of their motivation. I follow with an analysis of the 
perceived strengths by HSU participants in terms of the political, social and 
cultural transformation that their action is perceived to have brought about, and 
then move to presenting the perceived its limits with respect to all three.  
 
Rethinking Success in the Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian 
Youth Movement) 
In this first part of the chapter, I will now present the concept of ‗success‘ 
as defined by the PPT framework, and argue that the working definition 
conceptualised by PPT has a limited applicability for evaluating the success of 
the HSU. Furthermore, this first part argues for the use of the concept of 
‗significance‘ to study this particular case, defined through the PPT concept of 
‗resonance‘, which allows for a greater analytical focus on culture as a key 
element for any consideration of a social movement‘s outcomes.  
Examining success is central to the study of social movements and their 
effects. PPT provides a definition of social movement success as the unfolding 
of ‗a set of outcomes‘ (Gamson, 1975 p. 28) which can be of two types: 
acceptance and new advantages. First, success as acceptance is presented by 
the framework as the acceptance by its antagonists of the challenging group‘s 
existence. According to the PPT model, acceptance can be measured in terms 
of: consultation; negotiations; formal recognition or recognising that the 
challenging group is representative of a formally designated opposition group; 
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and inclusion, when the challenging group is included in the system (Gamson, 
1975 p. 28). Second, success for PPT is defined as a set of new advantages 
when any of the demands that are put forward by the opposition group are 
achieved (Gamson, 1980 p. 1043).  
The way in which social movement success is conceptualised by PPT is 
rigid, fixed and limited to the state, and that limits its applicability to the case of 
the HSU in three ways. The first limit to the application of this concept for my 
case is related to the timeframe. Given that the movement is relatively new and, 
although weakened, its structure still exists, it is still not possible to analyse 
concrete outcomes of its action. Given that success is defined in PPT as a set 
of outcomes, and is evaluated through the analysis of these outcomes, it is not 
possible to apply this concept of success in the analysis of the HSU.  
 The second and third limits to applying this concept for the case study 
are related to the goals of the movement. The second limit to using ‗success‘ in 
the analysis of the HSU lies in the fact that this movement does not demand 
‗acceptance‘ as defined by PPT from its dominating antagonist, the Jordanian 
regime. Therefore, acts of consultation, negotiation, formal recognition, and 
inclusion in the system, would not be considered by activists of the movement 
to be a successful outcome of their activism. Finally, the third limit to applying 
this concept in my study is that the movement does not demand political 
‗advantages‘ in the system; movement activists seek systemic change either via 
reform or wholesale substitution.  
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Due to these limits to PPT evaluations of a social movement‘s ‗success‘, in this 
study of the HSU, I prefer to evaluate the significance of the movement at the 
social, political and cultural levels. With the concept of ‗significance‘ I refer to 
the quality of being important, and to the quality of having notable worth or 
influence (Meyer and Kretschmer, 2007 p. 541). More precisely, when 
evaluating the significance of a movement, we have to measure the capacity of 
the movement in bringing about change.  
Although the concept of ‗success‘ provided by PPT is limited in its 
application to the present analysis, the framework does also provide the 
concept of ‗resonance‘ which is related to ‗success‘ and is useful for analysing 
the significance of the HSU. The concept of‗ resonance‘ is ‗relevant to the issue 
of the effectiveness or mobilizing potency of proffered framing‘ (Benford and 
Snow, 2000 p. 619).For PPT, the varying effectivenessli of framing processes is 
defined in terms of two factors: credibility, and salience (Benford and Snow, 
2000 p. 620). Although, as aforementioned, I will not be engaging with the 
concepts of success or effectiveness of the movement due to the limits of their 
applicability in the Jordanian case, the concept of ‗resonance‘, defined through 
the factors of ‗credibility‘ and ‗salience‘ are useful and will be applied throughout 
this chapter to evaluate the HSU‘s significance at a social, political and cultural 
levels.  
I will now turn to breaking down the concept of ‗resonance‘ which will be 
useful for the analysis of the HSU‘s significance. A movement‘s ‗resonance‘, in 
other words, its effectiveness or mobilising potential, is measured in terms of 
credibility and salience of the movement‘s frames. First, the ‗credibility‘ of a 
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particular frame is presented by PPT as dependent on three factors: the 
consistency between beliefs, claims and actions inside the movement; the 
empirical credibility of the movement‘s political framing in the eyes of potential 
adherents; and the personal credibility of frame articulators (social movement 
activists) themselves. On the other hand, salience also depends on three 
factors: centrality, or ‗how essential the beliefs, values, and ideas associated 
with movement frames are to the lives of the targets of mobilization‘; 
experiential commensurability, or resonance with personal, everyday, 
experiences of the targets of mobilization; and finally narrative fidelity (Benford 
and Snow, 2000 p. 621).  
Overall, using the concept of ‗significance‘ defined around the 
aforementioned PPT concept of resonance, that examined the variables of 
credibility and salience, is more appropriate for my analysis because it allows 
me to incorporate a wider set of social, political and cultural factors that are 
relevant to understand the way in which HSU participants frame the significance 
of their action in the Jordanian context. As we will see in the following pages, 
multiple and varied factors, particularly cultural, are key to answer the question 
on the way in which significance of the HSU is framed by movement 
participants, and it is relevant to broaden the analysis to include issues such as: 
social-psychological changes in values, beliefs, and opinions; cultural as a set 
of signs and the meaning of those signs; and cultural as the framing of a 
worldview and a social situation (Tarrow, 2011 p. 231).  
 
261 
 
Framing Social Significance in Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the 
Jordanian Youth Movement) 
I shall begin by exploring the way in which HSU participants have framed the 
social significance or the social resonance of the movement. I argue that 
overall, movement participants frame their action as having been socially 
significant in terms of managing to create, organise and sustain an informal, 
noninstitutionalised movement in Jordan. However, certain perceived limits in 
terms of the movement‘s social significance remain in relation to the resonance 
that it has managed to have in the Jordanian society, which has owed a great 
deal to the movement‘s political and social operating context. In order to put 
forward this argument, the analysis incorporates the perceived strengths and 
limits of the movement‘s social significance, i.e, its resonance, by exploring its 
credibility and salience in Jordanian society. 
Movement participants frame the HSU‘s main strengths in terms of social 
significance have been the social compliance with a different type of politics, the 
perception of having revived the political debates in society, and mobilising 
demands that were central to large social clusters. First, the existence of the 
movement as an informal, non-institutionalised organisation is perceived to 
have given hope to many people in Jordanian society that did not believe in 
politics anymore. This refers back to the resonance of the movement in terms of 
their credibility in the eyes of potential adherents. A worsening economic 
situation and the inability of existing formal political organisations to solve 
everyday social and economic grievances of the majority, led other people in 
the society to realise the need for other forms of politics to exist. Despite the 
weakness in terms of support that we will examine in the following pages, the 
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presence of alternative forms of politics was initially supported by society as a 
necessity to promote solutions to domestic socio-economic issues. In words of 
Suleyman: 
‗With time, most of the people started to accept the idea... with the bad 
economic situation, people started to understand that there is a social 
movement that has to carry out its role even if it was weak or people 
joining it or accepting the idea of it was weak‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
Alongside this perceived resonating and socially-compliant message that 
promoted a different vision for politics that would address everyday social and 
economic grievances, the second way in which HSU participants framed the 
movement‘s social significance has been marked by what they see as the 
reinvigoration of national social, economic, and political debates within the 
Jordanian society. For participants, this has resulted in a society that has 
expressed increasingly vocal demands at particular periods; according to 
Khaled, this is a reflection of the HSU‘s efficiency in ‗creating a situation of 
refusal and nonconformity which now exists in the country‘s social and political 
reality‘ (AI02-24.08.13).  
Moreover, although the limits created by the increased threats to 
mobilisation have had a great effect on the mobilisation of particular social 
clusters, to be further examined below, the movement‘s activities are seen by 
movement participants to have created spaces for dissent even among un-
mobilised individuals with critical views of the system, especially in terms of 
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socio-economic grievances and among economically disenfranchised social 
clusters. As Ahmad explained: 
‗It gave the space for people to talk against stuff in general. People used 
to be scared or they used to not mention anything for example that has to 
do with the King or whatever the Government itself. And now people 
have this space. Everyone talks. Whoever… if you walk on the street or 
get into a cab or sit beside someone in a restaurant, everyone talks now. 
It gave people the space‘ (AI12-13.09.13). 
Finally, resonance was perceived to have been partly achieved by the 
movement through mobilising demands that were central to large social 
clusters, and congruent with personal everyday experiences. Participants 
consider that the HSU managed to be socially significant and resonated with 
society because of its salient strategy of highlighting demands that were 
essential and resonated with everyday experiences of Jordanian society. For 
them, this was particularly so with topics related to social equality or justice, 
central for the movement. In words of Seraj, who presents himself as secular, 
social resonance ‗depends on the topic. They might not accept or support you if 
you have a particular religious opinion, but they would agree with you on the 
topic of social equality‘ (AI04-04.09.13). Overall, movement activists consider 
that one of the key ways in which their social significance could be evaluated 
would be the consideration that their message directly addressed the people; 
that their demands included issues that affect people‘s everyday lives.  
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Hassan, referring to such campaigns as the Samtak Bikalfak, analysed in 
chapter five on movement strategies, explains that ‗what inspired me to 
continue for some time was the response of the people to the ideas that we had‘ 
(AI20-29.09.14). This ‗inspiration existed for a period, and then it disappeared‘ 
(AI20-29.09.14). During the Samtak Bikalfak campaign, he explains, ‗people 
cooperated with us, cooperated with us in a strong way. During protests, you 
felt that you reached what the people need. They collaborated and started 
joining you on the street‘ (AI20-29.09.14). Activists interviewed for this project 
strongly feel that, because they conceive their activism as being directed to the 
people, the periods when people responded positively to their action, 
particularly when recognising their work as one that talked about them and that 
was close to them, were the ones that inspired to continue.  
Although the movement has been socially significant at these three 
levels, Suleyman explains that ‗the main challenge was talking to the people‘ 
(AI06-05.09.13). As narrated by HSU participants in the interviews carried out 
for this project, their perception is that the movement has particularly 
encountered limits to its ability to resonate in society which are key to 
understand its current situation. Sara explains that sometimes, ‗people are not 
that accepting; it is not because of them, but it is because of the whole regime 
and how the system was built. So they do not give you a space to be able to 
work in freely‘ (AI13-13.09.13). Although the movement‘s mobilisation has been 
clearly determined by the threatening and adverse conditions imposed by the 
Jordanian regime in the last period, as analysed in the preceding chapter, an 
analysis of the perceived social significance and resonance of the movement 
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should also incorporate an analysis of the concept of credibility at three levels: 
frame consistency, empirical credibility, and credibility of frame articulators.  
 The first limit perceived by participants to the movement‘s social 
significance is related to frame consistency, which greatly determines the 
movement‘s resonance and credibility in society. The strategic framing 
processes within the HSU, as analysed in the chapter on social movement 
strategy, is characterised by an inconsistency of frames, and a weak articulation 
between beliefs, claims, and actions in the three-step strategic framing process 
(diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational). This weak strategic framing process 
has been perceived by HSU participants as one of the conditions that has 
affected the consistency of frames articulated by the movement, weakening the 
credibility of the movement and their capabilities for taking effective action in the 
eyes of the society. As Suleyman explained: 
‗We might have succeeded in building a good speech that includes 
people‘s demands, but our direction keeps finding obstacles because of 
the regional situation‘ (AI06-05.09.13).  
The second main perceived limit to the movement‘s strategic framing that has 
negatively affected the movement‘s social significance is related to its empirical 
credibility. In this sense, HSU participants consider that the presence of radical 
voices in the movement, together with the regime‘s use of the legacy media in 
order to portray the whole movement as exclusively radical, have hampered 
efforts at building resonance with the Jordanian society, which Ibrahim defines 
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already as ‗a security-minded and stability-minded population‘ (AI23-04.11.14). 
Sara explained that: 
‗In a similar way as when you refer to the American dream, we have the 
Jordanian one which is stability and security. So if you are trying to go 
away with whatever small line [sic] they are going to be against you and 
people are going to be against you because they are scared. And you 
cannot blame the people but rather you do blame the regime for this. And 
as you know the regime is always trying to prove that no, these people 
are trying to make whatever troubles in the country and stuff like that. So 
people become against you in general‘ (AI13-13.09.13).  
This security-minded and stability-minded population is largely a result of the 
historically ongoing conflictive situation, where Jordan stands as a relatively 
safe-haven in comparison to other neighbouring countries. Ahmad explains that, 
to a great extent, ‗to have a very radical thought for change is not accepted by 
the society‘ (AI12-13.09.13) and until today, ‗the culture of the society it is a 
main block‘ (AI12-13.09.13). Despite the aggravating socio-economic 
grievances that the majority of the Jordanian society faces today, engaging in 
activism or in any type of social movement for change is generally discouraged 
in the Jordanian context. As Ahmad explained: 
‗Many Jordanian youth they were raised in a culture and by their parents‘ 
who do not agree with being politically active and participating in politics. 
Many young activists actually hide from their parents and never tell them 
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that they are participating in protests or in any social movement; ‗it is a 
red area, do not enter it. Stay away from it‘ (AI12-13.09.13). 
This cultural factor in Jordanian society is pushed to its limits at times of 
regional and national instability, when the regime acts, in words of Hakim, as a 
‗scarecrow for the people‘ (AI19-22.09.14), ‗putting them in a scenario that has 
two sides: you are either on the side where you accept the existing corruption, 
or you will go to an unknown scenario like in Syria or Egypt or others where 
there is bloodshed‘ (AI19-22.09.14). The rejection of any type of radical 
position, and of any type of action that might be perceived as a factor of 
instability, is stronger during periods of contention; as has been the case for the 
HSU. Ahmad explains that ‗people thought if I am political I will not work in the 
public sector, in the Army, the GID [military intelligence] will follow me, and they 
may call me for investigations. They may threaten me‘ (AI12-13.09.13).  
An increasingly threatening national and regional environment, both 
politically and economically, since mid-2011, but more noticeable since 2013 
and 2014, is perceived by HSU participants as one of the reasons resulting in a 
reduced the empirical credibility of the movement‘s actions over time. As 
Suleyman explained: 
‗We are in a society that until this moment rejects any informal politics, 
and this starts from your family. The family does not want to see you 
[thrown] out of the main political institutions. This is the main challenge. 
The society, the environment, the family, as we are living in a society 
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where familial links are strong, the tribal alliances exist until now‘ (AI06-
05.09.13). 
Given this widespread perception in society on political activism and social 
organisation as factors that could potentially destabilise the political situation in 
the country, an open engagement with the movement‘s activities has generally 
affected individual activists negatively. As Seraj explained: ‗political activism 
affects your personal life in a clear way, including your relationship with your 
family, with your work, it affects you financially, it pressures you financially, even 
emotionally‘ (AI04-04.09.13).  
The third and final limit to the movement‘s social significance that has 
been perceived by HSU participants as key and has occupied much of their 
discussion is related to the credibility of frame articulators; young activists 
themselves. This point is also related to culture and to traditional 
understandings of social structure and hierarchies. The Jordanian society, as in 
other MENA societies, is hierarchically structured, from the smaller scale family 
unit to the larger national societal unit, around gender and age (Barakat, 2005). 
Youth are perceived in Jordanian society as weak claim-makers that ‗do not 
know what they do or what they want‘ because of this generational hierarchy in 
society. Because of this, the organisation of a movement by youth in this 
context necessarily ‗entails the definition of a constituency as a meaningful 
group and the redefinition of that group‘s characteristics in opposition to 
dominant culture‘s definition of the group‘ (Whittier, 2002 p. 302). Throughout 
the extensive periods of participant observation carried out for this project it has 
become clear that this generational hierarchy is still a strong element in 
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Jordanian society and is perceived by HSU participants as an element that 
affects the way in which society receives their message. This element, coupled 
with the HSU activists‘ weak experience as frame articulators and the short-
lived organisation they represent have been framed by HSU participants as 
limits the social significance of their activities in the Jordanian society. 
 
Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement) and 
Framing Political Significance 
Turning to the way in which HSU participants frame their political significance, I 
will explore the debate around three important contributions that they consider 
their actions have had with respect to: first, altering the forms of political action 
and political expression tolerated by the regime; second, reintroducing national 
politics into the political discussions in Jordan; and third, changing the culture of 
political activism for the future. The movement‘s activities have been framed by 
participants as having been politically significant at these three levels, which 
represent key elements and transformations for the study of Jordanian politics 
in the future.  
 The first factor to analyse in terms of the way in which the movement‘s 
political significance has been framed is the way in which it has been perceived 
to have shifted the ‗red-lines‘ of freedom of political expression in Jordan; the 
way it is considered to have altered the forms of tolerated organised political 
action and expression. As expressed by Suleyman, ‗there was a huge barrier 
that we broke‘ (AI06-05.09.13). The HSU was able to organise politically and 
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put forward radical demands at specific moments in time, and this occurred in 
the context of other regional revolutionary efforts. Omar explains that ‗not 
everybody but a large number of people are talking about the King in ways that 
were unimaginable five years ago‘ (AI01-31.07.13).  
Although the increasingly threatening national and regional context is 
perceived to have had a negative effect on the type of demands and the overall 
organisation of the movement, as we have seen in the preceding analysis, it is 
necessary to acknowledge the fact that movement participants consider that 
their action was able to alter, if only during a specific period in time, the limits of 
freedom of political expression in the country. As Suleyman explained: 
The ‗freedom that people have taken by their hand, and the freedom that 
they have exercised regionally; my right is to talk about whatever I want 
without harming anyone of course. The amount of freedom that people 
took; maybe this is the biggest success that I see until now, that 
individuals are able to talk, that they moved from whispering to talking‘ 
(AI06-05.09.13).  
As well as altering the ‗red-lines‘ in terms of freedom of political expression, 
HSU participants consider that the discourse put forward, mainly of national 
focus, was able to reintroduce national politics in the political debate in Jordan. 
Before 2011 Ibrahim explains that ‗Palestinian politics were safe; they would 
talk about the peace process, anything outside. But local politics, it was not only 
fear, it was disinterest. No one was interested in it‘ (AI23-04.11.14). Political 
actors that were part of the opposition in Jordan before 2011 mainly criticised 
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the policies of the Jordanian regime in relation to its foreign policies towards 
Israel, its peace treaty with Israel, and on occasion the economic and political 
agreements with the US and its policies in the region. According to HSU 
participants, national politics were not discussed, and issues of passed 
conflicts, such as the 1970 Black September, or the identitarian divisions in 
politics and society were just part of the knowledge acquired from your family. 
As Ibrahim put it: 
‗All of this is not taught in schools. You know, 1970, the Civil War. This is 
not in our history books. It‘s absent completely. It‘s all inherited politics, a 
father telling his son his version of history. It‘s just inherited politics. And 
that has created that identity crisis‘ (AI23-04.11.14).  
The action of the HSU is considered by participants to have expanded this 
political discourse to necessarily include national socio-economic grievances 
derived from a deficient political system, thereby aiming to resonate in society 
by incorporating everyday life grievances in Jordanian society. Moreover, as 
analysed in the chapter on social movement strategy, movement activists 
themselves put forward an effort to re-frame identity politics, and to bring back 
national political issues key to understand the resulting social divisions.  
 The third and final key factor that contributes to understanding the way in 
which participants have framed the movement‘s political significance is the fact 
that movement‘s activities sustained during this period are perceived to have 
changed the culture of activism in terms of the transformation of individual 
participants and forging an organisational experience and culture. As we have 
272 
 
seen, PPT tends to narrow down the study of culture to frames, which is often 
considered a ‗limited and distorted means of studying culture‘ (Meyer, 1999 p. 
80). Moreover, PPT considers that the study of culture in social movements is 
opposed to structure, and this conceptualisation results in a ‗narrow view of 
(political) structures as noncultural‘ (Polletta, 1999 p. 64). The way in which PPT 
studies culture in social movements has been criticised as ‗structures are 
cultural‘ (Polletta, 1999 p. 64) and there is a need to analysing ‗meaning as 
constitutive of structure‘ (Armstrong and Bernstein, 2008 p. 83).  
The way in which PPT approaches the study of culture as above is 
limited for the analysis of the HSU and the framing of its significance in 
transforming the culture of activism in Jordan. Therefore it is necessary to study 
the ‗culture within movements‘ (Meyer, 1999 p. 85) and explore the cultural 
effects of movements, which remains analytically ‗underdeveloped‘ (Meyer and 
Kretschmer, 2007 p. 548). As we have seen in this chapter, HSU participants 
consider that the movement has faced challenges to its significance and 
resonance at the (macro) social and political levels. In order to complete the 
analysis of the framing of movement‘s significance, it is important to incorporate 
this final reflection on significance in terms of organisational culture which is key 
because ‗symbols, meanings, and practices forged in the cauldron of social 
protest often outlive the movements that created them‘ (Meyer and Kretschmer, 
2007 p.547).  
Despite the organisational challenges that activists have faced, the 
symbols and meaning created during the analysed periods of contention endure 
until today, therefore this analysis of cultural significance of movements has to 
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necessarily be built on the micro and meso levels of inquiry (Staggenborg, 
2002). First, a micro level of inquiry that focuses on the perceived 
transformation of individual activists that participated in the movement. Second, 
a meso level of inquiry where the analysis focuses on the way in which the 
activities of a particular movement are perceived to have built organisational 
experience that can be mobilised in the future. These two levels of cultural 
significance will shed light on the perceived deep cultural transformations that 
define the culture of dissent and resistance in Jordan today.  
 The transformation of individual participants is a key feature to explore in 
order to analyse the movement‘s significance in terms of building a culture of 
activism. In the words of Meyer and Kretschmer, ‗someone who has forged a 
sense of self and values through collective action and tried to exercise political 
power through membership in a community of struggle will not readily submit to 
being acted on by distant authorities in the future‘ (2007 p. 548). Despite the 
limits to organisation or strategic building in an increasingly threatening context, 
and a decrease in organised collective action, activists continue interpreting 
‗their experiences in political terms and politicize their actions in both movement 
contexts and everyday life‘ (Meyer and Kretschmer, 2007 p. 548), changing the 
way in which they live. 
As Ahmad explained, HSU participants consider that ‗the change in the 
culture of activists in Jordan was a revolution‘ (AI12-13.09.13). Despite the 
challenges to organisation and building strategies, which were posed mainly by 
the Jordanian regime but also by the society and imposed consequent limits to 
the movement‘s social and political significance and resonance, activists of the 
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HSU do not give up their struggle. As explained by Suleyman, ‗the only option is 
to continue putting forward our demands and talking to authorities about our 
demands. We continue to talk with citizens about their rights, we have to 
continue‘ (AI06-05.09.13). Their individual motivations to continue being 
involved in their activities today is expressed by Hassan in terms of ‗passion; it 
is the only thing that will move you‘ (AI20-29.09.14) and by Seraj as ‗hope for a 
political path that I believe in‘ (AI04-04.09.13). The words of Suleyman and 
Ibrahim rightly capture a shared feeling among movement activists for whom a 
shared inspiration after their collective struggle is the endurance ‗pain and 
suffering‘ (AI06-05.09.13) of ‗people stretched to the max‘ (AI23-04.11.14) in the 
community and their ‗massive‘ dissatisfaction (AI23-04.11.14). 
 Finally, HSU participants consider that their activities have been 
significant in changing the culture of activism in the country by building 
organisational experience that can be mobilised in the future. In threatening 
contexts in which mobilisation decreases as a result of the existence of 
repression, ‗newly available organizational infrastructures can be used to 
sustain reformist contention in the near term as well as be radicalized to launch 
more disruptive and violent protest campaigns when opportunities recede and 
the political environment transitions to one characterized by mounting threats‘ 
(Almeida, 2003 p. 345). Despite decreased public and collective activities, 
movement activists share memories of their collective action, and the activities 
of movements ‗seed mainstream politics and society with activists, 
organizations, and issues that animate change in the future‘ (Meyer and 
Kretschmer, 2007 p. 548). 
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In Jordan, activists of the HSU have managed to organise during the 
period of regional political opening that supposed the Arab uprisings and started 
in 2011. In the current period of political closure, although almost completely de-
mobilised, the organisational structure endures. This organisational structure is 
not maintained by action in itself, but by the memories of collective action and 
suffering to which activists of the movement continuously refer to throughout the 
observation periods. For movement participants, the movement has therefore 
managed to provide a lasting organisational infrastructure and an organisational 
memory that can be mobilised in a future period of greater opening in the 
political opportunity structure. The words of Suleyman reflect this: ‗I hope that 
maybe this generation of youth will achieve something real; even if it was a 
start, they will open a way for future generations‘ (AI06-05.09.13). 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued first, that the concept of success as defined by 
PPT is not applicable for the case of the HSU, and that it is more appropriate to 
talk about significance. I have analysed the way in which HSU participants have 
framed significance at a social and political level and argued that movement 
participants have framed the significance of their action in the following ways: 
socially, the existence and organisation of an informal, noninstitutionalised 
movement in Jordan; and politically, altering limits of political action or political 
expression tolerated by the regime, or the ‗red-lines‘ of freedom of political 
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action and expression in Jordan, and the reintroduction of national issues in the 
political debate. 
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Conclusion 
 
This research has focussed on the HSU. It has examined its organisation, 
ideology and approach to collective action, as well as the strategies it uses to 
acquire significance in society and push for social and political change in 
Jordan. The project has sought to illuminate the new actors, new forms of 
organisation, and new strategies in this movement, as well as the challenges to 
organisation and the limits to bringing about change that participants encounter 
today.  
This chapter outlines the project‘s empirical findings and summarises the 
main arguments that have been developed throughout the preceding chapters. 
It further affirms the way in which this project contributes to the academic 
conversation on both social movements in Jordan and in the MENA. 
Furthermore, it advocates the need for similar projects to study collective action 
and contentious politics in the MENA that focus on alternative structures and 
forms of organising. This will encourage thinking about the way in which 
alternative discourses develop and challenge dominant structures in this region. 
The chapter closes by indicating possible future lines of research and 
highlighting the insights that this type of study can make to the knowledge on 
transformations in societal dynamics and discourses in other cases.  
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Empirical findings in the Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian 
Youth Movement) 
This thesis has presented the empirical findings about the HSU that have 
resulted from extensive periods of observation, over 30 months in total, starting 
in 2011. The empirical findings and arguments that have resulted from this 
research contribute to the conversation on social movements in Jordan. The in-
depth exploration of the HSU has contributed to delineating part of the space 
that a more radical discourse for change occupies in social movements in 
Jordan. The dynamics and developments of the Arab Spring in Jordan have 
been subjected to academic scrutiny in recent years. Although they have 
received notably less attention than in other regional cases, there have been a 
series of important academic contributions that have told a story of what the 
Arab revolutions have meant for Jordan and its prospects for change. With the 
data collected for the project, this research aims to contribute to this 
conversation by providing the first comprehensive account that maps the 
organisation, strategies and significance of this youth-led and youth-organised 
movement in Jordan.  
Empirically this thesis aims to be an initial exploratory analysis of the 
HSU at three distinct levels of inquiry: micro, meso, and macro. The aim of 
analytically combining these three levels of inquiry has been to provide ‗greater 
clarity in the empirical case‘ (Staggenborg, 2002 p. 127). First, at a micro level, 
this thesis has focused on the analysis of individual enthusiasms and emotions. 
Throughout the different analytical chapters, the project has provided an 
analysis of individual participants in the movement, which includes their 
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demographic profile as well as the motivations and grievances that led them to 
become part of the organisation. 
The empirical contribution of this thesis at a micro level adds to the 
literature on activism in Jordan, particularly to the contribution of Pénélope 
Larzillière on Activism in Jordan (2015), which provides an exploration of 
motivations, ideologies and careers of activists under the exclusionary 
Jordanian political system, both before and after the Arab Spring. Her aim in 
this volume has been to show how opposition movements have shifted from the 
underground before 1989 to a heavily controlled public sphere. This publication 
provides insight into the importance of Jordan as a stabilising factor in the 
contemporary Middle East through the perspective of controlling activism in the 
public sphere.  
In this line, the thesis has found that, in the HSU, participants of the 
movement are demographically young, politically conscious, ideologically 
diverse, and ethnically plural. Male in their majority, participants include a 
minority of women that prioritise their economic needs instead of furthering 
gender-specific demands. We have seen how class is an important variable of 
self-identification among participants of the movement, who are working class, 
mainly from disenfranchised urban areas as well as from middle-income urban 
neighbourhoods and marginalised rural localities.  
In terms of grievances of individual participants that motivate them to 
engage in collective action, we have presented them at two levels. Grievances 
are social and related to social injustice, lack of opportunities, and a lack of 
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freedom. These social grievances are linked to socio-economic problems 
identified by individual activists, which are explained in relation to the country‘s 
dependency, privatisation, and its social effects, particularly in terms of 
inequality. The socio-economic problems are related to political issues of 
concern for activists of the movement, related to the formation of governments, 
decision-making processes, and the lack of freedom, highlighting the 
authoritarian nature of the regime.  
At a meso level of inquiry, this thesis has focused on analysing framing 
mobilising structures and activists‘ connections and networks. It has contributed 
to exploring the way in which the movement is organised, the structure that the 
movement has adopted, as well as the way in which strategies and action are 
put forward by the movement at different moments in time. Through this meso 
level of inquiry we have contributed to understanding that the HSU is formed of 
diverse constituencies —individuals, groups or unions—,, which are loosely 
organised as an informal network. This informal network is based on pre-
existing tribal, family, and friendship ties, which provided safety for young 
activists to establish their trust network and start mobilising at the beginning. As 
well as being a network-like organisation, internally the movement is non-
hierarchical, and the internal decision-making process is democratic and 
participatory. Finally, the informal organisation of the movement is reflected by 
the lack of formal membership, where participation is based on individual 
involvement. 
The empirical findings at this meso level of inquiry that looks at social 
movement organisation and strategy in Jordan adds to the conversation on 
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organisational dynamics in Jordan during the Arab revolutions, which has 
mainly focused on the role of existing political actors ‗well integrated into 
Jordan‘s political landscape‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 7) and the political opposition and 
reform coalitions they establish in this period between them (Ryan, 2011b). 
Particular attention has been dedicated to major political actors including urban 
intellectuals, tribal elements, or the Islamic Action Front (IAF), the political wing 
of the Muslim Brotherhood (Barany, 2012). Other contributions have explored 
the specific role of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan during this period of 
contention (Bondokji, 2015) particularly analysing the internal crisis in the 
organisation and the need for it to reform in a changing and challenging national 
and regional context. Finally, other organisations that have been studied in 
Jordan during this period are professional associations (Larzillière, 2012), which 
are presented as alternative contentious arenas that appeared in this period 
characterised by their ambivalent role between challenging and integrated 
positions.  
Within this insightful literature on the latest period of contention and 
activism in Jordan, in-depth exploration of specific dynamics within movements 
in Jordan in this period can be found in Sara Ababneh‘s excellent contribution to 
understanding the role of women in the Jordanian Day-Waged Labour 
Movement (2016). In the same way as the HSU, the Day-Waged Labour 
Movement (DWLM) played a central role during this period. In her article, 
Ababneh‘s contribution provides an extensive exploration of the active and 
leading role of women within this movement. Through the analysis of discourse 
and structure of this movement, her study provides important lessons about the 
way in which the movement understood women to be embedded within 
282 
 
communities, prioritising their economic needs, and about gender-inclusive 
political and institutional reform. 
 Finally, from a macro level of inquiry, the thesis has focused on political 
opportunities and culture and their effects on the collective action of the HSU. 
The research has contributed to understand the movement, first, in relation to 
the political context and the Jordanian regime through analysing the way in 
which movement strategies and regime counter-strategies converse. Through 
the analysis, we have contributed to understanding that movement strategies 
are reactive and context-specific, and vary in time. Moreover, even if we are 
talking about a movement as a whole, there is a strategic variation between 
constituencies that adopt more confrontational strategies and those that prefer 
non-confrontational ones.  Second, the macro level of inquiry contributes to 
understanding the movement in its social and cultural context, in relation to the 
Jordanian society. This macro level of analysis has especially contributed to 
identifying patterns and trends in the way in which the movement has been 
significant at a political, social and cultural level.  
At this macro level of inquiry, the empirical findings of this project 
contribute to the academic conversation on the Arab Spring and collective 
action in Jordan in several edited volumes which have included chapters 
dedicated to this case study. Among them we can note the contribution of 
Pascal Debruyne and Christopher Parker, who situate protests in Jordan at the 
beginning of 2011 as ‗responding to very real changes that had been brought 
about by more than a decade of rapid and dramatic neoliberal restructuring‘ 
(2015 p. 437). Their exploration of these events as mirroring regional efforts, 
283 
 
traces the protest dynamics back to the start of the 2000s to justifiably present 
them as the result of sustained efforts at organising efforts of many other social 
actors in preceding years. 
 Academic contributions have also aimed to advance the knowledge on 
contentious politics and protest in Jordan through different dimensions. Among 
them, Jillian Schwedler‘s research presents an insightful systematic 
examination of protests in Jordan over the years in regard to the dimensions of 
law, space, and spectacle (2012b); exploring these three variables since the 
1950s to present protest as a recurring dynamic in authoritarian Jordan. In 
another article, this author explores the political geography of protest in 
neoliberal Jordan (Schwedler, 2012a) where she presents Jordan as a case 
where new strategies of non-democratic governance are emerging, and 
explores the expanding neoliberal economic reforms to shed light on broad 
dynamics of protest and contention.  
This research builds on Schwedler‘s research by analysing the element 
of change in the structure of governance itself that the HSU builds its discourse 
around. This analysis shows that this movement is not exclusively about 
economic grievances or about different political ideologies, but that proposes a 
discourse of a shift in governance that could give people a chance to address 
these other issues. This analysis is in distinction to Schwedler‘s focus because 
it takes a bottom-up approach to the analysis by examining the organisation and 
elaboration of popularly organised youth demands in contrast to examining local 
responses to top-down ‗neoliberal‘ policies put forward by the regime and the 
security apparatus.  
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 Overall, combining the three levels of inquiry has been critical in this 
project in two different ways. First, the meso-micro link has helped to explore 
how characteristics of movement communities influence individual commitment 
and how meso structures are altered by leaders and activists. In this sense, it 
has been key to understand that the horizontal, non-hierarchical, organisational 
structure, and the democratic participatory decision-making processes in the 
movement, reflect the rejection of individual movement participants to 
hierarchical agents of socialisation, mainly formal (educational, religious, and 
political institutions) but also informal (family), and to the authoritarian nature of 
the Jordanian regime.  
The meso-macro link has allowed us to examine the ability of different 
mobilising structures to exploit, and sometimes create, political opportunities 
and large-scale changes, as well as the ways in which large-scale changes alter 
mobilising structures. In this sense, we have analysed organisational and 
strategic weaknesses or limits of the movement in light of the challenging 
context of repression and conflict, and of activists‘ lack of previous organisation 
experience related to the limited freedoms of assembly or communication that 
characterise the opportunity structure in Jordan.  
 
Reviewing the Arguments 
Moving to summarise the arguments made throughout the thesis, this part is 
organised around the four analytical chapters that explore ideology and 
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organisation of the movement, movement strategies, regime counter-strategies, 
and significance of the movement. Moreover, it reviews the theoretical 
contributions made throughout the project.   
In contextualising the study of the HSU in the Jordanian political context, 
the third chapter of this thesis, entitled ‗Contextualising the Case: Jordan‘s 
Liberal Autocracy in Containing Social Mobilisation‘, has analysed the way in 
which the relationship between the Jordanian regime and social movements 
today has been historically constructed in Jordan. In this chapter I argued that 
the Jordanian regime has faced challenges to its authority since the 1950s, and 
that its development into a liberal autocratic system of authority since 1989 
determines the way social movements organise and build their strategies, as 
well as the way in which the regime responds to challenges posed by social 
movements.  
This chapter aims to analyse the context in which the HSU appeared, 
politically ruled by a regime that has consolidated a repertoire of counter-
strategic measures for decades. Throughout the chapter I argued that the 
development of authority into a liberal autocratic system in Jordan has allowed 
the state to survive until today through the implementation of a calculated 
counter-strategy that combines liberal democratic conciliatory measures with 
repression and securitisation moves. This system of authority has effects at a 
social, economic, and political level and has historically determined expressions 
of social dissent and mobilisation in the country. Moreover, I argued that 
analysing this context is key to understand the way in which participants of the 
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HSU organised, built their ideology, and the significance of their activities for 
Jordanian society.  
 In order to elaborate this argument, the chapter provided a working 
definition of ‗liberal autocracy‘ in the theory, and characterised the case of 
Jordan as one that corresponds with this theoretical definition of authority. This 
chapter then briefly introduced the period that preceded 1989 in Jordan, 
characterised by a brief period of contention followed by the implementation of 
martial law. The second analytical period considered in this fourth chapter of the 
thesis analyses the period between the 1989 April Uprising, and the early 
2000s. This period has been presented as the beginning of the development of 
Jordan as a liberal autocracy after the lifting of martial law and by the 
realignment of state interests in society. Finally, this chapter turned to analyse 
the period since the year 2000, when social, economic, and political 
repercussions of this model became particularly evident with the rapid 
development of global capitalism and the engagement of Jordan in the Global 
War On Terror (GWOT).  
We will now summarise the arguments outlined along the four axes of 
inquiry. This thesis has contributed to understanding the organisational 
characteristics of the HSU to find that it is an alternative form of political and 
social organisation in Jordan that extends the formalised organisational forms 
and therefore has the flexibility to try to transform social and political 
subjectivities. The HSU is the only youth-led and youth-organised movement in 
Jordan which ‗includes some of the most active political organisers in the 
country‘ (2014e p. 74). This thesis has pursued four lines of inquiry around this 
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social movement in Jordan, around organisation, strategy, counter-strategy and 
significance, and has put forward the following arguments.  
In chapter four of this thesis, titled ‗Mapping Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-
ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement): Grievances, Aims, Structure and 
Ideology‘ the analysis has turned to the form that dissent takes in the HSU and 
the different constituencies and activists therein. The aim has been to explore 
the structure of the movement, its degree of institutionalisation and its internal 
organisation. Moreover, the chapter has characterised the activists that take 
part in the movement and how they construct the movement‘s ideology. This 
chapter has argued that movement participants have taken on an informal, non-
institutional, and network-like form of organisation. This form of mobilising 
structure has been rationally chosen by participants, and has allowed internal 
ideological flexibility. 
The HSU is an ideologically diverse movement that serves as an 
organisational umbrella that brings together individual young people with shared 
socio-economic and political grievances and aims. For participants, the fact that 
the movement is able to provide an organisational structure under which 
multiple ideologies find common ground to put forward their shared activism is 
one of the characteristics that give it power. Although different, there is some 
common ground as the majority of activists in the movement label their political 
ideology as leftist, socialist, communist, or nationalist, but that the ideological 
plurality allows for the participation of activists that are former Muslim 
Brotherhood (MB) members. 
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This research has also contributed to the discussion on the role that 
ethnicity plays in social organisation in Jordan. Social fragmentation and 
traditional ethnic fault lines have been at the centre of the conversation, 
presenting social dynamics and discourses as divided into ‗two halves‘ (Pelham, 
2011 p. 2). The centrality of identity politics in mobilisation (Ryan, 2011) had 
continued being central in the academic debate. The conversation has 
presented Jordan as a case in which both new and old opposition use 
identitarian divisions ‗to advance their reform priorities‘ (Yaghi and Clark, 2014 
p. 250), and where ethnic differences are ‗the most decisive‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 
23) factor. The detailed empirical exploration of the HSU outlined here 
contributes to the academic dialogue by incorporating different discourses in 
grassroots organisations in Jordan that do not mimic the top-down identitarian 
discourse. This case shows how discourses on class struggle and social justice 
are becoming more present in organisations that are able to remain 
independent from institutional actors in the country, aiming to critically recover 
the debate on class and inequality.  
As well as bringing together youth of many different ideologies under a 
shared frame, another ideological characteristic of the movement that the 
research revealed is the existence of a radical-reformist spectrum within the 
movement. In this sense, the movement‘s informal structure and its detachment 
from institutionalised political actors have allowed for the existence of these 
radical constituencies and a radical ideology. This is due to the fact that it has 
managed to break with other politically institutionalised bodies, in the form of 
parties and movements, that have tended to encourage youth to demand further 
reform instead of more radical change. The analysis of this ideological spectrum 
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has moreover shown that it is flexible and changes in relation to the opening 
and closing political opportunity structure. 
The research has argued that the way in which these two 
conceptualisations of change within the movement relate to each other is 
described by two main characteristics. We have come to understand that 
reformist activists and constituencies argue for the need to be flexible in terms 
of reconsidering a more confrontational strategy at moments of time where the 
context becomes increasingly threatening. We have tried to contribute to 
understanding the way in which individual participants with a radical approach 
to change perceive reformist activists; an approach based on convictions that 
reforms are unable to change the systemic problems and instead suggest that 
structural challenges must be addressed.  
The literature has stressed the peaceful nature of social action and the 
centrality of calls for change at the governmental level (Anderson, 2015 p. 50). 
In keeping with this view, accounts have told a story of the Jordanian Arab 
Spring where there was an absence of radical or revolutionary demands due to 
the King‘s legitimacy and social support (Ottaway and Muasher, 2011 p. 9) and 
where ‗no one publicly suggested abolishing the monarchy‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 8). 
These arguments have been supported in the literature by presenting the King 
as the ‗thread that holds a divided country together‘ (Barany, 2012 p. 10), and 
have discussed the way in which this absence of radical discourses could be 
related to a ‗fear of the alternative rather than any deep appreciation for [King] 
Abdullah himself‘ (Hamid and Freer, 2011 p. 4). Within this context of social 
movements, youth activists are presented in the academic conversation as 
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participants that ‗moderated their demands‘ (Yom and Gause, 2012 p. 80) 
without questioning the position of the monarch. The in-depth exploration of the 
HSU in this thesis has contributed to this conversation around the existence of 
radical alternative discourses in social organisations in Jordan. 
Perhaps most importantly, this research has foregrounded existing 
internal debates which have been recurrent among movement activists. These 
debates are mainly concerned with the challenges to organisation that they 
have faced. As we have seen throughout the thesis, although all activists 
interviewed and observed for this project consider that the main challenges for 
organising are posed externally by the regime, they acknowledge the existence 
of other internal challenges to organisation, including issues of funding, time 
and dedication to movement activities, the lack of organisational experience, the 
difficulty of managing emotions, dedication and commitment, and individualism. 
This chapter has presented key features of the HSU that distinguish it. It 
has retained financial and political independence in the face of competition from 
larger, traditional, political parties and increasingly intolerant authorities. Its 
primordial focus on the domestic political scene also differentiates its politics. 
Despite this fresh approach, the HSU faces traditional and novel organisational 
challenges. Its focus on national politics allows it to bring together a range of 
varying ideological views yet consensus is not sought, thus perhaps limiting the 
directionality of the movement. More basic challenges such as travel funding 
and internal hierarchies were also discussed by interviewees. A striking feature 
of discussion with activists was their apprehension of social media as tool that 
undermined organisational coherence through the promotion of individualism. 
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This chapter has set out the way in which HSU´s originality contributes to 
complementing the picture of dissent in Jordan. It also demonstrates the 
fundamental impact of the Arab Spring in shaping new forms and expectations 
particularly among an educated and transnational youth. It also denotes that 
fundamental limits of a self-organised movement that seeks to limit ties to 
traditional sources of political and social power (Mann, 2012). More broadly, this 
has important insights for traditional accounts of the Arab Spring´s dissent; 
particularly those stressing exogenous factors such as Western-imported social 
media. It challenges generic literature that assumes hierarchical roots to social 
organising by demonstrating a movement that was not formed through 
homogeneous opposition or via the sponsorship of a regime or foreign actor. In 
fact, despite the transnational and educated views of its activists, their focus is 
almost wholly domestic. 
  Turning to the collective action strategy, chapter five of this thesis entitled 
‗Strategy in Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement)‘ 
has argued that the articulation of social movement strategy in Jordan must be 
understood as a dyadic relationship with regime counter-strategies. HSU‘s 
strategy has been analysed through the development of confrontational, 
conflict-oriented, and non-confrontational, consensus-oriented strategies 
therein, as well as the events that have affected this variation. The thesis 
argues that movement strategies are reactive and context-specific, and vary in 
time. Moreover, even if we are talking about a movement as a whole, there is a 
strategic variation between constituencies that adopt more confrontational 
strategies and those that prefer non-confrontational ones. Strategic weaknesses 
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or limits of the movement have been found to be a result of the challenging 
context and of activists‘ lack of previous organisational experience.  
The analysis of social movement strategy has been carried out using 
three key concepts in Political Process Theory: political opportunity, mobilising 
structure, and framing processes. Analysing social movement strategy through 
these PPT concepts has allowed this project to present the following 
arguments. Taking into account political opportunity and the way in which it 
determines the strategies of a social movement allows an exploration of how a 
changing political opportunity structure in Jordan has resulted in a variation in 
the strategy of the HSU. Therefore, its strategies can be framed in terms of 
periods of increased and decreased confrontation.  
Taking the timeframe from January 2011 until summer 2014, the analysis 
of social movement strategies points out to the way in which distinct episodes of 
harassment, waves of imprisonment or legislative amendments have 
contributed to a shifting and increasingly threatening operating environment for 
collective action and mobilisation to develop. This research, in turn, establishes 
a correlation between this closing political opportunity structure and the shifts in 
the strategies put forward by the HSU. The analysis is key to understand not 
only the way in which increased threats deter Jordanian mobilisation, but 
moreover to see the way in which a shifting context pushes activists to 
necessarily continuously rethink and reframe their strategies in light on the 
context; with the effect of driving protestors to exhaustion, de-motivation and 
stagnation.  
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Analysing social movement strategy in light of the movement‘s mobilising 
structure has contributed to understanding that, in the HSU, mobilising structure 
has been deliberately chosen by activists of the movement and responds to a 
strategy and a shifting political and ideological position aware of the political 
context and their scope of action. In order to present social movement strategy 
in this way, the thesis has explored the way in which different episodes of 
contention initially drove activists to favour a loosely organised, network-like, 
structure, and the way in which they strategically chose an informal model of 
organisation.  
Moreover, the research has contributed to understand the way in which 
this structure has in turn affected activists‘ strategic repertoire in terms of their 
level of mobilisation, the level of external subsidies, and the alliance structures 
with other actors such as political parties, unions, religious institutions, and 
authorities. Finally, this project has argued that this mobilising structure has 
facilitated the appearance of voices in the movement that favour confrontational 
and conflict-oriented strategies. Overall, through the study of the HSU this 
research has shown that the case follows the theoretical assumption on 
informal, horizontal, network-like structures allowing for the flourishing of more 
radical strategies. 
Finally, social movement strategy has been analysed in relation to 
framing processes to contribute to an understanding of the movement‘s 
strategies at the diagnostic, prognostic and motivational phases. Through this 
analysis we have argued that, in this movement, there is clear agreement 
among activists during the diagnostic framing phase. However, when the 
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problem is identified and attributed to a particular actor, disagreement between 
the radical and reformist camps occurs at the moment of prognostic framing, or 
finding a solution to the problem and articulating it jointly. Moreover, this part of 
the analysis has shown that, with existing competition between activists in terms 
of articulating a solution to the problem, motivational framing, or the third step in 
framing processes, is further weakened. 
In the HSU, there is agreement between individual activists and 
constituencies of the movement when identifying the problems as being social 
and economic in nature, and when attributing them to the regime, which in turn 
makes the problem also political. There is agreement in the movement that 
social and economic problems are central for their action, and particularly affect 
socio-economically marginalised groups that suffer from shared grievances. 
This agreement has resulted in two different strategic framing processes.  
Frame transformation, whereby activists intend to change old 
understandings and meaning of the way in which the Jordanian society is 
structured, is done through the incorporation of a debate around class structure 
and inequality as a fundamental variable in defining society. At this diagnostic 
phase, a second strategy used is frame bridging with different groups of 
workers, where activists incorporate socio-economic grievances of workers of 
different companies into their claims, particularly grievances related to the ever-
expanding informal job sector and the deterioration of workers‘ rights.   
Arguments around social movement strategy have been developed in 
conversation with the Jordanian state‘s counter-strategies to mobilisation, the 
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third line of analytical inquiry in this project. In chapter six of this thesis, entitled 
‗The Jordanian State‘s Counter-strategies and the Challenges to Collective 
Action‘, the counter-strategies put forward by the Jordanian regime have been 
analysed, focusing on those targeting activists of the HSU. Although the 
movement has faced organisational and strategic challenges, the main 
challenge encountered by the movement has been posed by the regime. This 
makes a macro level of inquiry necessary to analyse the contextual elements 
that have affected the movement‘s development. The regime‘s response to the 
HSU has been complex, and has critically challenged the movement in terms of 
its internal organisation and its strategic articulation.  
This chapter has explored the regime‘s complex response to the 
movement‘s strategies, analysing what repression looks like in Jordan and how 
it has become the main challenge to mobilisation. I argued that the Jordanian 
regime has responded through balancing apparently conciliatory and repressive 
counter-strategies. This in turn has meant that the HSU has had to adapt to a 
shifting political opportunity landscape. This counter-strategy has challenged 
the HSU organisationally and strategically to the point that it has become a 
major challenge to its survival. The Jordanian regime‘s resilience is therefore 
the result of a planned balancing act and a carefully calculated strategic 
management of collective action that combines apparent conciliation and 
repression.  
  In order to support these arguments, the chapter introduced the overall 
power imbalance between the regime and the movement, framing their strategic 
dialectic as one of subordination of the movement to the regime. The Jordanian 
296 
 
regime‘s counter-strategy is then analysed in two parts. The exploration starts 
with what could, at first glance, look like conciliatory measures. These have 
taken the form of government reshuffles, and putting forward a roadmap to 
reform that includes constitutional amendments, and reforming the elections 
and political party laws. Moreover I explored the limits to these apparent 
conciliatory moves in meeting the movement‘s demands, as well as the effects 
of some of these moves towards weakening the movement‘s organisation and 
strategy.  
  In this line, the research carried out for this project also contributes to the 
conversation on the Jordanian regime‘s response to social movements. 
Academic focus has been put on conciliatory measures taken by the regime, 
such as constitutional amendments, government reshuffles, reform committees, 
or elections, presented as ‗a first step in the right direction‘ (Muasher, 2011). 
Academic conversation has generally been cautious in evaluating this response 
positively, describing them as ‗limited political reform‘ and ‗nonexistent‘ 
economic reform (Ottaway and Muasher, 2011 p. 12). Critical accounts have 
described the state‘s response as ‗insufficient‘ (Pelham, 2011); a set of ‗top-
down reforms‘ which are not targeting structural problems such as ‗the grossly 
unequal distribution of power between elected institutions and those that remain 
unelected‘ (Hamid and Freer, 2011 pp.3-4). 
The chapter then explored specific repressive measures put forward by 
the regime to target activists of the HSU, which define the overall closing 
political opportunity structure. Repressive regime counter-strategies to 
mobilisation has been recognised in short analyses of the crackdown on dissent 
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as an overarching dynamic in Jordan (Bishop, 2014) and reports that monitor 
the tightening grip on activism (Su, 2013). More in-depth reporting of repressive 
strategies towards activists have mainly been reported by Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) in short electronic articles that focus on freedom of expression (2011b, 
2012a, 2013a, 2013d, 2014a, 2014b); attacks on protestors (2011c, 2014c); 
imprisonment of activists (2012b, 2012c, 2012f, 2013c); torturing activists in 
prisons (2011a, 2012d, Coogle, 2013); trials in the State Security Court (2012g, 
2012e, 2013b); and under the Terrorist Law (2014d).In this part, as well as 
talking about direct repression in terms of surveillance, arrests and harassment, 
the analysis takes into account the selective application of law to activists of the 
HSU, and the legal umbrella and specific legislative amendments that have 
marked the closure of the opportunity structure and the increasingly threatening 
environment under which constituencies of the movement have been pushed to 
reassess their initial strategic approach. 
Through an in-depth evaluation of top-down regime measures, both 
repressive and conciliatory, the thesis has argued that these were harmful and 
managed to weaken the movement‘s organisation and strategic articulation, 
preventing it from creating a social support base. Conciliatory measures have 
helped to present the regime to society as a regime that is willing to reform and 
is reforming, with no further evaluation of what these reforms resulted in or how 
they would change or benefit the majority‘s living conditions. This made 
audiences reticent to believe and support the need for participants of the 
movement to continue organising. Repression has been argued to be a practice 
that extends to other actors beyond the regime, increasing its complexity as it is 
exercised in different forms and levels over time. Studying repression exercised 
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on HSU, who have become ‗a central target for anti-reformist forces in Jordan‘ 
(2014e p. 74) due to the controversial and confrontational discourses in the 
movement, has been key to explore and present these dynamics, as it is the 
most politically controversial movement of the last period in Jordan, and has 
therefore become a central target for status quo defendants.  
 The significance of the movement, the final line of inquiry, has been 
analysed at both a social and a political level in chapter seven, entitled 
‗Enduring Social, Political and Cultural Transformations: Framing Significance in 
Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī (the Jordanian Youth Movement)‘. The analysis 
of the way in which HSU participants frame social significance has covered both 
the strengths and limits to the perceived resonance of the movement‘s activities 
in the Jordanian society. The perceived strengths of the movement in terms of 
social significance are the social compliance with a different type of politics, the 
revival of political debates in society, and the mobilisation of demands that were 
central to large social clusters. The activities of the movement have been 
framed by HSU participants as significant in terms of social acceptance among 
Jordanians of different ways of doing politics in the country. Despite having lost 
part of the social support and acceptance later on, due to different elements 
mainly related to the way in which the Jordanian regime managed to shape the 
discourse to the movement‘s detriment, initially society perceived the movement 
as a necessary actor that could potentially be able to put forward their concerns 
through more confrontational, direct action.  
The HSU has also been framed as significant in reactivating the national 
social, economic, and political debates in the society. This has mainly been 
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analysed in relation to the creation of a generalised situation of nonconformity 
which now exists in society, and that in an increasingly threatening national and 
regional situation, is currently only manifested in private circles. Participants 
considered that resonance was partly achieved by the movement through 
mobilising demands that were central to large social clusters, and congruent 
with personal everyday experiences. Throughout the thesis we have argued 
that the way in which this was achieved was through the mobilisation of 
widespread grievances related to social equality or justice. 
 Weaknesses of the movement‘s activities owing to its social significance 
have been perceived as outweighing its strengths. This is due to the 
movement‘s weak strategic framing process, the limits to the movement‘s 
empirical credibility in society, and the weak credibility of frame articulators. The 
weak strategic framing process has been perceived as one of the elements that 
have affected the consistency of frames articulated by the movement, 
weakening the credibility of the movement and their capabilities for taking 
effective action in the eyes of the society. The strategic framing processes 
within the HSU is characterised by an inconsistency of frames, and a weak 
articulation between beliefs, claims, and actions in the three-step strategic 
framing process. This inconsistency of frames has been considered to have 
negatively affected the social significance and resonance of movement activities 
in the Jordanian society, particularly in an increasingly threatening scenario.  
 The weak empirical credibility of the movement has negatively affected 
and posed a limit to the movement‘s strategic framing. In this sense this thesis 
has argued that the presence of radical voices in the movement, together with 
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the regime‘s use of media in order to portray the whole movement as radical, 
have been considered as limits to building resonance in the Jordanian society. 
Together with this, the way in which participants have perceived the credibility 
of frame articulators, young activists themselves, has been analysed in relation 
to culture and to traditional understandings of social structure and hierarchies. 
This thesis has argued that, right up to the present day, youth are perceived in 
Jordanian society as weak claim-makers that ‗do not know what they do or what 
they want‘ because of this generational hierarchy in society, but also due to 
their weak experience as frame articulators, and the short-lived organisation 
they represent. 
 The way in which participants have framed the political significance of the 
HSU‘s activities is related to the alternation of the forms of political action and 
political expression tolerated by the Jordanian regime, the reintroduction of 
national politics into the political discussions in Jordan today, and the ability to 
foster a change in the culture of political activism for the future. Participants 
consider that, during particular moments in time, the movement has managed to 
alter the forms of political action and political expression tolerated by the 
regime. It was able to organise politically and put forward radical demands, and 
this necessarily in the context of other regional revolutionary efforts. The fact 
that this movement was able to alter, if only during specific periods of political 
opportunity, the limits of freedom of political expression in the country has been 
perceived to be one of its variables of political significance.  
Activists have also framed the political significance of HSU action around 
the way they consider it has managed to reintroduce national politics into the 
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political discussions in Jordan. Before 2011, political debates in Jordan rarely 
addressed national and local politics and policies, and they were focused mainly 
on Palestinian politics and Jordanian foreign politics, particularly towards Israel. 
According to participants, the HSU has pushed other actors in the Jordanian 
political scene to address national and local political issues particularly related 
to national socio-economic grievances derived from a deficient political system. 
Political significance of the movement‘s activities has been moreover framed in 
relation to the change in the culture of political activism in the country. This 
change has depended on two factors: the transformation of individual 
participants in the movement and the organisational experience and culture. 
These elements, we have argued, might define the development of future 
Jordanian political participation.  
Turning to my theoretical conclusions, several conceptual and theoretical 
arguments have been made throughout the research, contributing to social 
movement theory in general, and particularly to the theoretical framework used 
for this project, Political Process Theory (PPT). Expectations on mobilisation in 
non-democratic countries have been extended, particularly in liberal 
autocracies. Overall, the thesis has argued that PPT is a useful framework for 
the study of social movements in Jordan, and have pointed out to several 
weaknesses for its application in non-democratic countries, particularly in terms 
of the model‘s conceptualisation of repression, political opportunity, and 
success.  
The relationship between repression and mobilisation, particularly in 
terms of different types of repression and in terms of repression that varies over 
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time, has been addressed contributing to disentangle the concept of repression 
further. PPT‘s threat-opportunity analysis assumes that costs and benefits drive 
decisions of organisations (Goodwin and Jasper, 2009 pp. 12-14) and that high-
level repression might lead to the absence of mobilisation or to radicalisation. 
Studying the HSU allows us to understand other types of repression, particularly 
low-level repression in the form of surveillance, imprisonment and an arbitrary 
application of law, and its varying effects for mobilisation of the movement in 
Jordan. Repression in Jordan, which we have classified in these terms, has led 
to paralysis and almost complete absence of radical voices. The case of the 
HSU has shown that the relationship between repression and mobilisation is not 
as fixed as suggested by the PPT framework. 
This study has expanded on the effects of varying repression or a 
changing opportunity structure in time. The varying political opportunity 
structure has deeply impacted the internal organisation and strategy of the 
movement by forcing activists to continuously re-strategise, rethink, and 
reconsider their action in relation to ever- changing contexts. During periods of 
more muted repression and an opening opportunity structure, movement 
demands were radicalised, while during periods of greater repression and a 
closing opportunity structure, social movement strategies have seen a de-
radicalisation of demands. Overall, the changing repression in time has 
weakened the movement internally in terms of its capacity to make strategic 
decisions.  
The project has contributed to understanding of the concept political 
opportunity structure. The PPT framework assumes that the opportunity 
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structure is provided by the state, and focuses on opportunities at a national 
level. This research has contributed to understanding political opportunity 
structure as a more complex concept where other factors as well as the state 
come into play. In Jordan we have seen that it is necessary to include the 
regional context, and the way in which it affects the changing opportunity 
structure. This conceptual contribution by which we have proposed a new 
understanding of political opportunity structure that expands to the regional 
level, could be applied to the study of mobilisation, repression and opportunity 
structures in other countries of the region.  
Contribution has been made towards understanding the relationship 
between mobilising structure and success of social movement outcomes. PPT 
assumes that hierarchical, formal, institutionalised organisation structures will 
result in successful political outcomes (understood as institutionalisation and 
acceptance) because they can sustain interaction with authorities and 
supporters. In this respect, this thesis has contributed to understanding that the 
concept of ‗success‘ as presented by PPT theorists, has to be re-thought for 
cases in which claimants do not seek neither acceptance nor advantages from 
powerholders.1 This is the case of the HSU where activists strategically decided 
the informal, non-institutional nature of the movement, and refused to create 
coalitions with any other formal or institutionalised actors, such as political 
parties. This case, therefore, leads us to understand that conceptually, we 
cannot assume that the aim of this movement is to be accepted by the political 
                                                     
1
 a) as acceptance, when ‗the challenging group‘s existence is accepted by its antagonists‘, 
reflected in acts of consultation, negotiations, formal recognition that the challenging group 
represents a formally designated opposition group, and inclusion in the system; b) in the form of 
new advantages, when any of the objectives or demands that were being demanded by the 
opposition group were achieved 
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system or to acquire new advantages in this system: activists‘ idea of being 
successful would not come as a result of interacting with authorities.  
If this contribution to the theory has been key for understanding the 
significance of this movement in the case of Jordan, a broader and more flexible 
conceptualisation of success would be necessary for the study of other similar 
social movement organisations in the region and beyond. It is key to incorporate 
into this conceptual definition of success other social and cultural variables in 
order to provide a more accurate analysis of the significance of social 
movements. Overall this thesis has contributed to building on the assumptions 
made by the PPT framework to expand its applicability to this case and facilitate 
its application in similar studies in other regional cases. 
 
Significance for Social Movements in the MENA 
The study presented in this thesis on the HSU not only contributes to the 
academic conversation on social movements and organisation in Jordan, but 
also to the study of social movements, particularly youth movements, in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In general, it contributes to the academic 
discussion that places youth at the centre of accounts on the Arab Spring from 
a comparative perspective, highlighting the distinctive role of youth, 
characterised as self-aware and self-identified actors, in shaping and driving 
these events (Lynch, 2014 p. 9).  
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  The findings of this project moreover contribute to the examination of the 
roots of the Arab Spring and overarching dynamics in other cases, particularly 
in relation to the political situation, but more extensively to the economic 
variables (Achcar, 2013) and the systemic conditions throughout the Middle 
East (Gerges, 2015). It does so by providing an account on motivations for 
Jordanian youth in the HSU, including factors related to social justice, including 
poverty, inequality, precarity, the growth of the informal sector, and 
unemployment. Moreover, this project contributes to the academic conversation 
that compares other regional cases by presenting the new narratives and 
discourses in the HSU as part of the new stories and new narratives of 
resistance, hope and determination that include crisis of political authority, 
failure of economic development, and new genres of mobilisation and activism 
analysed particularly in Fawaz Gerges‘ volume.  
  Moreover, this project has contributed to the academic conversation that 
brings personal stories and direct accounts from Arab youth (Ahmari and 
Weddady 2012, Al-Saleh 2015). By including the direct account from 
participants in the HSU from a micro level of analysis, this thesis contributes to 
placing and representing the voice of youth in Jordan as having similar 
concerns to other youth actors during the Arab Spring. Individual accounts are 
presented therefore as part of a wider regional reality that has led to similar 
collective action efforts in other regional cases. In this sense, accounts on the 
experiences of participants in the HSU are similar to those experiences and the 
atmosphere that led other youth organisations in other cases to mobilise.  
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  As well as contributing to the academic dialogue at a micro level through 
these accounts, this project contributes to understanding the relevance of the 
dimensions of resistance and rebellion in authoritarian regimes (Anderson, 2015 
p. 50). In particular, this research has aimed to contribute to the questions 
raised by Lisa Anderson and to exploring the way in which the Jordanian regime 
has challenged the organisation of the HSU, thereby seeking to contribute to 
the understanding of the opportunity structure in Jordan, as well as to enriching 
the literature on the structures of opportunity for these youth organisations 
across the Middle East. 
  Finally, the findings of this research aim to add to the in-depth empirical 
accounts on other regional youth movements examined in the academic 
literature, such as youth movements in Egypt (Shehata, 2012), Moroccan youth 
movements (Desrues 2012), or the Sudanese grassroots youth organisation 
Grifna (Medani 2013). This research contributes to the academic conversation 
on other youth movements in the region and reinforces the idea of shared 
transnational social and collective action dynamics. This is the case according 
to several lines of argument. Most notably, transnational arguments to which 
this thesis has contributed we find the one presented by Dina Shehata related 
to youth as critical in constructing revolutionary alternative discourses in the 
region. This research has shown how HSU has been the organisation in Jordan 
in which similar rupturist discourses have emerged to those that have been 
presented in the case of Egyptian youth movements.  
  Moreover, this research contributes to the conversation on youth 
movements as being distinctive from previous generations, as argued by 
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Thierry Desrues for the Moroccan youth movement, for which discontinuities in 
relation to family, education, or cultural and political expression are highlighted. 
It is worth to note the way in which, in a similar way to the Moroccan youth 
movement, the HSU has remained independent from other institutional 
opposition organisations in the country. The strategy of both movements vis-à-
vis the state has been similar and in line to the strategy of other youth 
movements such as Girifna in Sudan (Medani2013).  
  In relation to this case, and as argued by Khalid Mustafa Medani for the 
case of Girifna, we can point to the way in which the case of the HSU can be 
situated as part of regional trends in terms of internal organisation and strategy, 
as the Moroccan youth movement also brings together youth from different 
ideological and activist backgrounds around the mobilisation of the concept of 
youth as a distinctive social category. As well as a regional trend of ideologically 
inclusive youth movements, this project has contributed to pointing to the 
existence of a shared strategy by which youth counters top-down discourses on 
ethnic divisions, such as Arabised tribes and Darfunians in Sudan, or in the 
case of Jordan, Transjordanian and Palestinian Jordanian ethnic divisions. 
Youth movements in the MENA region claim that these divisive discourses 
deter the development of collective action and try to reintroduce more pressing 
issues related to class and inequality into their discourse.    
 
Suggestions for future research 
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This study does not claim to have provided a complete and unchallengeable 
picture of the HSU. It merely aims to be an initial, though comprehensive, effort 
to contribute to the empirical and conceptual analysis of social movements in 
Jordan and in the broader MENA region. It is because of this that there are 
several issues that are worthy of study in future research. 
The organisation of other youth-led movements in the region, as well as 
the development of their discourses and strategies in face of different state 
responses is worth studying both in comparative perspective and individually. It 
would be worthy to explore the way in which the organisation and development 
of these discourses and strategies have fed from the experiences of other 
similar groups through regional and international levels transnational networks. 
Bringing into the story of organisations and social movements in the MENA 
different grassroots dynamics and discourses following a similar in-depth 
empirical approach could contribute to understanding the potential for change in 
non-institutional groups.  
Linked to the former, a second line of research that could follow concerns 
cultural transformations that similar movements have brought about in the 
region, particularly in terms of transforming the culture of activism, dissent and 
resistance in the MENA. The role of individual activists that were engaged in 
youth movements during the Arab Spring has been key to the ongoing cultural 
transformation in Jordan and in other countries of the MENA that will possibly 
determine the way in which individuals perceive and participate in social 
movements and in political life in general. Research should look into the way in 
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which activism in an increasingly threatening context has transitioned from a 
political to a cultural focus.   
The study of alternative discourses and organisations such as the one 
embraced by the HSU in the face of adversity should provide an insight into the 
conditions of emergence and repression of truly transformative discourses 
according to a particular opportunity structure. The extensive empirical evidence 
discussed here suggests a need for PPT approaches to reconsider the shifting 
possibilities for outlining and enacting political change at individual (micro), 
group (meso) and (inter)national (macro) levels. The HSU‘s appearance and 
hindrance is fundamentally tied to its nature as a loose, horizontal structure that 
framed political dissent in Jordan through social justice and mundane concerns 
alongside traditional Islamist, familial and politicised confrontation.  
By shifting public awareness to Jordanian peoples‘ elemental needs 
while capitalising on the political opportunity structure of the Arab Spring, this 
movement was able to highlight the deep difference between state and society 
in unprecedented ways. Such a candid and non-hierarchical approach to 
organising social demands was seen a threat to the regime without parallel in 
more rhetorically rooted and identifiable protest movements. The extent of quite 
successful pressure put on this youth movement evidences how a PPT 
framework and considerations of political opportunity must approach social 
movements from locally-rooted, grassroots examinations that can reduce a 
reliance on structurally-fixed actors in a particular political landscape.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Transliteration Chart 
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Appendix 2. Referencing codes for interviews and focus group 
 
 
 Interviewee Pseudonym  Language Date Time Place Code 
1 Anonymous activist  Omar English 31st July 2013 16.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI01-31.07.13 
2 Anonymous activist Khaled Arabic (dialect) 24th August 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI02-24.08.13 
3 Anonymous activist Mahmoud English 1st September 2013 21.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI03-01.09.13 
4 Anonymous activist Seraj Arabic (dialect) 4th September 2013 15.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI04-04.09.13 
5 Anonymous activist Abed Arabic (dialect) 4th September 2013 18.00hrs Jubeiha, Amman, Jordan AI05-04.09.13 
6 Anonymous activist Suleyman Arabic (dialect) 5th September 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI06-05.09.13 
7 Anonymous activist Rashid Arabic (dialect) 7th September 2013 19.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI07-07.09.13 
8 Anonymous activist Amin Arabic (dialect) 8th September 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI08-08.09.13 
9 Anonymous journalist Mohammad Arabic (classical) 9th September 2013 17.00hrs Jabal Amman, Amman, Jordan AI09-09.09.13 
10 Anonymous activist Yusef Arabic (dialect) 10th September 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI10-10.09.13 
11 Anonymous activist Isra Arabic (dialect) 10th September 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI11-10.09.13 
12 Anonymous activist Ahmad English 13th September 2013 12.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI12-13.09.13 
13 Anonymous activist Sara English 13th September 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI13-13.09.13 
14 Anonymous researcher Mustapha English 15th September 2013 16.00hrs Jabal Amman, Amman, Jordan AI14-15.09.13 
15 Anonymous activist Akram Arabic (classical) 15th September 2013 19.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI15-15.09.13 
16 Anonymous activist Basil Arabic (dialect) 20th September 2013 18.00hrs Sweifiyeh, Amman, Jordan AI16-20.09.13 
17 Anonymous activist Kareem Arabic (dialect) 22nd September 2013 18.00hrs Jabal Lweibdeh, Amman, Jordan AI17-22.09.13 
18 Anonymous activist Faris Arabic (dialect) 25th September 2013 12.00hrs Abdali, Amman, Jordan AI18-25.09.13 
19 Anonymous activist Hakim Arabic (dialect) 22nd September 2014 19.00hrs Abdali, Amman, Jordan AI19-22.09.14 
20 Anonymous activist Hassan Arabic (dialect) 29th September 2014 18.00hrs Downtown, Amman, Jordan AI20-29.09.14 
21 Anonymous researcher Aida English 9th October 2014 12.00hrs Jabal Amman, Amman, Jordan AI21-09.10.14 
22 Anonymous researcher Amal English 20th October 2014 12.00hrs Jabal Amman, Amman, Jordan AI22-20.10.14 
23 Anonymous activist  Ibrahim English 4th November 2014 13.00hrs Abdoun, Amman, Jordan AI23-04.11.14 
24 Focus Group  - Arabic (dialect) 3rd February 2013 17.00hrs Downtown, Amman, Jordan FG01-03.02.13 
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i
 This thesis uses the English Transliteration System for terms in Arabic (see Appendix 1).  
ii
 These spaces include Al-Husseini mosque in Downtown, the parliament, the prime ministry, 
the Israeli embassy, the US embassy, or the road to the King Hussein Bridge connecting Jordan 
and Israel. 
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iii
6th of April Youth Movement - لٌربإ 6 بابش ةكرح (ḥarakatshabāb 6 ʿibrīl). Facebook page 
available at: https://www.facebook.com/shabab6april?fref=ts 
iv
Mouvement 20 février –  ةكرح31 رٌاربف  (ḥarakat 20 fibrāīr). Facebook page available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/groups/AdminGroupMoov20Feb/ 
v
راذآ 32 بابش (Shabāb 24 ʿAdhār).Facebook page available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/shbab.march.24?ref=ts&fref=ts 
vi
Anonymous interviewee. In chapter 2 of this thesis I have included details of the codes with 
which I reference each of the personal interviews and focus group carried out for this research 
project. 
vii
As part of the Jordanian regime‘s strategy to divide and rule over the Jordanian Youth 
Movement which will be analysed in detail in chapter six of this thesis, activists of the movement 
assert that political parties created what they call ‗child‘ movements. An example of this is the 
alleged ‗child‘ of the MB, Al-Ḥirāk Ash-Shabāb Al-ʿIslāmī(Islamist Youth Movement). 
viii
 a) as acceptance, when ‗the challenging group‘s existence is accepted by its antagonists‘, 
reflected in acts of consultation, negotiations, formal recognition that the challenging group 
represents a formally designated opposition group, and inclusion in the system; b) in the form of 
new advantages, when any of the objectives or demands that were being demanded by the 
opposition group were achieved 
ix
 Some radical constituencies do not see any possibility of change with the current regime, 
therefore a result that would meet these groups‘ demands might imply elite substitution or 
regime change. These activists would actually consider interacting with authorities as a negative 
result of their activism that would be interpreted as a success of the regime‘s counter-strategies 
of co-optation. 
x
 Also called the ‗political process model‘ (ALMEIDA, P. D. 2003. Opportunity Organizations and 
Threat-Induced Contention: Protest Waves in Authoritarian Settings. American Journal of 
Sociology, 109, 345-400. 
xi
 I will not be using the concept of ‗effectiveness‘ as used by PPT, nevertheless, the concept of 
‗resonance‘ is useful for examining the social and political significance of the Jordanian Youth 
Movement.  
xii
 Political parties were banned for over thirty years, until martial law was lifted in 1989 and the 
new Political Parties‘ Law was passed in 1992.  
xiii
 She refers to studies by UrielDann, Clinton Bailey, Benjamin Schwadran, Amnon Cohen or 
Kaman Salibi. 
xiv
 In Jordan, the Parliament is formed by the Lower House and the Senate.  
xv
 Before these amendments, according to the 1952 Constitution, the Senate had to resign. The 
time in office for the members of the Senate was of 8 years. Every 4 years, half of the members 
of the Senate changed. With the 1958 amendments, the time in office for members of the 
Senate was reduced to 4 years and after this time all the members changed.  
xvi
 Before the 1958 Constitutional amendments, in the case of the dissolution of the Lower 
House, the government was forced to resign within a timeframe of two weeks. After the 
resignation of government, a transitional government would be assigned until the next elections 
were held. None of the ministers participating in the transitional government were able to run for 
the next elections.  
xvii
 Before the 1958 amendments, according to the 1952 Constitution, any member of the 
Parliament (Lower House or Senate) could suggest the creation of a la won his own. Only one 
signature was needed to consider a draft law to be passed.  
xviii
 Other amendments related to the Parliament included clauses related to the king‘s power to 
extend the term of the Lower House, changing the duration of parliamentary sessions, or 
changing the representation of members from the Lower House and the Senate during joint 
sessions.  
xix
 The main trend of Arab nationalists, of which Nasser was major representative, claimed that 
the authority of the Arab state´s authority derived from the larger Arab nation that trascended 
the state borders drawn with the Sykes-Picot agreements; defended closer economic, cultural, 
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and security ties among Arab states; rejected territorial and political segmentation; and 
demanded the elimination of borders and divisions. Major opposition groups to the Hashemite 
rule inside Jordan were close to this Arab nationalist ideology headed by Abdel Nasser.   
xx
Naksain Arabic means ‗setback‘. Together with the Nakba, the Naksais considered one of the 
major Arab defeats in the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
xxi
 These requirements, addressed by Jabber, were the following: areas under the total control 
of the resistance; near enemy territory to easy military operations; in areas populated by large 
numbers of Palestinians; and in locations at a safe distance from the cease-fire lines.  
xxii
 After the Black September civil war, Jordanians of Palestinian origin, mainly living in urban 
areas such as Amman or Zarqa, had seen a decrease in their jobs for the state and had mainly 
worked in the private sector. East-Bank Jordanians had been favoured by the state in a move to 
further consolidate its support base by the regime and had worked in state jobs and for the 
Army.  
xxiii
 See for example BRYNEN, R. 1992. Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in 
the Arab World: The Case of Jordan. Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne 
De Science Politique, 25, 69-97, MILTON-EDWARDS, B. J. P. 1993. Facade Democracy and 
Jordan. British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 20, 191-203, SADIKI, L. 2000. Popular 
Uprisings and Arab Democratization. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32, 71-95, 
CAROTHERS, T. 2002. The End of the Transition Paradigm. Journal of Democracy, 13, 5-21, 
OTTAWAY, M. & CAROTHERS, T. 2004. Think Again: Middle East Democracy. Foreign Policy, 
RYAN, C. R. & SCHWEDLER, J. 2004. Return to democratization or new hybrid regime?: The 
2003 elections in Jordan. Middle East Policy, 11, 138-151, YOM, S. L. 2005. Civil Society and 
Democratization in the Arab World. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 9, 14-33, 
ANDERSON, L. 2006. Searching where the light shines: Studying democratization in the Middle 
East. Annual Review of Political Science, HINNEBUSCH, R. 2006. Authoritarian persistence, 
democratization theory and the Middle East: An overview and critique. Democratization, 13, 
373-395, CAROTHERS, T. 2007. The "Sequencing" Fallacy. Journal of Democracy, 18, HAMID, 
S. 2009. Jordan. The Myth of the Democratizing Monarchy. In: BROWN, N. J. & SHAHIN, E. E.-
D. (eds.) The Struggle over Democracy in the Middle East: regional politics and external 
policies. UCLA Center for Middle East Development, BROWNLEE, J. 2011. Executive Elections 
in the Arab World: When and How Do They Matter? Comparative Political Studies, 44, 807-828, 
GILBERT, L. & MOHSENI, P. 2011. Beyond Authoritarianism: The Conceptualization of Hybrid 
Regimes. Studies in Comparative International Development, 46, 270-297. 
xxiv
 People living in West Amman hardly visit East Amman, except few cases of people who 
work or volunteer there, particularly in the NGOs based in the poorer areas of the city. 
xxv
 When we talk about the ―old guard‖ in Jordan we refer to the people who ruled, the ruling 
elite, during King Hussein‘s reign, and lost their power when the new king and his new men 
came into power. Those people are very influential in the mukhabarat(security services) and in 
the Army, especially in the groups of old veterans and among in the retired veterans. 
xxvi
 The main constituents of the alternative opposition are: Jordanian Social Left Movement, 
Jordanian National Initiative, National Progressive Current, National Committee of Military 
Veterans, Jordanian Writers Association, Nationalists‘ Progressive Current, Philosophy Society, 
Socialist Thought Forum, Assembly of Circassian Youth, Association Against Zionism and 
Racism 
xxvii
 January 16
th
, February 2
nd
, 9
th
, 18
th
, 22
nd
, and 25
th
. 
xxviii
 March 13
th
, 2011: the announcement against the MB‘s move was signed by 15 groups, 
overlapping leftist parties, thabhtouna, and the trajectory rashad, a platform for democratic 
Jordanian youth, and other student bodies well versed in the left by definition and practice. 
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xxix
 The Jordanian Communist Party, Arab Ba‘ath Socialist Party, Arab Ba‘ath Progressive Party, 
The Jordanian Popular Unity Party, The Jordanian People‘s Democratic Party. 
xxx
 Before presenting the movement‘s structure and participants, and in terms of analysing the 
nature of my subject of inquiry, I want to point out to the problematic use of the work ḥirāk in 
Arabic in the Jordanian context. The Jordanian Youth Movement is called in Arabic Al-Ḥirāk Al-
Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī. Initially, there seems to be nothing to note about the translation into English 
of Shabābī (youth) and ʾUrdunī (Jordanian). However it is important to talk about the word Ḥirāk 
in terms of its translation into English due to its ambiguous meaning in Arabic. The translation of 
the word ḥirāk has been debated when talking about the movement in the Jordanian context. 
‗Movement‘ in Arabic is ḥaraka, so the word ḥirāk stems from the same linguistic root (ḥ/r/k) as 
‗movement‘, but takes a different form which is ambiguous in Arabic but has been said to mean 
something like ‗mobilisation‘ or ‗the act of moving‘ instead of a more organised movement, as 
the work ḥaraka would suggest. However, the term ḥirāk has been consistently translated as 
‗movement‘, and this translation is commonly accepted in Jordan and in the literature. This is 
why I will be translating ḥirāk as ‗movement‘ in this analysis. 
xxxi
 Among those created before 2011, the Islamist movement, the Salafi movement, the 
Teacher‘s union, Naqabyūn min ajal al-ʾislāḥ (Syndicates‘ Members for Reform), Al-hamlat al-
waṭaniya min ajal al-khubzwa al-dimūqratiyya (The National Campaign for Bread and 
Democracy), Muqati‟oun min ajal al-taghyīr (Boycotting for Change), Jayyīn (Coming Forward). 
Since 2011, Mubadarat al-malakiya al-dusturiyya (The Initiative for Constitutional Monarchy), 
24
th
 March Movement, Al-tajmouʾ al-shaʾbīli-l-ʾislāḥ (The Popular Gathering for Reform), Al-
ḥirāk al-shaʾbi al-ʾurdunī (The Jordanian Popular Movement), Ḥarkat abnaʾ al-aʾshāʾir li-l-ʾislāḥ 
(The movement of the sons of tribes for Reform), Ieʾtilaf al-aʾshāʾir al-ʾurduniyya (The Coalition 
of the Jordanian Tribes), Ie‟tilaf al-taghyīr al-ṭulābī (The Students‘ Change Coalition), al-lajna al-
waṭaniyyali-isqāṭ majlis al-nuwāb al-ʾurdunī (the National Committee to overthrow the Jordanian 
House of Representatives), hayaʾt al-difaʾ ʾan muʾataqlī al-ṭafīlawa al-rabīʾa (the Committee for 
Defending the Prisoners of Al-Tafieleh and the 4
th
 Roundabout), and al-ḥirak al-shabābī wa al-
shʾabī (the Youth and Popular Movement) 
xxxii
Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī Al-ʾUrdunī – Al-Ṣafḥa Al-Jadīda (The Jordanian Youth Movement, new 
page). Facebook page. Available at: https://www.facebook.com/7erak 
xxxiii
Al-Ḥirāk Al-Shabābī (Jordanian Youth) https://twitter.com/jo7erak 
xxxiv
Some examples of this are the page of the youth group in Kerak 
[https://www.facebook.com/groups/7erak.al.krarak/], in Balqa‘ 
[https://www.facebook.com/groups/140864002654276/], in Madaba 
[https://www.facebook.com/groups/229607420412798/], other group in Ajloun 
[https://www.facebook.com/7erak.ajlun]. 
xxxv
 Some of the most notable constituencies in the movement in terms of size and activity have 
been Aḥrārʾ Ammān Li-l-Taghīr, Aḥrār Irbid, Aḥrār Madaba, Aḥrār Kerak, Aḥrār Zarqa, Ḥirāk 
Hayy Tafaileh, Aḥrār Hayy Ḍibān, Ḥirāk al-Shabāb fi Maʾan, Ḥirāk Al-Jerash, Iʾtihād Al-Shabāb 
Al-Dimuqrātī (Union of Democratic Youth) and Tandīm Al-Taghīr wa Al-Tahrīr. 
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xxxvi
 In Arabic: ‗تٌبو ةراحو ًحو عراش لك‗ (transcription: “kul shāriʿ wa ḥayy wa ḥāra wa bayt”). This is 
their ‗location‘ as stated in their Facebook page [available at: 
https://www.facebook.com/7erak/?fref=ts]. 
xxxvii
Taking a service (shared taxi) inside Amman costs 0.35JOD (around 0.37 GBP) and a bus 
ticket costs 0.50 JOD (around 0.53 GBP).  
xxxviii
 Mosque located in Downtown Amman, where numerous protests were organised. 
xxxix
 It is necessary to clarify at this point that only part of the youth activists that started protests 
in 2011, were the ones that created, led, and organised the Jordanian Youth Movement in 2012. 
This movement does not include youth that was absorbed into the ‗child‘ youth movements of 
other institutionalised opposition groups during 2011, as in the case of youth activists that joined 
the aforementioned Al-Ḥirāk Ash-Shabāb Al-Islāmī (Movement of Islamist Youth) affiliated to the 
Muslim Brotherhood. The creation of these ‗child‘ movements organisationally and strategically 
linked to political parties will be analysed in chapter seven of this thesis as part of the regime‘s 
counter-strategy. 
xl
ًندرلأا ًبابشلا ناملربلا  (al-barlamān al-shabābī al-ʾurdunī) The Jordanian Youth Parliament. 
Available on Facebook [https://www.facebook.com/YouthParliament.jo] and Twitter 
[https://twitter.com/YouthJo] 
xli
 In this sense, this initiative also served as a way to reclaim the space for the voice of youth in 
politics. According to Jordanian Legislation, no one aged less than 30 years old is able to go in 
a list for parliament. 
xlii
 These leftist groups were closer to the traditional left in the country, and include Jayeen, the 
Movement of the Social Left, and figures associated with the Union of Jordanian Writers. 
xliii
 See for example SINGH, R. 2001. Liberalisation or democratisation? The limits of political 
reform and civil society in Jordan, ibid., WIKTOROWICZ, Q. Ibid.Embedded Authoritarianism: 
Bureaucratic Power and the Limits to Non-Governmental Organisations in Jordan, 
WIKTOROWICZ, Q. 1999. The limits of democracy in the Middle East: The case of Jordan. 
Middle East Journal, 53, 606-620, ADAMS, L. S. 1996. Political liberalization in Jordan: An 
analysis of the state's relationship with the Muslim brotherhood. Journal of Church and State, 
38, 507-528, BRAND, L. A. 1999. The Effects of the Peace Process on Political Liberalization in 
Jordan. Journal of Palestine Studies, 28, 52-67, FREIJ, H. Y. & ROBINSON, L. C. 1996. 
Liberalization, the Islamists, and the Stability of the Arab State: Jordan as a Case-Study. Muslim 
World, 86, 1-32, HOURANI, H. & ABU RUMMAN, H. 1996. The democratic process in Jordan... 
Where to? Democratic Process in Jordan - Realities and Prospects. Amman: Al-Urdun Al-Jadid 
Research Center 
Sindbad Publishing House, KAMRAVA, M. 1998a. Frozen political liberalization in Jordan: The 
consequences for democracy. Democratization, 5, 138-157, LUCAS, R. E. 2004. Monarchical 
Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type. 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 36, 103-119, MUFTI, M. 1999. Elite bargains and 
the onset of political liberalization in Jordan. Comparative Political Studies, 32, 100-129, 
WIKTOROWICZ, Q. 2000a. Civil Society as Social Control: State Power in Jordan. Comparative 
Politics, 33, 43-+. 
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xliv
 Other organisations that have been excluded from this national consensus have been mainly 
radical organisations such as the Jordanian Salafis.  
xlv
 Online petition launched available at [www.7erakjo.org].  
xlvi
 In Jordan until today half of the parliament, the government, and the Prime Minister are still 
appointed directly by the King.  
xlvii
 About 10 local strikes in Amman, Ma‘an, Al-Mafraq, Al-Karak, and coordinated cross-
governorate strikes, occurred around February in objection to the Landlords and Tenants Law, 
which brought into demonstrations new social groups of merchants who considered the new law 
an attack on their livelihoods as tenants as they were expected to adhere to renewed rent 
contracts which took into account the inflation waves since the 1980s. 
xlviii
 It is understood that the MB had significant influence among the teachers‘ cadres during 
their lobbying for the law with government, and managed to produce a law deemed favourable 
to their organization method, allowing them a swift success in the upcoming first elections of the 
union. This mobilization seemed a mark of the MB taking a step towards the new mobilization 
dynamic around public sector restructure, distancing itself from the government that other 
groups considered friendly to the MB. 
xlix
 To name some of the recorded ones as they appeared on the media: municipalities; doctors; 
university professors; agriculture and day-waged labourers; department of statistics; water 
department of Madaba; public sector nurses; the authority of Petra; ministry of education 
directorate in al-Tafieleh and Ajloun; artists syndicate; unionists for accountants; directorates of 
income and sales tax; directorate of land registration; retirees on social security; and retirees of 
the phosphate company. Moreover, a growing labour movement was establishing its new 
independent unions that the state still does not recognize despite getting into negotiations 
whenever they managed to organize successful strikes. 
l
GID, General Intelligence Department. Also known as the mukhabarat. It is one of the five main 
agencies engaged with policing protests. As well as the GID, protests and social mobilization 
are controlled by the Royal Guard, the Riot Police (darak), the General Security (amn al-ʿām), 
and the Army. SCHWEDLER, J. 2012a. The Political Geography of Protest in Neoliberal 
Jordan. Middle East Critique, 21, 259-270. 
li
 I will not be using the concept of ‗effectiveness‘ as used by PPT, nevertheless, the concept of 
‗resonance‘ is useful for examining the social and political significance of the Jordanian Youth 
Movement.  
